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ABSTRACT 
 
South Africa‟s high telecommunication costs are attributed partly to high 
interconnection rates. High costs negatively impact developmental objectives. 
This paper analyses the processes engaged in by ICASA in regulating 
interconnection rates, using a qualitative case study methodology. Enabling 
legislation, regulatory administration and rules and the bringing to bear of 
regulatory rules on institutions are stages of regulatory processes that are 
examined. Perspectives are taken from processes executed by TRAI, India‟s 
regulatory authority. South Africa followed a market review process which 
contrasts with India‟s cost-based process. South Africa‟s process although 
arduous did not achieve the desired result of establishing cost based rates. 
The root cause is attributed to a combination of factors that include an 
onerous market review process prescribed by the ECA, institutional problems 
at ICASA and a politically driven process that ran alongside and engulfed the 
process managed by ICASA.  India‟s process meanwhile has yielded some of 
the cheapest telecoms retail rates in the world. Gaps exist between processes 
in the two countries and lessons learnt provide an improved understanding of 
South African shortcomings. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
“In a global economy where the most valuable skill you can sell is your 
knowledge...” (Obama, 2009).  
 
1.1 Affordable telecommunications access is a developmental issue 
 
This research report focuses broadly on telecommunications pricing but more 
specifically on processes engaged in by the South African telecommunications 
regulatory authority in regulating interconnection or call termination rates. The report 
explores processes for regulating call termination rates in South Africa and gives 
perspectives of similar processes in India. Telecoms access and affordability is 
influenced by policy and regulatory processes and decision making. Cardilli and 
Spiller confirm that “policy decisions concerning telecommunications deregulation do 
affect competitive outcomes” (Cardilli and Spiller, 1997, p.137).  
 
Accordingly, the impact of policy and regulatory processes and decisions are 
experienced in the way information and communications technologies (ICTs) are 
utilized for socio-economic development. We live in a global economy that is 
characterised by information flows and that is organised through a “network of 
linkages by economic agents, leading to a networked, deeply interdependent 
economy” (Castells, 1996, p. 66-67). In a similar vein, the metaphor of a flattened 
world is used to describe how knowledge pools and resources have linked up 
throughout the globalized world in the 21st century; where Indian call centres can 
service clients in the United States and Chinese workers can collaborate with 
workers in other countries as if they were in offices next door. Telecoms policy 
changes increased competition and enabled telecommunications companies to 
spend $1 trillion in wiring the world (Friedman, 2005). The laying of the global optical 
fibre highways flattened the world and allowed the “breakdown of global regionalism 
thus creating a more seamless global commercial network” (Friedman, 2005, p. 67-
69). 
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ICTs can be used in developing countries for sustainable development in the area of 
public administration by making information available to firms and households. 
Mansell points out how kiosks can serve as electronic delivery points for access to 
government benefits such as pensions and grants (Mansell, 1998, p. 82). Information 
can also be made accessible to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) for 
administrative procedures for export and import, for tax filings, value added tax 
claims (VAT) and for other business opportunities (Mansell, 1998, p. 82). ICTs are 
used by local government authorities for urban and rural development programs by 
making available databases, drawing facilities, simulation and modelling tools for 
decision making for planning, management and development processes. Mansell 
adds that in the transport sector, “advanced transport telematics (ATT) is used for 
improved road safety, increasing transport efficiencies, solving environmental 
problems related to congestion, pollution and resource consumption” (Mansell, 1998, 
p. 88).  
 
In health care, scarce resources are used more efficiently by using ICT systems to 
exchange important patient data between health care professionals. Tele-medicine 
can provide support to people in remote locations, during emergencies or in their 
homes. Tele-radiology is used to store, retrieve and transmit medical images, thus 
enabling distant specialists to make remote diagnostics which is extremely important 
for developing economies. Furthermore, ICT applications used by the disabled and 
elderly can “increase opportunities for independent living” (Mansell, 1998, p. 88). For 
example, innovative applications can assist with “interpersonal communication, 
mobility, computerised braille and acoustical displays” (Mansell, 1998, p. 89). Other 
examples cited include “smart homes, multimedia medical files, graphical user 
interfaces, computerised drug prescription systems, smart prostheses, networks of 
organ donor banks, more accessible telecommunications terminals, biological 
signals, personal communicators, tele-diagnosis systems, alarm systems, remote 
expert consultation, and intensive care networks” (Mansell, 1998, p. 90). 
 
Mansell expands that in the environmental field, the use of ICTs has improved 
accessibility to information for households, firms, and local and national governments 
(Mansell, 1998). Information flow for general environmental issues and emergencies 
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is critical for the efficient management of the environment. ICT applications help 
collate environmental information in a form that can be used for particular users and 
can be made available through mobile services (Mansell, 1998, p.94). Applications 
such as geographical information systems (GIS), air and water quality monitoring 
systems, multi-media public information kiosks, emergency warning and 
management systems for floods, forest fires and industrial risks, amongst others, are 
ICT applications increasingly used in the environmental field (Mansell, 1998, p. 94). 
 
Sustainable growth for developing countries relies also on the efficient use of 
resources for food production. Farmers require information on planting date 
selection, efficient use of water resources, pest and disease monitoring, and harvest 
management (Mansell, 1998, p. 94). The use of this information is facilitated by 
expert ICT systems. Agriculturists also need access to road infrastructure 
information and markets. At the land resources planning and administration levels, 
information is required about markets, land usage, over production and under 
production, food movements, import and export pricing, and tariffs and quotas. The 
use of Land Management Systems (LMS) that have databases that are spatially 
referenced are being increasingly used for this type of information and this is 
disseminated to agriculturists, industry and local and national governments through 
ICT systems (Mansell, 1998, p. 94). Sheep farmers in the remote Welsh countryside 
find advice and guidance for various farming related activities using home 
asymmetric digital subscriber lines (ADSL) connecting to the internet. Farmers can 
diagnose and treat certain sheep ailments without the immediate need for veterinary 
doctors especially when weather does not permit. Other assistance could be found 
during lambing season (P. Smolas, personal communication, 26th December 2010). 
 
Despite all of these benefits, education and training is one of the key beneficiaries of 
the advancement in ICTs. Mansell describes the use of ICTs for educational 
purposes as a “paradigm shift due to a change in approach to education” (Mansell, 
1998, p.94). In the past, the focus was on teaching and this has shifted to a focus on 
learning. It also recognised that people learn throughout their lives (Mansell, 1998, 
p.94).This emphasis on the learner means that a “tailored learner plan can be 
developed for individual learners” (Mansell, 1998, p. 94). The use of artificial 
intelligence, multi-media applications, smart-boards, high speed  and WiFi networks, 
4 
 
video conferencing, computer conferencing, new programming languages such as 
Java, digital satellite radio, digital satellite and terrestrial television are all contributing 
to making this “paradigm shift in delivering education and training to people in urban 
and rural areas” (Mansell, 1998, p. 94). 
 
ICT systems provide new tools for the dissemination of information that can be used 
to develop new products. Knowledge is the new factor of production in the 21st 
century and knowledge workers in developing countries can collaborate with 
researchers in the industrialised world to develop new marketable products through 
the use of work-flow software, e-mail, video conferencing, Skype, YouTube and 
internet browsing.  
 
In developing countries however the technical networks supporting research 
activities have been developed piecemeal, resulting in a patchwork of 
technically diverse networks. A major challenge will be to create a regional 
research environment based on higher capacity networks which interconnect 
national networks and support state-of-the-art software based applications. 
(Mansell, 1998, p. 91). 
 
Social networks using applications such as Facebook, MySpace, Flickr, Twitter, Mixit 
and forms of blogging have changed the way that people communicate with each 
other and share information. Websites such as Wikileaks expose secret and 
confidential communications between high ranking government officials impacting on 
the fine balance of global détente on one hand and providing the public with rare 
insights into global politics on the other. Equally, communication through Facebook 
and Twitter in early 2011 is purported to having assisted protesters in organising 
themselves, leading to the toppling of so called dictatorships in the Arab world.  
 
ICTs have a major impact on the business sector for planning, production and 
monitoring of business processes. In manufacturing, production processes are 
controlled by ICT systems. Entire supply chains are run across geographical 
boundaries by ICT applications. This allows countries that have comparative 
advantage in certain economic sectors to specialise. The „just-in-time‟ based supply 
chain operations have become the norm in the 21st century business models of 
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production and supply. Systems are used for automation, planning and control and 
general business management.  
 
Businesses across the world are implementing electronic commerce systems. 
“Electronic commerce is widely recognised as an essential pre-requisite for 
knowledge societies of the future” (Mansell, 1998, p. 94). Mansell (1998) suggests 
that developing countries that do not embrace this new electronic form of conducting 
business will lag behind similar countries that do (Mansell, 1998, p. 97). Internet 
banking and mobile banking applications have profoundly changed the way the 
people engage with banking institutions by allowing clients to conclude virtually all 
banking transactions without seeing the inside of a banking hall.  
 
The tourism sector too can benefit from the advancement in ICT systems as well. 
“Frequent flyer programs, flexible holidays, electronic ticketing, video brochures, web 
sites for holiday destinations and travel agencies are some of the inroads made in 
the tourism industry” (Mansell, 1998, p. 94) Furthermore, since ICTs cuts out 
intermediaries, bookings can be made directly with service providers online. 
Computerised Reservation Systems (CRS) have reduced cost to an airline of making 
a reservation from $7.5 to just $0.5 (Mansell, 1998, p. 95). 
 
1.2 Chapter layout and outline 
 
Chapter 1 sets the policy and regulatory imperative for interconnection rate 
regulation. It explains why and how telecom is important for development and puts 
into perspective the interconnection issues in South Africa. Chapter 2 discusses the 
literature on regulatory processes for interconnection regulation and builds the 
conceptual framework for later analysis of the data that is gathered. The research 
methodology and methods are set out in chapter 3.   
 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 show the themes that have emerged from the data 
gathered in South Africa and India respectively. This is followed by Chapter 6 where 
analysis of the data is carried out. The research report concludes in Chapter 7 with 
lessons learnt and recommendations. 
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1.3 South African telecommunications policy gives prominence to 
developmental imperatives 
 
In 1996, the Minister for Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting, Mr Pallo 
Jordan presented a White Paper on Telecommunications Policy that set the tone for 
the reform of the telecoms sector in South Africa. The vision that was articulated 
coupled affordable telecoms access to the achievement of government‟s socio-
economic goals. The concept of universal access for all citizens is a central theme of 
the White Paper but it also does not separate universal access from the provision of 
advanced technologies and services that will meet the requirements of modern era. 
To reconcile these seemingly contradictory objectives, the Paper suggests that this 
must be accomplished within an integrated framework, which allows for a “dynamic 
definition of universal service and facilitates the co-ordination of all available 
infrastructure behind this goal” (Republic of South Africa, 1996a). The White Paper 
further recognises other important roles that telecoms access will play for example in 
the advancement of critical sectors of health and education. Furthermore, the White 
Paper emphasises that telecoms access facilitates participation by citizens in 
democratic processes at all levels of government including community, local and at 
national levels. The White Paper affirms that telecoms is the “essential backbone for 
development and offers the only opportunity for leapfrogging its relatively slow 
sequential processes” (Republic of South Africa, 1996a). 
 
Other policy directions given by the White Paper and pertinent to this research report 
include the establishment of an independent telecommunications regulatory authority 
whose “independence is necessary in order to ensure its impartiality” (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996a). The White Paper pays particular attention to the independence 
that is required of a regulatory body for the telecoms sector. Independence is further 
clarified in the White Paper to mean absence of undue influence by operators, 
government and other interested parties. The objectives of such a regulatory body 
would be to protect the interest of the public by ensuring that there is competition in 
the sector and to ensure that there is investment in the public telecoms networks.  
The functions of the regulatory body will be within the framework of the government‟s 
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competition policy though but will be specific in promoting competition in the 
telecoms sector. 
 
The White Paper emphasises that affordable access to telecoms is important in 
supporting the implementation of government policy and the manner in which costs 
and quality of service is regulated therefore is fundamental to the successful 
implementation of government policy (Republic of South Africa , 1996a). This task of 
regulating competition in the telecoms sector and the regulation of costs and quality 
of service is given to the independent telecoms regulatory authority. However the 
vision articulated in the White Paper is that although the desire in the long run is for 
tariff regulation to fall away as competition is entrenched in the sector there will be 
an on-going requirement to regulate tariffs to prevent collusion and predatory pricing 
(Republic of South Africa, 1996a). Cross-subsidies between different services 
offerings are also not supported by the goals articulated in the White Paper but may 
be permitted for the attainment of specified social goals (Republic of South Africa , 
1996a). 
 
Other policy settings relevant to this research report is the direction given in 
particular to the development of human resources and skills in the 
telecommunications sector. The White Paper recognises that there has to be 
adequate skills development across the sector to ensure that the sector is 
sustainable in the long term. It makes provision for a fund drawn from licence fees 
paid by operators for skills development for artisans and technicians and for 
undergraduate and postgraduate studies in the field (Republic of South Africa, 
1996a). 
 
The requirement for participation by South Africa in the regional and international 
telecommunications structures is also set out in the White Paper. On the 
international level South Africa will participate in relevant telecoms organisations 
such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) amongst others. Regional 
co-operation with for example the African Union and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) for integration of economies for sustainable 
development is supported. 
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In particular the White Paper recognises the importance of interconnection and how 
interconnection agreements will become more important as the sector becomes 
more liberalised and participation by more providers increases. Thus it sets a role for 
the Regulator to oversee interconnection agreements between the various players.  
1.4 High telecommunications costs impact on developmental goals 
 
South African telecom prices are amongst the highest in the world, as can be seen in 
Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: South African telecommunications costs in comparison with that of 
other countries 
 
 
 
SOURCE:  Kohler, 2008, p. 18 
 
Table 1 shows that South African telecoms costs are third most expensive from 
fourteen countries surveyed for local, national and mobile call costs. For the same 
fourteen (14) countries SA is rated sixth most expensive for international calls 
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making achievement of developmental goals as articulated in the White Paper more 
difficult to attain. 
 
Research has shown that access to information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) contribute to economic and social well-being (Chabossou, Stork, Stork, 
Zahonogo, 2008, p. 17). Chabossou et al (2008) also affirm that costs of telecoms in 
Africa are the main reason behind low levels of access (Chabossou et al, 2008, p. 
20). Chabossou maintains that ICT penetration in developing countries has an 
impact on health and education amongst others (Chabossou et al, 2008, p. 20). The 
study expresses that inhabitants of developing countries need easier and cheaper 
access to ICTs (Chabossou et al, 2008, p. 20). 
 
1.4.1 High telecoms costs are attributed in part to high interconnection rates 
High telecommunications costs are attributed, in part to high interconnection rates, 
the rates that telecoms operators charge for terminating calls on their networks. 
When the then Minister of Communications, Siphiwe Nyanda instructed the 
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) to issue regulations 
to reduce interconnection rates by November 2009, he requested that a previous 
study be taken into account that had shown that SA‟s average interconnection rates 
in 2007 for mobile calls was 17.06 US cents compared to India‟s 1.97, Malaysia‟s 
4.56 and Korea‟s 5.02 US cents. He made plain that high interconnection costs “had 
contributed to SA‟s excessively high telecommunications costs” (Ensor, 2009, p. 1).  
Further studies by Growitsch et al (2010) have also shown that lower interconnection 
prices lead to lower retail rates (Growitsch, Marcus, Wernick, 2010, p.110). 
Table 2 : South Africa’s interconnection rate compared to other developing 
countries 
Country Interconnection Rate (US cents, 2007) 
India 1.97 
Malaysia 4.56 
Korea 5.02 
South Africa 17.06 
 
SOURCE: Ensor, 2009, p. 1.  
Table 2 shows that South African consumers are faced with the highest 
interconnection charges when compared to a group of similar countries 
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Figure 1:  Interconnection revenue for a typical South African mobile 
telecommunications company 
 
 
Source: van Eeden, 2009, p. 4 
 
Figure 1 shows that interconnection revenue makes up an important component of 
up to 20% of the revenue for a typical mobile telecommunications company. 
 
The following excerpt from the Electronic Communications Network (ECN) 
Telecommunications (2009) website shows the magnitude of the revenue earned by 
the incumbent mobile operators from interconnection charges. 
 
For the financial year ending 31 March 2009 Vodacom generated R 8 
632 000 000 through interconnection in South Africa, up from R 7 945 000 
000 a year ago. This is the company´s second largest revenue stream after 
airtime and access´, and is far higher than the R 5 973 000 000 generated 
through data services (SMS, MMS & broadband) or the R 5 190 000 000 from 
equipment sales. 
MTN generated R 6 951 000 000 in interconnect revenue for the 
financial year which ended December 2008, up from R 6 346 000 000 for the 
previous twelve months. As is the case with Vodacom it is also the second 
1.8% 
9.6% 
0.1% 
21.4% 
67.1% 
Other
Cellular telephones and
accessories
Connection revenue
Interconnection revenue
Airtime and subscription
revenue
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largest revenue generator for the MTN behind airtime and subscription 
revenue. 
MTN´s interconnect revenue is in fact more than its data and SMS 
revenue (R 3 596 000 000) and cellular telephone and accessories sales (R 3 
122 000 000) put together (ECN, 2009).  
 
Studies have shown that lower mobile termination rates have resulted in lower retail 
rates in a European country context (Growitsch, Marcus, Wernick, 2010, p.110). The 
study further concludes that lower mobile termination rates result in greater 
consumption of mobile services in terms of minutes of usage (Growitsch et al, 2010, 
137). 
 
1.4.2 Interconnection regulatory processes have been mired in controversy 
The South African telecommunications sector authority, ICASA issued new call 
termination regulations and interconnection regulations only in 2010. The process to 
get to final rates got going in 1998 when the Authority “issued a notice to invite 
representations in respect of the form and content of interconnection and facilities 
leasing agreements” (Thornton, Carrim, Matshaulana & Reburn, 2006, p.185). 
However the path leading to the issuing of the new regulations was mired in delays, 
controversy and media, political, and consumer group attention. While this was 
process was winding along, the South African interconnection fees remained 
unregulated and consumers were not given any relief with regard to 
telecommunication prices. 
 
In 2009 Patricia de Lille, then member of the Independent Democrats and member of 
the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Communications called for immediate 
intervention from government on interconnection rates to reduce charges drastically 
(de Lille, 2011). Prior to the launching of Cell C 1n 2001, South Africa‟s third mobile 
operator, interconnection fees were R0.25 per minute. Interconnection charges 
increased to R1.25 in 2009 and calls were now being made to reduce this to R0.25 
which was estimated to be the true cost of interconnection (Ensor, 2009, p. 1). In 
parallel, media attention intensified significantly. Meanwhile ICASA reasoned that 
regulations were not forthcoming as the process to prescribe regulations as defined 
in the ECA was still underway. However Advocate Gilbert Marcus Senior Council 
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expressed a legal opinion that sufficient work had already been done by ICASA 
which would enable ICASA to prescribe regulations without further delay. ICASA did 
not seem to share this opinion. 
 
However operators voluntarily reduced interconnection rates to R0.89 in March 2010 
arguably in the face of intense media and political scrutiny.  General (Ret) Siphiwe 
Nyanda summoned the major operators to the ministry pressing operators to reduce 
charges. An announcement was made by the ministry soon thereafter that operators 
were to reduce interconnect fees by 36 cents to 89 cents. Although the reduction 
was welcomed it did not follow the process promulgated in the ECA. 
 
Eventually a draft set of call termination guidelines were issued in 2010 giving 
responses to the findings that were made as required by the ECA. Operator input 
was sought and to the relief of many, a glide path for reducing calls termination rates 
were at long last prescribed in October 2010. 
 
In the very near future, it is promised, South African consumers can look forward to 
lower telecommunications prices with the laying of many new undersea cables such 
as Seacom, EASSy and WACS. These cables together with the laying of new 
landline optical fibre networks will provide enhanced new telecommunications 
backbones to complement the existing one. New satellite ventures to provide the 
backhaul between cellular and broadband towers, a landmark court decision allowing 
value added network service providers (VANS) to build their own networks and the 
entry of the incumbent telecommunications fixed line operator into the mobile arena 
will all contribute to the lowering of prices (McLeod, 2009). “The biggest challenge is 
to ensure that the national carriers pass the savings on to consumers” (Financial 
Mail, 2008). An efficient and effective approach to interconnection regulation is 
therefore critical. With the proliferation of new service providers the importance of 
seamless and cost effective interconnection between the various service providers is 
clearly more important now in ensuring that end users receive the benefit of 
accessible and affordable telecommunications services.  Therefore clearly 
documented and well informed sets of processes that have been implemented in a 
country that has been successful in reducing interconnection charges could be 
useful to policy makers, regulators and consumer interest groups in South Africa.  
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1.5 India and South Africa have both embarked on telecoms reform with 
seemingly different outcomes 
 
India and South Africa have both embarked on reform for the telecommunications 
sectors in their respective countries albeit with similar intentions but different 
outcomes. 
 
1.5.1 India is the largest democracy in the world 
India is a constitutional republic consisting of 28 states and seven union territories. 
Each state or union territory is divided into a number of districts and these are further 
divided into villages. India has embarked on a process of economic reform starting 
from the 1980‟s and this has resulted in India‟s phenomenal economic growth in the 
last three decades. India‟s urban renewal is very evident from the vast amount of 
development that is taking place in the urban areas. However India‟s vast rural areas 
are still lagging behind in terms of social and economic reform. India‟s population is 
1.21 billion (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011) comprising of a rural population 
of 72% (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008). India‟s gross domestic product in 2010 
is USD 1 729 trillion (World Bank, 2011). This places India in the top ten economies 
of the world (Wikipedia, 2011). 
 
India gained its independence from Britain in 1947. Its government is based very 
much on the British system of government where the Prime Minister is the head of 
Government. Parliament consists of the Upper House, the Rajya Sabha (Council of 
States) and the Lower House called the Lok Sabha (House of the People) 
(Wikipedia, 2011). India is a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since 
1995 (WTO, 2011). 
 
The Indian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Department of 
Telecommunication (DOT) is the telecoms policy maker, grants licences and plays a 
coordinating function for the telecoms sector in India. Overall policies and objectives 
for the telecommunications industry were articulated in the National Telecom Policy 
of 1994 (NTP, 94). The objective of NTP, 94 was to progress India‟s 
“competitiveness in the global market, to quicken the pace of growth of exports in 
this sector and to attract foreign direct investment” (Shroff, 2009, p. 116). The NTP, 
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94 Policy was replaced by the National Telecom Policy of 1999”in order to achieve 
some of the objectives that were not fulfilled by the previous policy” (Shroff, 2009, 
p.116).  
 
The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) is the independent sector 
regulatory body. TRAI‟s responsibility is to make recommendations on telecoms 
issues in India. The recommendations made by TRAI however do not have to be 
accepted by the central government. TRAI also issues regulations periodically on 
interconnection, quality of service and tariffs amongst others (Shroff, 2009, p. 116). 
 
The Telecom Dispute Settlement Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) is a special tribunal set 
up to adjudicate any disputes between various players in the telecoms sector. This 
includes operators, consumer groups, licence holders and the policy maker. Appeals 
against decisions of the TDSAT can be referred to the Supreme Court. 
 
The Competition Act of 2002 proposes the establishment of a Competition 
Commission of India to promote competition however this is not in implementation 
mode at the time of this study. The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices 
(MRTP) Commission is established under section 5 of the MRTP Act, 1969 and 
adjudicates matters pertaining to unfair trade practices. 
 
1.5.2 India has vigorously pursued competition for the mobile telecoms sector 
There is strong competition in the mobile phone sector. Mobile services were 
introduced in India in 1995. Licences were issued in 20 circles which coincide with 
the States and four Metros. The Government followed a duopoly policy as there was 
to be two operators per circle (Gupta, 2007, p. 30 - unpublished). Thus, there could 
be up to 48 operators in the market. However, some operators have multiple 
licences. The profile of the mobile supplier market has since changed significantly 
however, with mergers, acquisitions and some companies falling by the wayside 
(Gupta, 2007, p.31). Although the incumbent BSNL is a major player it faces stiff 
competition by private companies such as Bharti, Vodaphone and Reliance amongst 
others (Gupta, 2007, p. 34).  
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On the other hand, the fixed services business continues to be dominated by the 
state owned incumbents BSNL and MTNL (Gupta, 2007, p.30). The country is 
divided into 27 circles, which coincided with DOT‟s existing switching areas and had 
different designations (A, B or C) depending on the revenue generating potential 
(Gupta, 2007, p. 30). 
 
Likewise, the National Long Distance market is dominated by the incumbent BSNL 
with a market share of 75,3% (2005-06 figures) with the rest of the supplier market 
made up by VSNL, Bharti and Reliance (Gupta,2007, p. 30). Various other private 
entrants are emerging and are seeking licences as well. With International Long 
Distance the recently privatized incumbent VSNL has 49,2% of market share with 
the rest made up with Reliance at 37,4% and Bharti with 13% of market share. 
(Gupta, 2007, p.30) 
 
1.5.3 Interconnection is regulated by the Telecoms Regulatory Authority of India 
As per the terms and conditions of the Universal Access Service (UAS licence), the 
licensee is mandated to provide interconnection to all eligible telecom service 
providers (Shroff, Amarchand &, Mangaldas, 2009, p. 117). TRAI issues 
interconnections regulation from time to time, which include price and cost 
regulation. The interconnection between different service providers shall be as per 
the standards issued by the telecom engineering centre (Shroff et al, 2009, p. 117). 
 
Interconnection disputes, amongst others, are resolved by the TDSAT. In terms of 
the local loop unbundling the TRAI has made recommendations for mandatory 
unbundling of the local loop by incumbent operators so as to expedite the 
penetration of broadband however the government has not yet implemented this 
(Shroff et al, 2009, p. 117) 
 
In India, internet telephony through IP based protocol has been permitted by the 
DOT with the effect from April 2002; via the “guidelines for issue of permission to 
offer internet telephony services” (Shroff et al, 2009, p.117). However the 
interconnection between IP based networks and public switched telephone networks 
have not yet been permitted. The TRAI has made recommendations with respect to 
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introduction and licensing of the next generation network services (Shroff et al, 2009, 
p. 118). 
 
1.5.4 South Africa is one of the newest democracies on the African continent 
South Africa as the name suggests is located in the southern tip of Africa. South 
Africa is divided into nine provinces. Provinces are further divided into districts that 
are made up of metropolitan areas and district municipalities. District municipalities 
are further divided into local municipalities. South Africa has a bicameral parliament 
that comprises of the National Council of Provinces (the upper house) that has 90 
members and the National Assembly (the lower house) that has 400 members 
(Republic of South Africa, 2011).  
 
The leader of the majority party in the National Assembly is the President. South 
African law is based on Roman-Dutch mercantile law and English common law 
(Wikipedia, 2011). The Parliament is the legislature and passes laws for the country. 
South Africa is a member of the World Trade Organisation since 1 January 1995 
(WTO, 2011). 
 
Information and Communications policy is the domain of the government ministry, 
the Department of Communications (DoC). South Africa enacted the Electronic 
Communications Act (ECA) in 2005, replacing the Telecommunications Act (1996), 
and a large portion of broadcasting legislation (Thornton, 2009, p. 251). The main 
objective of the ECA is to provide for the regulation of electronic communications “in 
the public interest” (Thornton, 2009, p. 251).  
 
The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) regulates the 
telecommunications, broadcasting and postal sectors. It is a product of statute – the 
Independent Communication Authority of SA Act of 2000 which was later amended 
in 2005. The specific amendments are discussed in Chapter 4 of this report. 
 
The Complaints and Compliance Committee (CCC), established in terms of the 
ICASA Amendment Act 3 of 2006 adjudicates disputes and complaints from 
licensees and consumers. It also adjudicates interconnection and facilities leasing 
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disputes from licensees. ICASA‟s decisions are not appealable but its decisions may 
be taken on review to the High Court (Thornton, 2009, p. 251). 
 
The Competition Commission is a statutory body constituted in terms of the 
Competition Act (1998) and is empowered to investigate restrictive business 
practices. The Act also establishes the Competition Tribunal with adjudicative 
powers and the Competition Appeal Court to hear appeals and review decisions of 
the Competition tribunal. There is concurrent jurisdiction between ICASA and the 
Competition Commission with regard to competition issues in the 
telecommunications sector (Thornton, 2009, p. 251). 
 
1.5.5 South Africa’s telecoms market structure is dominated by just a few firms 
Public switched telecommunication services are dominated by the partly state owned 
incumbent Telkom. Government has 39.8% shareholding in Telkom and the Public 
Investment Corporation has an additional 10.9% (Creamer Media, 2010). This gives 
government an effective shareholding of more than 50% in Telkom. A second 
provider, Neotel has been licensed but it has not made any significant impact in 
terms of market share in the telecommunications sector. At least 61.5% of Neotel is 
owned by Tata Communications (Creamer Media, 2010). Tata is a part of a powerful 
Indian family owned corporation (Creamer Media, 2010).  
 
The fixed line business is effectively a monopoly. Government also has interests in 
Sentech, the South African Broadcasting Corporation and Broadband Infraco. The 
mobile cellular market is effectively a duopoly and is dominated by MTN and 
Vodacom and although a third service provider, Cell C, has been licensed it has very 
small market share at about ten percent (10%) (Creamer Media, 2010). Vodaphone 
Group has a 65% shareholding in Vodacom with the South African government 
owning 13.91%. Vodacom is South Africa‟s largest mobile company with MTN a 
close second (Creamer Media, 2010). 
 
Telkom disposed of its fifty percent share in Vodacom in 2009 but not without 
controversy. It then launched its own mobile telecommunications service provider 8ta 
soon thereafter. International, long distance and local network services is in effect 
dominated by the incumbent Telkom (Creamer Media, 2010). Although the 
18 
 
telecommunications market in South Africa is in transition it is still heavily dominated 
by the State through it part ownership in the large service providers (Creamer Media, 
2010). 
 
1.5.6 Interconnection in South Africa is regulated by ICASA  
“Every licensee must interconnect and every Electronic Communications Network 
Services (ECNS) licensee must provide facilities, on request, on terms negotiated, 
unless the request is unreasonable” (Thornton, 2009, p. 252). Chapter 7 of the 
Electronic Communication Act, section 37 deals specifically with the obligation to 
interconnect. In summary the Act obliges all licensed operators to interconnect with 
other licenced operators under certain conditions (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, 
p. 140).  
 
ICASA determines whether a request is unreasonable by determining whether the 
request is technically and financially feasible and whether the request will promote 
the efficient use of communications networks and services. (Thornton, 2009, p. 252) 
The determination of who is exempt from the obligation for providing interconnection 
had been stalled for many years, pending a determination on the issue of significant 
market power (SMP). Until then ICASA had proposed to exempt all ECNS licensees 
from the obligation to provide facilities pending a determination on the issue of SMP 
(Thornton, 2009, p. 252). 
 
Thornton (2009) further concludes that the existing regulations set up a 
discriminatory pricing regime for interconnection (Thornton, 2009, p. 252). Major 
operators such as Telkom providing essential services to Public Operators, Service 
Providers or Private Operators do so by using Long Run Incremental Costs (LRIC), 
Fully Allocated Costs (FAC) and Retail Costs respectively. 
 
However ICASA has issued new interconnection and call termination regulations in 
2010. This process leading up to the issuing regulations is the subject of this study. 
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1.6 India and South Africa in comparison 
 
Table 3 : Comparison of basic country indicators of South Africa and India 
 
Indicator India South Africa 
Population Size 1 200 million 47 million 
Size of country 3 287 590 sq km 1 221 037 sq km 
Provinces 28 states & 7 Union territories 9 provinces 
GDP/capita $2 600 (PPP 2007) $9 700 (PPP 2007) 
GNI/capita $ 2 740 (PPP 2007) $9 560(PPP 2007) 
Institutions Competition Commission, 
Ministry of 
Telecommunications, 
Regulator –TRAI 
Competition Commission, 
Ministry of 
Telecommunications, 
Regulator –ICASA 
Independence of the Judiciary Yes Yes 
Rural population 72% 36% 
Literacy rate 61% 86% 
Population below the poverty 
line 
25% 50% 
Unemployment rate 8% 25% 
Teledensity – main fixed 
telephone lines per 100 
inhabitants 
2.87 8,43 
Mobile cellular subscribers per 
100 inhabitants 
19,98 87,08 
Internet users per 100 
inhabitants 
6,93 8,16 
 
SOURCE: CIA, 2008, ITU, 2009 and the World Fact Book website: BASIC 
COUNTRY INDICATORS, 2008 
 
Table 3 illustrates country indicators for South Africa and India. South Africa small by 
comparison in terms of geographic size and population has a very high poverty rate 
and unemployment rate. Telecommunications indicators are more advanced in South 
Africa than India. 
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Figure 2 :  Mobile call termination rates (ZAR) (2009) 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Comninos, Esselaar, Gillwald, Moyo & Naidoo, 2010, p. 12 
 
This chart shows that South Africa has the highest interconnection rate in the basket 
of countries that have been indicated, with India being the lowest. 
 
 
 
1.7 Summary  
 
Telecommunications access and affordability is a developmental issue. Responsible 
policy and regulatory decision making is therefore critical in ensuring that 
telecommunications are used appropriately to enhance wellbeing. Telecoms systems 
are the highways on which ICT application run and without accessible and affordable 
transport, developmental objectives will not materialise. South Africa regrettably has 
some of the highest telecoms rates in the world. Interconnection rates are an 
important factor in the overall costs of telecoms and its regulation will arguably assist 
with reducing telecoms costs. South Africa‟s processes to achieve effective 
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interconnection regulation have been dogged by controversy and the long period of 
limbo has not benefited the South African consumer who has had to pay high costs 
over this period. India on the other hand has some of the cheapest rates in the world. 
A view of how each country has wrestled with processes for interconnection rate 
regulation will be helpful to policy makers, regulators, consumers and operators 
alike. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DEBATES IN THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE ON PROCESSES FOR 
REGULATING INTERCONNECTION RATES 
“Interconnection is the cornerstone of competition” (Melody, 1997, p. 53). 
 
Interconnection is a controversial subject because its regulation can be used to 
serve pre-determined outcomes (Noam, 2001). The manner in which interconnection 
is regulated can result in retail prices being reduced. Reduced interconnection 
charges can also be used to facilitate service provision in underserviced areas. 
However if not properly regulated interconnection can be used by incumbents to 
entrench their positions as monopoly service providers. New entrants can enter 
otherwise closed markets if interconnection regulation allows for easy entry for new 
telecoms companies. However regulation also needs to ensure that established 
operators are not negatively impacted by regulation where new entrants may gain 
unfair advantage at the expense of established operators. Consequently 
“…interconnection charges are a highly contentious issue” (Noam, 2001, p. 69).  
 
The deliberations are enmeshed around whether interconnection rates should even 
be regulated at all and if they are to be regulated, the appropriate economic models 
to be used to determine the rate. In this regard, it is not only the economic model to 
be used that is contentious, but the question of whether rates should be symmetrical 
or asymmetrical and for what period the regulated rates should apply. Issues 
pertaining to whether access deficit charges should apply and whether rates should 
subsidise other products are raised frequently. Debates focus around whether the 
regulation of interconnection would indeed achieve the desired outcomes of reducing 
retail telecommunications prices and whether there would be other unintended 
consequences.  
 
Other debates are concerned with the market conditions under which interconnection 
rate regulation should be applied and how markets should be defined (Intven, 2000, 
p.5-10). Critical to this is to determine the present and future market power of 
individual telecommunications companies to gauge their ability to influence the 
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market outcomes and whether obliging them to interconnect under predefined 
conditions would have the desired effect of facilitating competition. Gauging market 
competitiveness is key factor in determining whether anti-trust measures should be 
applied and the nature of such interventions in the market (Intven, 2000, p. 5-10). 
 
The body of knowledge on interconnection rates and the regulation thereof, embrace 
the issues that have been raised. The debates span various academic areas. The 
regulation of telecommunications in general and the manner in which it is evolving 
attracts the interest of researchers in the policy and legal fields while market 
structures, competition and pricing is the domain of economists. Technologists 
research the interoperability of networks and social scientists examine the impacts 
on society. Political scientists examine policy development and outcomes (Noam, 
2001, p. 6). This research paper focuses on processes for interconnection rate 
regulation and synthesises the debates and discussions in the various disciplines 
and positions the debates within the broad field of public and developmental 
management  
 
Regulatory processes comprise three stages: “the enactment of enabling legislation, 
the creation of regulatory administrations and rules and the bringing to bear of those 
rules on persons or institutions sought to be influenced or controlled” (Baldwin & 
Cave, 1999, p. 96).The literature review sketches out, using Baldwin and Cave‟s 
three stages of regulatory processes, how the understanding of interconnection has 
developed over the years as markets evolve and disputes have arisen. It looks at the 
rationale for regulating interconnection in general. Views on market definition, 
competitiveness and pro-competitive interventions which include the various pricing 
models proposed for regulating interconnection rates are discussed. A conceptual 
framework is developed that draws on the underlying theory and proposes concepts 
that were used to design the research approach and analyse data.  
 
Insights into the European Union regulatory framework are described to position 
South African regulatory processes within this broader context, given South Africa‟s 
historical, political and strategic ties with the European Union in many facets of it 
political and social life and in aspects of its development. 
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2.1  Arguments in the interconnection debate show that interconnection is 
not only about the physical linking of networks 
 
Economic theory would define interconnection as an intermediate good (or service) 
because it is used in the production of a final good (or service) (Noam, 2006, p. 69). 
In telecom terms, the intermediate good is the physical linking to other network/s and 
the services required to enable the production of the final good which final good is 
the completion of a voice call emanating from network 1 and terminating on network 
2 (Parkin, Powell & Matthews, 2000, p. 470). Interconnection in its broadest sense 
can further be described as relationships between various players in the 
telecommunications sector. According to Noam (2001), the relationships can be 
cooperative, vertical or horizontal in nature (Noam, 2001).  
 
Prior to commencement of telecoms reform approximately twenty years ago 
operators‟ co-operated with each other as they did not generally compete in the 
same markets (Noam, 2001, p. 3). These relationships were characterised by the 
major operators co-operating to deliver for example international call services to their 
end users usually across country borders. It must be noted however that these 
operators remained monopoly service providers in their own jurisdictions (Intven, 
2000. p. 3-1). Therefore operators under these circumstances had symbiotic 
relationships defined by mutual benefit. Since there was mutual benefit 
interconnection issues “rarely became a problem” (Intven, 2000, p. 3). Co-operation 
under these circumstances made sense as there was a need for common technical 
standards, communication protocols and methods to ensure a standard quality of 
service across networks. The co-operation also extended to investments decisions 
and billing systems that needed to be aligned (Melody, 1997, p. 49). 
 
The second relationship can be defined as vertical in nature in that one operator 
provides a bottleneck service on one stage of the transmission system and where 
another operator requires the use of that bottleneck to provide a service to its own 
clients. Such a bottleneck service for example could be an undersea cable system 
including the landing station operated by an international carrier. The local exchange 
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carrier will then interconnect to the international long distance carrier to allow its 
clients to make international telephone calls. It could also be a local loop system that 
is owned and operated by an incumbent operator and where new entrants require 
access to the local loop to provide a service to potential clients. This type of 
interconnection was “fraught with problems from the early days regarding prices for 
interconnection, use of facilities and the quality of service” (Melody, 1997, p. 4). 
 
A third form of interconnection relationship according to Noam (2001) is horizontal in 
nature where different operators compete for the same markets and customers. 
Examples include that of incumbent versus new phone companies including both 
fixed to fixed, fixed to mobile, mobile to mobile, internet service provider (ISP) to 
fixed or mobile. The permutations are numerous and the relationships could also be 
both horizontal and vertical in nature. The telecommunications sector of the 21st 
century is defined by these horizontal and vertical relationships. This introduces the 
types of complex relationships that contribute to the challenges experienced by 
policy makers, regulators, operators and consumers today.  
 
Interconnection can also be viewed as taking place at a physical level, at an 
applications or content level or at a geographical level (Noam, 2001). At a physical 
level it is a physical linking of networks for example between fixed and mobile 
operators or between different mobile operators. At the physical level this might also 
require the co-location of equipment and the use of each other‟s facilities such as 
buildings, towers and conduits. At an application or content level this might mean the 
sharing of systems such as billing systems, collaboration with numbering systems 
and access to support, control and monitoring systems. At a geographical level 
interconnection involves multiple service providers connecting across different 
countries. This means that regulators, policy makers, and operators will have to 
collaborate across national boundaries (Noam, 2001, p. 5).  
 
The definition expressed by the International Telecommunication Union simplifies 
this complex concept thus: “Interconnection comprises the commercial and technical 
arrangements under which service providers connect their equipment, networks and 
services to enable customers to have access to the customers, services and 
networks of other service providers” (ITU, 1995, p. 5).  
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Interconnection as per the Electronic Communications Act of South Africa is defined 
as “the physical or logical linking of two or more electronic communications 
networks, electronic communications services, broadcasting services, services 
provided pursuant to a licence exemption or any combination thereof” (Republic of 
South Africa, 2005a, p. 90). 
 
More specifically interconnection charges are the prices levied by network operators 
on each other for the use of their networks and associated services and for the 
termination of calls on each other‟s networks. Interconnection charges as defined by 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and development (OECD) is “a charge 
levied by network operators on other service providers to recover the costs of the 
interconnection facilities (including the hardware and software for routing, signalling, 
and other basic service functions) provided by the network operators” (WTO, 2010). 
 
A more comprehensive definition of interconnection has been expressed by the 
European Commission in the 12 July 2000 Directive on interconnection and access: 
 
Interconnection means the physical and logical linking of public electronic 
communications networks used by the same or a different undertaking in 
order to allow the users of one undertaking to communicate with the users of 
the same or another undertaking, or to access services provided by another 
undertaking. Services may be provided by the parties involved or other 
parties who have access to the network (Intven, 2000, p 3-2).  
 
The European Union directive establishes that interconnection rules should apply 
equally to users of the same network organisation as they should do with users of 
different network organisations. This directive also introduces the concept of „access‟ 
which is different from end user „access‟ to networks (Intven, 2000, p. 3-2). Access in 
this sense means access to infrastructure and services of incumbent operators. 
Interconnection then embodies more than the physical connection of rival networks 
but includes the co-location of infrastructure at bottleneck facilities, compatibility of 
equipment and consistency of quality of service across the interconnecting networks, 
unbundling of network elements at mutually acceptable interconnecting points and 
rules regarding use of telephone numbers and domain names. (Intven, 2000, p. 3-2)  
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The underlying nuance captured in the definitions of interconnection is that 
incumbents‟ could operate both vertically and horizontally in the telecoms value 
chain. Thus an understanding of the market in which the telecommunications 
operators carry out their interconnection business is fundamental to the development 
of regulatory interventions. The implication therefore is that any development of 
regulatory processes should be cognisant of this as this could be used for unfair 
advantage by dominant operators. A further clarification embedded in this definition 
is that interconnection is also at an access to services level. Access to services 
could mean interconnection to domain services of the incumbent or access to 
databases of other operators. At the systems level it could also mean access to the 
numbering systems of other operators for number portability or carrier selection and 
as has been described access to bottleneck facilities such the local loop or undersea 
cabling systems. This leads on to the fact that networks need to be sufficiently 
unbundled to achieve this collaboration for the benefit of the public at large.  
 
There is general consensus that the complexity of interconnection cannot be 
understated as it not only concerns the physical linking into other networks but also 
the sharing of facilities and systems and more importantly interconnection impacts 
competition in the sector. 
 
2.2 Interconnection is regulated because it impacts on competition 
 
“Strategic anti-competitive” behaviour on interconnection arrangements increases 
telecoms prices to consumers (Melody, 1997). It further negatively impacts on 
investment in telecoms infrastructure and will ultimately impact on participation in the 
global information society.  
 
It seems that low interconnection charges and strong competition go in hand 
with a growth in investment. Therefore protection of the incumbent operator, 
e.g. through a delay in a reduction in interconnection charges, seems not to 
be a good strategy for promoting investments either in developed or 
developing countries (Falch, 2005, p. 126). 
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An important policy objective for telecommunications is the provision of affordable 
accessible and good quality fixed and mobile telecoms networks (Melody, 1997). As 
the sector become increasingly liberalised competitive competing carriers need to 
interconnect with each other in order to provide seamless end-to-end services for 
their users. However, interconnection agreements are stacked heavily in favour of 
established operators, making policy formulation and regulatory intervention 
important in promoting effective competition for the sector. When policy direction is 
unclear and regulatory processes are weak then established operators can use their 
market dominance to charge interconnection rates that do not reflect underlying 
costs. If this is not controlled then retail rates can be set at a unreasonably high 
prices to end customers. Furthermore, established operators can impose high 
interconnection charges directly or indirectly on new entrants making it extremely 
difficult for new operators to establish themselves thus reducing them to weak 
players in the sector. 
 
Ineffectual interconnection arrangements may also result in duplication of 
infrastructure and facilities thus placing additional burden on already scarce 
economic resources. In addition, ineffectual interconnection arrangements hamper 
policy goals for universal access and service thus re-enforcing the need for effective 
policy direction and regulatory process.  
 
2.2.1 The WTO has set rules for interconnection 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) recognises that interconnection arrangements 
play a key role in opening up telecom markets. To this end, the 1997 Agreement on 
Basic Telecommunications Services, Reference Paper on regulation contains rules 
for interconnection to reduce bias and discrimination: 
 
Interconnection with major suppliers must be assured: 
 At any technically feasible point in the networks 
 In a timely fashion 
 On non-discriminatory and transparent terms (including quality and rates) 
 Sufficiently unbundled to avoid charges for unnecessary components 
 At non-traditional interconnection points if requestor pays charges 
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Procedures 
 Procedures for interconnection to major suppliers must be made public 
Transparency 
 Agreements or model interconnection offer of major supplier must be 
made public. 
(Intven, 2000, p. 3-5)  
 
The rules emphasise that interconnection could be a barrier to entry for new 
telecoms operators and could consequently reduce competition and impede 
innovation. It reinforces that high telecoms prices have a knock-on effect on other 
sectors of the economy by increasing the cost of doing business in general. Again 
ineffectual interconnection arrangements may result in unnecessary duplication of 
infrastructure and placing additional strain on scarce economic resources.  
 
The importance that interconnection regulation holds for telecommunications 
markets is further articulated by Noam (2001); “Control of interconnection…..is the 
key to the control of the telecommunications system and its market structure”. Noam 
(2001) elaborates, “The regulation of interconnection is therefore becoming the 
paramount tool of government into the reasonably foreseeable future…It provides 
government with a tool for extensive micromanagement of markets” (Noam, 2001, p. 
3). 
 
Interestingly, interconnection can also be used to entrench monopoly as can be seen 
in the history of interconnection regulation in the United States (Noam, 2001). 
Interconnection regulation has a chequered history in the USA. Initially it was used to 
entrench the positions of the big players. When the Bell patents expired in the 1890‟s 
this should have given the opportunity for numerous new players to enter the market. 
Instead interconnection to the national networks was blocked for new entrants thus 
“…creating the monopoly telecoms markets that are being reformed today” (Melody, 
1997, p. 49). Independent competitors entered the market when the Bell patents 
expired especially in the underserviced rural areas and in central business districts 
(Noam, 2001, p. 17). These independents competed with Bell but there was no 
interconnection between them. The Bell Company‟s policy was to refuse 
interconnection to the independents (Noam, 2001 p. 18). This perpetuated a system 
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where AT&T exercised dominance over the telecommunication market and they did 
this by controlling interconnection of equipment onto their networks and by 
controlling rival‟s interconnection on to their local networks and rivals networks to 
Bell‟s long distance networks (Noam, 2001 p.18). 
 
Today, interconnection issues go hand-in-hand with the telecoms policy objectives of 
introducing competition in telecoms markets. Melody (1997) comments that: “efficient 
interconnection is crucial to the effective implementation of virtually all public policies 
opening competitive opportunities in telecom” (Melody, 1997, p. 49). Thus, 
incumbent operators have no market incentive to connect with a new operator 
(Melody, 1997, p. 51). However, modern telecom policy and regulation instructs the 
incumbent to interconnect. Instead incumbents seek to maintain the status quo by 
engaging in behaviour that maintains market positions. Pricing interconnection costs 
at higher than actual costs incurred, providing poorer quality of service to 
interconnecting operators, operating cartels to fix interconnection prices, delaying 
conclusion of interconnection arrangements with new entrants or generally 
frustrating processes that may lead to fairly priced interconnection arrangements are 
some of the “strategic anti-competitive behaviour” engaged in by incumbent and 
established operators (Intven, 2000, p. 3-1).  
 
Traditionally, telecommunications services were provided by large monopoly service 
providers. With the reform initiatives of the last twenty years, new entrants in the 
telecommunications sector are faced with a choice of either building their own 
networks and facilities at huge cost or to link to existing networks and facilities, 
where possible, to enter this market (Intven, 2000, p. 3-1). Incumbent operators have 
had entrenched businesses, in some cases for hundreds of years, and have 
developed extensive network coverage over the years. These networks can be 
viewed as being natural monopolies thus creating macro-economic inefficiencies if 
infrastructure is duplicated. Thus to encourage competition one must assure 
interconnection by entrants to the incumbents networks and services on an efficient 
basis rather than by compelling new entrants to build their own networks.  
 
Lawrence (2006) summarises succinctly how incumbents use interconnection to 
frustrate competition – they could not allow new entrants to connect to their networks 
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on technical or commercial grounds. They could deliberately delay the conclusion of 
interconnection agreements. They could only agree to interconnect at points on the 
network that will favour them. They could charge interconnection prices that far 
exceed costs to provide the service. Lastly they could provide technically inferior 
interconnection solutions that could negatively impact the quality of service provided 
by new entrants thus rendering them uncompetitive (Thornton, et al, 2006, p. 175). 
This collectively will have the effect of increasing new entrant costs. Furthermore, the 
provision of interconnection may allow the incumbent providing the service to gain 
valuable insights into the pricing structures of new entrants thereby gaining unfair 
advantage over newer rivals (Vaitilingam, 1998, p. 104). 
 
However, regulators need to take into consideration that new entrants too may want 
to seek unfair advantage over established operators by understating costs for 
interconnection onto the incumbent‟s networks (Vaitilingam, 1998, p. 104). The 
challenge for regulatory processes therefore is to find a balance that will ensure 
benefits for the end consumer and at the same time ensure the sustainability of 
established operators and give opportunity for new entrants to establish their 
businesses. Thus the importance of fairness, justice, equality and general fair-
mindedness in the process for interconnection price determination is crucial and any 
regulatory process that is developed should be able to withstand such challenges 
which could defeat public policy objectives and at worst could be challenged legally.  
 
Overwhelmingly then, the literature points to the manner in which interconnection 
issues have been used to entrench monopoly and later to open up markets. It is an 
important regulatory tool and can be used to arrive at certain pre-determined 
outcomes. In the era of de-regulation, the regulation of interconnection rates is a 
means of facilitating competition in the telecommunications sector and by 
implication, facilitates the lowering of retail prices. How this should be done and the 
process to get to a rate that is fair to all is the subject of intense debate and will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
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2.3 Interconnection pricing regulatory processes generally require rates to 
be cost based 
 
The World Trade Organisation‟s (WTO) 1997 Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications Services, Reference Paper on regulation prescribes rules for 
interconnection to reduce unfair business practices for this sector that could 
negatively affect end users. Interconnection rates according to the Reference Paper 
should be cost oriented. This means that interconnection prices should be related to 
the underlying costs for providing the service. However to establish regulatory 
processes based on cost based interconnection charges one must “understand the 
economics of interconnection” (ITU-D study group 1, 2004, p. 5). 
 
2.3.1 Interconnection charges should reflect the underlying fixed and variable costs 
All telecommunications costs can be classified as either “fixed or variable costs” 
(ITU-D study group 1, 2004, p. 5). Fixed costs as the term suggests remain constant 
irrespective of the quantity of output produced. Fixed costs can also be called 
overhead costs, indirect costs or unavoidable costs (Fourie & Mohr, 1995, p. 319). 
There are two types of fixed costs viz. once-off investment costs (capital costs) and 
recurring costs called operating expenditure (opex). Capital expenditures are 
generally comprise of large investments in telecoms switches and other network 
equipment, purchases of land and buildings and investments in cabling and radio 
equipment. Operating expenditures that are recurring include rental costs, labour 
costs such as salaries and training, insurance costs, and other costs including 
materials and services. 
 
Variable costs are directly related to the level of network usage (ITU-D study group 
1, 2004, p. 6). In telecoms variable costs are referred to as “traffic sensitive costs” 
while fixed costs are referred to as “non-traffic sensitive costs” (ITU-D study group 1, 
2004, p. 6). To achieve cost based interconnection charges any analysis should 
identify costs related to the specific service. The challenge according to the ITU-D 
study group (2004) is that it is difficult to ring-fence charges related specifically to 
interconnection costs especially when it makes good economic sense to share 
facilities to deliver a range of services. However as a general rule Intven (2000) 
33 
 
suggests that interconnection charges should indicate the difference between fixed 
and variable charges as this “should lead to a more efficient use of network 
components” (Intven, 2000, p. 3-29).  
 
2.3.2 Interconnection charges should reflect peak and off peak rates 
Intven (2000) further suggests that interconnection charges should also be priced 
according to peak and off peak usage. Generally speaking, charging a higher rate 
during peak hours will incentivise users to call during off-peak hours (Intven, 2000, 
p.3-29). Calling during peak hours will impose a greater burden on network 
components during these hours, causing the network provider to upgrade facilities to 
cater for increased usage. Thus interconnection charges should reflect underlying 
behaviour of costs (Intven, 2000, p.3-29). 
 
2.3.3 Interconnection charges should be sufficiently unbundled 
The WTO Reference Paper requires incumbent operators to sufficiently unbundle 
network components. This is required so that new entrants can choose at which 
point they would like to connect onto the incumbent network instead of this is being 
imposed on them by the incumbents‟.  Unbundling network components will go some 
way in ensuring that incumbents do not charge competitors unnecessarily for 
unwanted network components or facilities (Intven, 2000, p. 3-30). Unbundling 
reduces barriers to entry for new entrants as initial capital outlay to build complete 
networks may not be financially feasible but the building of smaller components such 
as switching circuits, access lines and limited facilities to connect on to incumbents 
networks may be very possible (Intven, 2000, p. 3-30). The unbundling option will 
certainly facilitate competitive entry for new operators as the use of the incumbent‟s 
network in the main, in the early stages of establishment and set up of businesses is 
usually necessary for new entrants to compete with the established operators 
(Intven, 2000, p.3-30).  
 
It is envisaged that over time the new entrants will be able to compete effectively as 
they become self-sufficient in terms of network capability. It also encourages 
innovation as new entrants can bring in their own brand of innovation for example 
they can interconnect with legacy PSTN networks using IP technologies opening up 
a whole new world of opportunity to digital technologies. However one must be 
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cognisant that one of the disadvantages of full scale unbundling is that new entrants 
may not want to build or upgrade their own networks if the existing incumbents 
networks are priced below costs and are providing the basic services that are 
required by the new entrant. This may, instead, discourage innovation (Intven, 2000, 
p. 3-31).  
 
The advantages however outweigh the disadvantages as it avoids unnecessary 
duplication of networks, encourages innovation and reduces barriers to entry. Many 
countries including India and South Africa are implementing unbundling by issuing 
policies in this regard. Local loops are targeted as components that should be 
unbundled for competitive entry to be encouraged. The local loops described as the 
copper cable that connects the client with the local exchange are generally owned 
and operated by incumbent operators. Local loop unbundling (LLU) requires the 
incumbent to provide access to their local loops to competitors. With more 
competition at the local loop level it is hoped that this will encourage innovation by 
allowing many service providers to offer a multitude of services to households some 
of which might include competitive broadband services, digital TV, and voice over IP 
telephony.  
 
2.4 The European Union Framework Directive came into being in 2003 
 
Article 7 of the Framework Directive sets out the procedure under which National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) must assess competition in telecommunications 
markets in conjunction with operators and also assess whether operators have 
significant market power (SMP). The NRAs are then required to prescribe remedies 
to restore competitiveness (Evans & Long, 2009, p. 1). 
 
Article 15 of the Framework Directive revised in 2007 makes recommendations in 
terms of telecommunications markets. Amongst others, the Directive identifies 
wholesale call termination on individual mobile networks as relevant markets and call 
origination and termination on public fixed networks and individual public fixed 
networks as relevant markets. Furthermore the Directive provides guidelines on how 
to define a market and how a market analysis to assess competitiveness is to be 
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conducted. The aim of the EU Framework is to ensure consistent approaches across 
all member states (Evans et al, 2009, p. 2).  
 
2.5 A market analysis is necessary for regulatory processes to be 
prescribed 
 
2.5.1 Market failure and Pareto efficiency 
The telecommunication sectors in most countries have grown out of monopoly 
market structures. Services bundled with posts and telegraph was provided by 
government departments in monopoly market structures. With the introduction of 
competition and for the reasons described previously the risk therefore exists that 
those incumbents will continue to exert dominance in their markets after competition 
is introduced. This continued exercise of market power is a type of market failure 
(Fourie, et al, 1995). Economic theory suggests that market failure occurs when the 
allocation of resources is not efficient. Efficiency is achieved when it is not possible 
to make one person better off without making someone else worse off. This notion of 
allocative efficiency is called Pareto efficiency. Thus market failure exists when there 
is no Pareto efficiency (Fourie, et al, 1995, p. 365). 
 
2.5.2 Market competition  
Theory on market competitiveness suggests that a market is competitive when 
buyers and sellers face no transaction costs, products are homogenous and there 
are many suppliers each accounting for a small fraction of the overall supply of the 
good (Bernheim & Whinston, 2008, p. 498). In a perfectly competitive market both 
buyers and sellers have no effect on price. Now in the absence of transaction costs, 
sellers can easily communicate their prices, buyers can easily locate suppliers and 
learn their prices and buyers and sellers can arrange transactions without significant 
obstacles. Another factor in determining whether a market is competitive is to 
determine whether the product on offer, in the telecommunications case, 
interconnection, is homogenous i.e. if a telecommunications operator charges more 
for interconnection it needs to be established whether the buyer can simply get their 
interconnection from elsewhere. The third factor is the presence of a large number of 
buyers and a large number of sellers in the market being investigated. A market is 
competitive when this is true i.e. when there are a large number of providers of 
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interconnection and there are a large number of consumers that demand 
interconnection. 
 
2.5.3 Monopoly Markets  
A monopoly market on the other hand, is a market where the likelihood of market 
failure is high. A firm can produce a product that may not be sold by other firms or it 
may sell a product for which there are few or no close substitutes. In 
telecommunications, a substitute for the product defined as interconnection would be 
a similar product that a consumer would demand if the price for the interconnection 
that he desires, all else being equal, rises to unacceptable levels for the consumer. A 
substitute then, if all else being equal, is a product that may be demanded if the price 
of one product causes consumers to demand more of the other (Bernheim et al, 
2008, p. 27). A firm has market power in a situation where there are few or no close 
substitutes for the product it is selling and where the firm can profitably charge prices 
above its marginal cost (Bernheim et al, 2008, p.623). So the question of whether the 
interconnection product on sale has close substitutes or not is essential in 
determining whether a firm has market power or not. 
 
2.5.4 Market definition 
Economists define a market to include products that are close substitutes for one 
another and to exclude some distant substitutes. In practice the boundary lines 
between products that are inside a market and those that are not can be very difficult 
to ascertain. Hence if a market is defined too narrowly then a firm may be incorrectly 
defined as a monopolist in that market. However it may be that it in fact it faces 
significant competition because there are substitutes for the product that it is selling 
that may have not been identified (Bernheim et al, 2008, p. 624). Similarly if a market 
is defined too broadly then a firm that faces no significant competition may appear to 
do have many competitors providing similar services. Again incorrectly identifying 
broad substitutes for a product may incorrectly conceal monopoly markets.  Correctly 
establishing whether products are substitutes is essential therefore in defining the 
market properly. 
 
Thus a thorough market analysis is necessary to determine the boundaries of the 
market before any determination is made on whether a company has market power. 
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This has a direct impact on regulatory processes to be imposed on the markets 
identified.  
 
 
2.5.5 Market definition and interconnection rate regulation  
The indication is that a market analysis needs to be conducted before rates can be 
prescribed. This in itself is not problematic. The problem however arises in the 
mapping out of the process that needs to be followed before rates are prescribed. 
There is a choice of conducting the process ex-ante or ex-post and this could 
significantly affect the timing of the issuing of regulation. The choice that is made by 
regulatory authorities should be a balance between a competition policy approach 
and an ex-ante approach (Buigues, 2003). 
 
2.6 Processes for market definition, assessment of competitiveness in that 
market and remedies in the absence of competitiveness are important 
process steps in regulating interconnection 
 
2.6.1 Market definition is based on the theory of hypothetical monopoly 
Gual (2003) expresses a view that standard definition of the relevant market for the 
purposes of competition policy or regulation is based on the principle of hypothetical 
monopoly (Gual, 2003, p.2). Gaul (2003) further explains that the principle is that a 
product or geographic market is defined as the minimum set of products or 
geographic areas that could be successfully monopolised (Gual, 2003, p. 2). This 
means that if this set of products or areas were in the hands of a single provider it 
could be restricted whilst improving the provider‟s profitability. The principle is also 
known as the SSNIP test as it refers to a small, but significant non-transitory, 
increase in price by the hypothetical monopolist (Gual, 2003, p. 2). The SSNIP tests 
begins by identifying the narrowest possible market and tests whether it will be 
profitable for a hypothetical monopolist, whose strategy is to maximise profit, to 
increase prices in a small but significant and permanent manner (Gual, 2003, p. 2). 
Economic theory suggests that consumers faced with the increase will naturally seek 
out alternative products, or substitutes from other providers. If these substitutes do in 
fact exist then the market definition will need to be expanded to include these 
38 
 
products and then the hypothetical monopolist‟s increase will not be profitable. 
Alternatively if substitutes do not exist then the market definition will be defined as 
this narrow market. 
 
This conventional definition of the relevant market as described by Gual (2003) can 
by and large be assessed using the methodology used in antitrust or competition 
legislation viz. the hypothetical monopolist and SSNIP test. However the essence of 
the argument made by Gual (2003) is that due consideration needs to be given to 
three modifications that need to be made to this traditional definition for the 
telecommunications industry to prevent markets from incorrectly being defined too 
narrowly (Gual, 2003, p. 1). 
 
Firstly one has to consider demand as well as supply substitutabilities. Demand 
substitutes will be other products that can be turned to that meet the consumer‟s 
requirements when the price of the product being demanded increases significantly. 
Thus the hypothetical monopolist will not be able to raise prices significantly without 
losing market share (Gual, 2003, p.3). Supply substitutability on the other hand 
means that other competitors can enter the market easily to substitute the product 
when production is being restrained or where price has increased significantly. Once 
again the hypothetical monopolist will not be able to raise prices or restrain 
production significantly without the risk of losing customers to other suppliers that 
can enter the market easily and provide the same product or service (Gual, 2003,  p. 
3).  
 
Secondly Gual (2003) argues that in the telecoms industry many products or 
services are bundled e.g. SMS, call termination, access and call origination due to 
economies of scale and scope and to the economies of joint production. These 
constitute demand complementarities (Gual, 2003, p. 18).  Complements are goods 
that are used jointly like milk and tea or subscription (access) and call termination. 
These bundles of services should also be analysed for competition or regulatory 
purposes (Gual, 2003, p. 1). 
 
Thirdly, the telecoms industry is characterised by fixed and continuous sunk costs of 
service provision because this industry continuously has to innovate and keep up 
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with technological advances (Gual, 2003, p. 1). According to Gual (2003) therefore 
the conventional definition of a hypothetical monopolist as being a firm that can 
increase its prices above marginal cost in a market where there are no close 
substitutes can be applied to the telecoms industry but a few adjustments need to be 
made (Gual, 2003,  p. 1). “Marginal cost pricing is taken to be the competitive 
benchmark in the conventional definition of a hypothetical monopolist” (Gual, 2003,  
p.6). This definition according to Gual (2003) needs to be expanded for the telecoms 
industry because pricing above marginal cost may be necessary to recover the 
continuous sunk costs typical of this industry (Gual, 2003, p. 6). Gual suggest that 
ideally a new benchmark needs to be set corresponding to mark-ups which generate 
sufficient revenues to cover fixed costs without leading to excessive profitability. If 
the effect of fixed cost recovery is not taken into consideration it may result in 
markets being defined too narrowly (Gual, 2003,  p. 6). 
 
A further characteristic of the telecoms industry is the existence of bottlenecks (Gual, 
2003, p. 15). The local loop which gives access to residential customers has been a 
bottleneck in many countries because access to the home can only be reached via 
the PSTN and given the existence of fixed costs it is not economical to duplicate this 
service. To apply the market definitions discussed earlier, this will constitute a 
market of its own because there are no substitutes and it is also difficult for another 
supplier to enter this market in the short-run (Gual, 2003, p. 15). Network effects too 
would result in a network being defined as a market on its own (Gual, 2003, p. 15). 
The internet for example demonstrates this concept quite aptly (Gual, 2003,  p.12). 
Network effects result in the internet becoming more useful as more users and more 
web servers are added. The internet now is large enough to have very few 
substitutes. This then will pose a dilemma to antitrust authorities who deliberate on 
mergers between internet backbone providers (Gual, 2003, p. 12). 
 
Similarly call termination in the mobile sector can be perceived as a bottleneck 
service because of the way the charges are structured (Gual, 2003, p.16).  In 
countries where the calling party pays (CPP) principle applies, there is little incentive 
for the end user to change networks when the cost of termination for the calling party 
increases (Gual, 2003, p. 16). If the end user paid for the call the reaction from the 
end user would be to change service providers if termination prices were excessive. 
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However the fact that the end user does not pay for this service creates an inelastic 
demand i.e. increase in price does not cause the consumer to seek alternative 
products (Fourie, et al, 1995). This coupled with the fact that there are no substitutes 
for call termination on the end user‟s telecoms provider, means that from the calling 
party‟s viewpoint, conventional competition law theory would regard call termination 
on each network to be a market on its own (Gual, 2003). “Each network operator 
thus has hundred percent (100%) market share of its own network” (Gual, 2003, 
p.16). 
 
Now, as has been previously described, a modification needs to be made to the 
conventional antitrust market definition as call termination is usually bundled with 
complementary services such as call origination, SMS, internet access and instant 
messaging (Gual, 2003, p. 16). Thus the relevant market for antitrust purposes could 
be a bundle of mobile services. The conventional definition of starting with an 
individual service, applying the SSNIP test and then expanding the product set may 
not work because of the complementarities that exist regarding the service bundles 
(Gual, 2003, p.16). Demand may be very elastic if the product set is expanded to 
include complements. In this case service providers will not be seen to have market 
power. However if only a single product such as call termination is expanded then 
the service provider can be seen to have market power. Thus the existence of 
complementary services can change the perception of the existence of market power 
for service providers. 
 
The conventional definition of relevant markets then involves the use of the 
hypothetical monopolist test to determine the consequences to competition when a 
hypothetical monopolist increases prices of its product by a small but significant 
margin for an extended period of time. Market boundaries are increased or narrowed 
accordingly. However consideration needs to be given to the effect of demand and 
supply substitutabilities, demand complementarities as a result of the bundling of 
services and the effect of fixed and sunk costs on pricing for the telecoms industry to 
avoid markets being defined too narrowly (Gual, 2003, p.16). 
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2.6.1 Assessment of competitive conditions in relevant markets 
There are a number of important criteria that can be assessed to determine the level 
of competitiveness in the market that has been defined. The existence of market 
power plays a very important role in assessing whether a market has an acceptable 
level of competitiveness. Michael Porter‟s five forces model can be used in general 
to determine the effectiveness of competition in a particular market (Hitt, Hoskisson 
& Ireland, 2009, p. 48). 
 
Firstly, the existence of rivalry between existing companies, on a forward looking 
basis needs to be evaluated as the prime source of competition in any industry is 
among the existing incumbents (Hitt et al, 2009, p.48). The rivalry is likely to be most 
intense when a number of conditions are satisfied such as when the companies are 
evenly matched in terms of market size and market share. If companies are not 
evenly matched then competition law may define firms as being dominant according 
to certain scales related to market share and the existence of market power. 
Concentration ratios may indicate the level to which companies may have significant 
market power. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) is used to measure the level 
of concentration in a market (Chin, 2010). High levels of concentration are not 
desirable. The HHI takes the sum of squares of market shares of each firm 
competing in a market (Chin, 2010). A score closer to zero indicates competitive 
conditions and values closer to one indicate the existence of firms with market 
power. Other indexes too may be used such as the Landes-Posner index (Melody, 
1997). Inputs to calculate the index comprise of the firms market share, elasticity of 
market demand and elasticity of competitive supply (entry conditions). Any index of 
greater than 0.50 means that there is a lack of effective competition (Melody, 1997, 
p. 35). 
 
Attention needs to be paid as well to firms that operate as vertically integrated 
businesses. In the telecoms industry firms that provide wholesale backbone 
infrastructure and that also provide up-stream services such as internet service 
provision could be in a position to cross-subsidise costs between industries. As such 
these firms may be viewed as possessing market power. Furthermore, in assessing 
competitive conditions authorities should take account of any collusive practices that 
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may exist in the market under review. This can be done by examining price trends 
between firms over a period of time. 
 
Rivalry also exists during periods of low market growth where price competition is 
intense (Hooley, Piercy & Nicouland, 2008, p. 74).  Furthermore firms are more likely 
to “compete hard for success” when they find it difficult to exit a market once they 
have entered (Hooley et al, 2008, p. 74). “High initial investments may create 
barriers to exit” in this situation (Hooley et al, 2008, p.74). Rivalry is also intense 
when customer switching costs are low when there is little variation across products 
in this market (Hooley et al, 2008, p. 74). Finally rivalry is also intense in markets 
where firms fixed costs are relatively high compared to variable costs. In this 
situation firms require greater sales volumes and until that volume is reached 
competition can be intense (Hooley et al, 2008, p.74).  
 
Secondly, in evaluating the effectiveness of competition authorities should also 
consider the potential for new entrants to emerge. New entrants are likely to enter 
the market when the costs of entry are low and when existing or new distribution 
channels are available for use (Hooley et al, 2008, p.74). Barriers to entry are high 
when “competitive retaliation” is anticipated i.e. when incumbents “signal their 
intention” (Hooley, et al, 2008, p. 75) to defend their market share aggressively for 
example incumbents‟ increasing interconnection rates precipitated by the granting of 
a licence to a new operator.  Barriers to entry are low when there is “little 
differentiation between product offerings” of existing operators (Hooley et al, 2008, 
p.75). Here there is more scope for new entrants to offer a service that is unique 
(Hooley et al, 2008, p.75).  Furthermore new entrants may emerge when there are 
perceived gaps in the market i.e. the existing incumbents “may not be serving the 
wants or needs of existing customers adequately” (Hooley et al, 2008, p.75). Here 
existing firms may be “slow to recognise diversity in customer requirements” 
prompting opportunities for new entrants (Hooley et al, 2008, p.75). 
 
Thirdly, the threat of substitute products makes for competitive markets (Hooley et al, 
2008, p.76). Substitutes increase competitiveness of a market by making existing 
products redundant through technological innovation e.g. 3D digital television sets 
replacing LCD television sets. Incremental product improvement too can affect 
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competition when existing market offerings become out-dated (Hooley et al, 2008, 
p.76). 
 
Fourthly, the bargaining power of suppliers to the industry can influence competition 
in that market (Hooley et al, 2008, p.76). When there are few suppliers their effect on 
buyers tends to be greater. Competitive conditions are reduced when the costs of 
switching suppliers are high. This might be the case when a supplier provides a key 
item for the industry that is not possible to source elsewhere. This key item may be a 
bottleneck service such as local loops in the telecommunication industry. Similarly 
competition is reduced when the suppliers‟ offerings are highly differentiated. 
Suppliers hold more bargaining power when their products are distinct and different 
through differences in standards or differences in branding and reputation (Hooley et 
al, 2008, p.76).   
 
Lastly competition is increased when buyers have countervailing power in situations 
where buyers are fewer than sellers and these buyers are responsible for large 
volumes of purchases (Hooley et al, 2008, p.77). This is also true when suppliers 
produce small volumes of product. Competitive conditions are improved when 
buyers have low switching costs i.e. buyers have an opportunity to choose easily 
between suppliers to get better deals (Hooley et al, 2008, p.77). In addition to this, 
competitive conditions improve when there are readily available alternate sources of 
supply where it may be relatively easy for buyers to buy elsewhere (Hooley et al, 
2008, p.77).  
 
2.6.2 Pro-competitive interventions may be applied in anti-competitive markets 
A number of pro-competitive interventions could be applied to firms in defined 
markets that have been identified as lacking acceptable levels of competition and to 
firms that have market power or significant market power in the defined markets. The 
European Commission‟s Interconnection Directive define firms that have more than 
25% share in the telecoms market as having significant market power (Intven, 2000, 
p. 5-12). Remedies imposed could be ex-ante, ex-post or both (Intven, 2000, p.5-12). 
Ex-ante remedies are imposed pro-actively and are usually the prerogative of a 
sector specific regulator whereas ex-post regulation is usually imposed after the anti-
trust transgression by a competition or anti-trust authority (Intven, 2000, p.3-6). 
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Structural separation of firms could be introduced to ring-fence different lines of 
business into separate companies. An arm-length relationship between the 
separated entities is desired (Intven, 2000, p. 5-22). There are disadvantages 
however as firms may lose opportunity for economies of scale where for example 
head-office premises may be shared. The advantages brought on by these 
economies of scale may be outweighed however by the reduced opportunity for firms 
to cross-subsidise lines of business where products or services are priced below 
cost or for firms to engage in predatory pricing where products and services are 
priced below cost in the short-run to force competitors‟ out of business (Intven, 2000, 
p. 5-23). With structural separation however the various firms that have been created 
are generally still owned by one holding company which does not “completely 
eliminate the opportunity for collusion” (Intven, 2000,  p. 5-23). 
 
More radical separation could involve divestiture which could mean that operators 
will be forced to sell off various lines of business through competition policy or 
regulation to remedy anti-competitive behaviour (Intven, 2000, p. 5-23). Here 
because of company law directors will be forced to make decisions in the interest of 
the company that they serve and thus companies will be run on an arms-length basis 
(Intven, 2000, p. 5-23). The “most famous divestiture case” involves the selling off of 
the local AT&T businesses from its long distance and international businesses to 
break the monopoly that AT&T had on the telecommunications business in the USA 
(Intven, 2000, p. 5-25).  This divesture was very successful in that it “created 
companies that could genuinely compete with each other” (Intven, 2000, p. 5-25).   
 
“Wholesale cost imputation” may be imposed to prevent vertical price squeezing 
(Intven, 2000, p. 5-24). This anti-competitive practice by incumbents that are 
vertically integrated involves setting upstream wholesale services to competitors 
such as backbone infrastructure at exorbitant prices to increase downstream prices 
for competitors where both incumbent and competitor compete for the same 
business such as internet access. The practice becomes even more anti-competitive 
when the incumbent for example reduces its own retail price in the downstream 
internet business (Intven, 2000, p. 5-24). Remedies include cost imputation which 
means that the incumbent needs to show evidence that its retail price for the 
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downstream service (internet access in this example) is not lower than the sum of its 
wholesale price to competitors for the upstream service plus its marginal cost for its 
own downstream internet access business (Intven, 2000, p. 5-25). 
 
Transparency of costs and account separation is another means that can be used to 
remedy anti-competitive practices (Intven, 2000, p. 3-8). Transparency obligations 
will allow regulators to determine whether a firm is engaging in practices that impact 
on competition and will improve on countervailing power of buyers of the services 
from the firm in question (Republic of South Africa, 2010a, p. 13). The principle of 
non-discrimination is generally included in transparency obligations (Republic of 
South Africa, 2010a, p.14) 
 
Accounting separation will enhance transparency obligations but the literature shows 
that although it will not deter firms from anti-competitive conduct it will assist 
regulators to determine for example whether there is any “cross subsidisation of 
costs between product offerings” (Intven, 2000, p.5-19). The European 
Interconnection Directive requires that its member states impose requirements on 
their public telecoms operators with significant market power, to keep separate 
accounts for their interconnection costs (Intven, 2000, p.5-19). In essence 
accounting separation requires operators to account for the costs and revenues of 
their different products separately. In this way it can be determined whether the 
particular products are making losses (Intven, 2000, p.5-19). It can be inferred from 
the accounting data that product costs are being cross subsidised by revenues from 
other product lines if this is the case. Thus accounting separation requires operators 
to ring fence costs and revenues for each product (service) on offer (Intven, 2000, 
p.5-19). This is not always possible for telecoms operators as telecoms operators 
provide a multitude of products and service. Therefore from a practical point of view 
for accounting separation, products are divided into broad categories of services for 
telecoms operators (Intven, 2000, p.5-19). Operators could be required to report 
costs in a standard format to be determined by the Authority in order to standardise 
reporting across various operators so that comparisons may be able to be made for 
similar products across firms. The Chart of Accounts and Cost Allocation Manual 
(COA/CAM) is an accounting separation methodology that can be used by 
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Authorities‟ to detail the underlying costs of providing telecommunications services 
(Republic of South Africa, 2002). 
 
Price controls are another method that can be employed to remedy anti-competitive 
behaviour. There is however no single process for setting interconnection charges. 
Interconnection charges make up a large portion of costs for any new entrant. As a 
result unnecessarily high costs “impact on the viability of any start up operator” 
(Intven, 2000, p. 3-23). It has been suggested widely in the literature that any 
process for setting interconnection charges should be set on actual costs incurred to 
provide interconnection.  There are a number of pricing models that could be 
adopted by regulators to achieve particular regulatory goals. Interconnection charges 
should be based on a forward-looking cost of providing the interconnection service 
(Intven, 2000, p. 3-25). The choice of a pricing model is therefore essential to the 
setting up of regulatory processes. Some of the other approaches to interconnection 
pricing will be discussed first, concluding with a discussion on forward looking cost 
models. 
 
2.6.3 Zero Charge (Bill and Keep/Sender Keeps All (SKA) and Lump sum payments 
In this model there are no call terminating charges between cooperating operators. 
This Bill and Keep model or SKA model can be used by regulators to reduce barriers 
of entry for new entrants. With this model two or more networks might agree on a 
zero charges if the volumes and costs of calls terminating on each other‟s networks 
is more or less the same. Since no cost based charge is levied each network has an 
incentive to increase efficiencies to reduce costs (Noam, 2001, p. 76). However this 
model must be seen in conjunction with other regulatory processes for example 
number portability regulations will give the opportunity for the telecommunications 
market to balance out as it reaches a level of maturity (Brock, 1995, p. 2).  
 
However with this model there might be an incentive to dump calls on the other 
network as soon as possible to reduce costs on one‟s own network. This could result 
in calls being routed in a very inefficient manner i.e. calls emanating from a suburb in 
Johannesburg made to a suburb in Pretoria being routed via Cape Town if the 
network that operates the Johannesburg – Pretoria link treats the call as a “hot 
potato” (Brock, 1995, p. 2) and dumps the call on a different network that so happens 
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to operate the Johannesburg-Cape Town-Pretoria link (Brock, 1995, p. 2). As a 
response this may incentivise the impacted operator to degrade its service to 
discourage this call dumping behaviour (Brock, 1995, p. 2). 
 
Further to this an additional negative outcome to this model is that development for 
rural telecommunications infrastructure may not take place as there is an imbalance 
with more incoming calls. As a result the rural operator does not receive any income, 
making the provision of the service in the rural area very unprofitable. The 
consequence is that rural operators will not readily invest in infrastructure here. 
 
The Bill and Keep model was the main model used by ISPs earlier when data 
exchanged between the ISPs was more balanced. However as the balance shifts the 
larger ISPs now treat the smaller companies as clients rather than as equals (Intven, 
2000, p. 3-24).Other analysis done for internet backbone service providers‟ show 
that this model does not provide adequate incentives for collaboration and an 
asymmetric interconnection rate is the preferred option (Tan, Chiang & Mookerjee, 
2006, p. 776-788). 
 
A similar model is related to a payment of a lump sum or fixed payment for access to 
another operator. This model too has negative consequences in that operators may 
choose to “ seek bypass” if the charges are perceived to be too high, to avoid 
payment (Noam, 2001. P. 78). This model was used in the early days by Indian local 
operators and by US and Canadian local operators (Intven, 2000, p. 3-24). 
 
2.6.4 Fully Distributed Cost Pricing Model (FDC, two part tariff) 
This model is also referred to as the Fully Allocated Cost method. It is based on 
historical allocation of costs and in theory it combines fixed and incremental costs 
and allocates them to different broad categories of services. The problem with this 
method is the difficulty of allocating joint and common costs to different classes of 
service. This is usually done by allocating these costs using a formula that is aligned 
to the relative usage of that particular service. For example if network access lines at 
the local exchange are used in a ratio of eighty percent (80%) for local calls and 
twenty percent for international calls then joint and common costs will be allocated in 
the 80/20 ratio as well. This model then is related to a two part tariff (Noam, 2001, p. 
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79). It is composed of a variable usage charge with a flat capacity charge. The 
problem with this method is that any inefficiency in the incumbent operator will be 
passed on to the new entrant using the historical costs associated with particular 
services (Intven, 2000, p. B-14). 
 
A counter argument is that because the fully distributed cost exceeds marginal cost 
that is it includes joint and common costs it will encourage unfair entry by new 
operators whose long run marginal costs are higher than that of the incumbent 
(Noam, 2001, p. 78). This model was used in many states in the United States at 
one stage (Noam, 2001, p. 79) 
 
2.6.5 Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) 
With this model the new entrant pays the incumbent any incremental cost that the 
incumbent incurs in providing the service for the new entrant plus any opportunity 
cost for revenue lost because of the complimentary service provided by the new 
entrant. This model has been the subject of intense debate from the time it was first 
proposed by Baumol, Ordover and Willig principal authors of the theory (Noam, 
2001, p. 94). Counter proposals suggest that in fact network access charges should 
be equal to the incumbents cost of excess excluding opportunity costs in order to 
achieve productive efficiency (Armstrong, 1998, p. 297). However the ECPR was an 
influential option and was used in the United Kingdom and New Zealand and is 
considered here (Noam, 2001, p. 86). 
 
The four main advantages proposed by the advocates of ECPR is that only 
interconnectors with lower incremental costs will be prepared to enter the market, 
new entrants would not affect incumbents revenues, it will not change any cross-
subsidisation that exists and finally it overcomes the desire for incumbents to keep 
new entrants out as it will not affect their revenues (Noam, 2001, p. 88). 
 
There are many criticisms regarding ECPR model however. Criticisms include the 
fact that this rule protects the incumbent from making losses due to competition as it 
will still retain profit from the interconnection fees charged to new entrants based on 
the opportunity lost model (Noam, 2001, p. 88). It is also incorrect to assume that 
customers of the new entrant would have necessarily been diverted from the 
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incumbent as the new entrant might be attracting first time customers to its network 
from the innovation and new products supplied by the new entrant. There are 
positive externalities i.e. the advantage that the new entrant brings to the customers 
of the incumbent by increasing the base number of customers that can now be called 
and this is not factored into the model. ECPR requires the new entrant to have its full 
costs less than the incremental costs of the incumbent; and given that the incumbent 
has the advantage of economies and scope and scale due to its generally 
entrenched nature, this will be difficult to achieve for the new entrant. Other criticisms 
include the fact that placing a value on opportunity cost is dependent on good 
information and because of information asymmetries this is not always possible for 
regulator to gather good data. 
 
Furthermore the ECPR is a sound principle only if a stringent set of assumptions 
holds true. These assumptions are that the “incumbent‟s price for the complementary 
service is based on a marginal-cost principle, the incumbent and the new entrant‟s 
service components are perfect substitutes and that the incumbent‟s marginal cost of 
production can be accurately determined amongst other things” (Economides, White, 
1995, p. 3). If any of these assumptions are relaxed for example if new entrants are 
excluded based on the fact that their costs are higher than the incumbents efficient 
costs then this exclusion could have negative social benefits (Economides, White, 
1995, p. 3). The argument posed by Economides and White is that if the incumbent‟s 
interconnection charges are reduced by regulatory process it will allow a new 
entrant, even if it is inefficient to enter the market thus posing a competitive 
challenge to the incumbent which will in the long run provide social benefits to 
consumer‟s at large (Economides, White, 1995, p. 8). 
 
The debate around the use of ECPR as a price model for interconnection has 
certainly been controversial with courts of law in New Zealand for example finding for 
and against the model (Noam, 2001, p. 92). However OFTEL the then British 
telecommunications authority concluded that in fact the “ECPR does not support a 
more competitive market for telecommunications” (Noam, 2001, p. 94). 
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2.6.6 Marginal Cost Pricing Models 
Marginal cost is defined as the cost of producing one more unit of a product (Fourie, 
et al, 1995, p. 306). In the same vein incremental cost is the cost of increasing output 
by a given quantity which in turn is equal to the marginal cost when the cost is 
averaged across the quantity produced to calculate the cost for one additional unit of 
production (Noam, 2001, p. 94). In interconnection terms marginal pricing models will 
be based on the incremental cost incurred by the incumbent to interconnect with a 
new entrant or network requiring interconnection.  However the short term 
incremental costs do not include the cost of capital i.e. upfront investments in the 
network which are usually fixed costs (Noam, 2001, p. 94). Therefore economists 
regard the “long run marginal cost as the optimal pricing rule” (Noam, 2001, p. 95). 
 
Thus the long run costing approach defines the incremental cost for the total service 
and this includes both fixed costs and the incremental and marginal costs (Intven, 
2000, p. 3-26). The question to be asked is whether the interconnection pricing 
model should be based on costs for building the network (historic or embedded 
costs), present costs or even future costs. Eventually many regulators for example 
Oftel and the FCC have settled for a forwarding looking cost model called LRIC 
based on a hypothetical network using best practice technology and efficient 
engineering (Noam, 2001, p. 95). A LRIC type of approach that is well designed will 
provide an estimate of the costs of an efficient operator to provide interconnection to 
a new entrant in a fully competitive market (Intven, 2000, p. 3-26). Any LRIC 
calculation will estimate the direct costs incurred by an operator over the long run to 
smoothen out any peaks in investments costs over the years and will also include 
capital costs for the costs of financing the interconnection facilities. Joint and 
common costs are also included and are calculated forward looking, according to the 
costs that an efficient operator will incur to provide the service. According to Noam 
(2001) there are “two variants of LRIC i.e. Total Service Long Run Incremental Costs 
(TSLRIC) and Total Element Long Run Incremental Costs (TELRIC)” (Noam, 2001, 
p. 95). 
 
TSLRIC is defined as the total forward looking cost of a hypothetical, efficient system 
built from scratch, using the most efficient technology (Noam, 2001, p. 95).  This 
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approach was developed by the FCC and measures the difference in cost of 
producing and not producing a service (Intven, 2000, p. 3-26). 
 
TELRIC on the other hand although similar to TSLRIC is not the cost of the total 
service but rather the cost of the unbundled elements that are used to provide the 
service (Noam, 2001, p. 95). This approach was also developed by the FCC and 
includes the incremental cost resulting from the adding or subtracting a specific 
network element in the long run together with the proportionate joint and common 
costs (Intven, 2000, p. 3-26).  
 
There are five major steps to deriving TELRIC: creating a hypothetical 
network based on future needs, a breakdown of the network into unbundled 
elements, the assignment of costs to the unbundled network elements (cost of 
constructing the network element, operating and maintaining the element and 
the allocation of overhead expenses), forecasting of a hypothetical usage rate 
based on current and future demand and lastly calculate the per unit cost of 
the specific network element by dividing total costs of the network element by 
the projected usage rate ( Noam, 2001, p. 97). 
 
Although generally accepted as best practice there is disadvantages to the use of 
the LRIC approach particularly in developing country environments (Intven, 2000, p. 
3-26). This model could be “inappropriate where there is cross subsidisation i.e. 
where end user prices are set far below costs” (Intven, 2000, p. 3-26). This model 
could also be problematic where incumbents are inefficient and the implementation 
of the LRIC model will not allow an inefficient operator to recover all its costs and 
could be a threat to the incumbents‟ sustainability (Noam, 2001).   
 
2.6.7 The waterbed effect must be recognised when regulating prices 
Prices charged by telecommunications companies are interdependent (Schiff, 2007, 
p. 23). Decreasing the price of one component will cause another component to rise 
hence the waterbed effect (Schiff, 2007, p. 23). This effect will prevail if operators are 
reluctant to absorb a decrease in revenue and will counter this by raising retail prices 
for example or by reducing capital costs (Schiff, 2007, p. 23). A caution is that if we 
ignore these “linkages between prices when doing market definitions this could lead 
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to a definition that is too wide or narrow” (Schiff, 2007, p.23). However there are 
debates on the consequences of regulating interconnection rates and how existence 
of a waterbed effect needs to be acknowledged, that is where the “downward 
pressure on interconnection rates in a regulated market could have the effect of 
increasing prices in un-regulated markets eg retail prices, handset subsidies” (Schiff, 
2007, p. 3)  
 
2.6.8 Access deficit charges are paid to operators to compensate them for prices 
below costs 
In the liberalisation process incumbent operators are expected to continue to rollout 
services to improve teledensity (Intven, 2000). In the past operators were able to 
achieve this by cross-subsidising the costs of these loss making service from more 
lucrative service offerings (Intven, 2000). However with tariff-rebalancing where 
prices are regulated to trend towards being cost oriented incumbent operators are 
reluctant to continue with loss making rural rollouts. To compensate for this 
incumbents are offered an access deficit charge. New entrants usually do not have 
these roll-out obligations and are requested to contribute to a Universal Service 
Obligation fund. Intven acknowledges that “it is good practice to ensure that these 
charges are separated from interconnection charges” (Intven, 2000, p. 3-31). 
Furthermore the WTO regulation reference paper requires USO and ADC to be 
reflected separately (Intven, 2000, p. 3-31)  
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2.7 The conceptual framework used to design the research approach and 
analyse data 
 
Figure 3 : The Conceptual Framework: STAGES OF THE REGULATORY PROCESS 
 
 Stage 1   Stage 2    Stage 3 
    
 Assess 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  *Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 96 
Prepared by: Chetty, 2011 
 
The concepts used to design the research approach are illustrated in Figure 3. The 
central concept to the study is drawn from Baldwin and Cave‟s three stage process 
for regulation i.e. the “enactment of enabling legislation, the creation of regulatory 
administration and rules and the bringing to bear of these rules on the identified 
institutions” (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 96). Concepts explored in Stage 1 are related 
to the legislation that has been promulgated and an assessment of the efficacy of the 
legislation‟s enablement of regulatory processes for interconnection regulation. The 
legislation is tested for ambiguity and gaps, strengths and weaknesses are identified. 
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In Stage 2 concepts such as demand and supply substitutabilities and product 
complementarities are explored with the view to defining relevant markets. Next, 
competitive conditions are explored using concepts such as market concentration, 
market share and barriers to entry in relevant markets. Stage 3 explores imposition 
of pro-competitive methods such as wholesale call termination price determination, 
asymmetrical prices and price models such as LRIC and divestiture.    
 
It is important to note however that the conceptual framework illustrated above 
however does not assume that the processes shown above need to be conducted in 
the sequence as illustrated. The market review process for example can be 
conducted ex-ante or ex-post. However it does not have to be one or the other as 
there could be a balance between competition policy processes and ex-ante 
processes. The cost based pricing study could also be conducted in parallel with the 
market definition process. 
 
 2.8 Summary  
 
Interconnection is contentious issue but is an important regulatory tool and in the 
past, in the days of AT&T has been used to entrench monopoly. More recently it is 
used as a tool to enhance competition. Entrenched incumbent telecoms companies 
hold the balance of power in settling interconnection agreements and can 
strategically use interconnection to dominate markets and keep new entrants out. 
Interconnection between telecoms operators takes place at different levels and 
includes concepts such as the co-location of equipment at data facilities. Before 
regulations can be prescribed it is important to define markets, assess 
competitiveness in the markets and impose pro-competitive measures to remedy in-
effective competition. Importantly the actual rates themselves need to be cost-based 
and an exercise needs to be performed to assess the costs. Different economic 
models can be used to determine rates and marginal cost models such as LRIC can 
be used to benchmark costs of an efficient operator. 
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A conceptual framework is developed against which the research design and 
analysis of data will be done and encapsulates the main concepts discussed in this 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY USED TO ANALYSE PROCESSES FOR 
INTERCONNECTION REGULATION IN INDIA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Processes to arrive at interconnection rates or wholesale call termination rates for 
call termination in South Africa, that are acceptable to all i.e. consumer lobby groups, 
operators, government, opposition political parties, the regulator, the competition 
commission and the media have been fraught with problems. The issue of 
interconnection rate regulation has attracted substantial media attention for the last 
few years. Certain opposition party members in government have called for state 
intervention at certain points in the process. Successive Communication ministers 
have called operators to book but in doing so have bypassed legislative processes 
earning the ire of the sector regulator and operators. At various stages of the 
process incumbents have threatened to take legal action against the regulator due to 
process not being followed correctly. Thus the processes to arrive at interconnection 
rates have been mired in disputes, challenges and contestations. 
 
The body of literature established fairly conclusively that interconnection affects 
competition and that interconnection needs to be regulated at least until competition 
is attained. The literature points to the robust processes that involve market 
assessments and cost analyses amongst other things that need to be performed 
before rulings can be made.  
 
3.1 The Research Problem 
 
The research problem is concerned with the efficacy of the processes for prescribing 
interconnection rates in South Africa. As has been described earlier South Africa has 
one of the highest telecommunications costs in the world and part of the cause is 
attributed to the high cost of interconnection or call termination rates. South African 
authorities have been wrestling with this problem for many years, the process of 
which was seemingly bogged down in a morass of processes, contestations and red 
tape. Not many studies have been untaken to document and analyse the processes 
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engaged in by the South African authorities in arriving at call termination rates. This 
piece of research seeks to document the processes and determine strengths and 
weaknesses and lessons learnt. 
 
Interconnection agreements between telecommunications operators in South Africa 
are stacked heavily in favour of the large established operators, making policy 
formulation and regulatory intervention important in promoting effective competition 
for this sector. Weak policy and regulatory mechanisms allow established operators 
to use their market positions to keep interconnection costs above actual costs 
incurred by them and because they are left unchecked result in high call costs to end 
users. Furthermore established operators seemingly impose high interconnection 
costs directly or indirectly on rivals who require their infrastructure and services thus 
rendering them uncompetitive.  
 
The South African telecommunications sector is characterized by high 
interconnection prices leading to high end user pricing. South Africa‟s 
telecommunications policy and regulatory reform process has struggled to arrive at 
reasonably priced interconnection rates compared to other developing countries. 
Telecommunications prices in India for example are amongst the cheapest in the 
world possibly due to their focus on interconnection pricing. Both countries went 
through major telecommunications reform but the outcomes have been different with 
respect end user to pricing.  
 
South Africa‟s process for the regulation of interconnection rates was stalled for an 
extended period due to impasses on processes that needed to be followed. Some of 
the disagreements on what constitute an operator with significant market power 
(SMP) for example, and the process challenges that ensued stalled the process for 
many years. Interconnection guidelines have been issued in 2000, 2002 and 
subsequently in 2007 but were only finalized in 2010. India on the other hand has 
progressively reduced interconnection charges over the similar period. 
 
Moreover, South Africa is in danger of losing its position as mobile leader in Africa 
and with it the economic benefits that come from improved telecommunications 
penetration. It has been shown previously in the report that high telecommunications 
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costs is a developmental issue and can have a debilitating effect on the economy 
because it has an impact on access, affordability, cost of doing business, rollout of 
new media and participation in the global economy. Furthermore the high cost of 
mobile calls erodes the disposable income of the poorest members of South African 
society by displacing requirements for food and other essentials with 
telecommunications costs.  
 
High mobile costs further widen the chasm of the digital divide because of 
unaffordability; further isolating South Africans from the rest of the world. Projects on 
poverty alleviation involving telecommunication services are also severely impacted 
by the high cost of telecommunications in South Africa. Many educational programs 
especially for rural communities rely on mobile service that cannot be rolled out cost 
effectively with current pricing structures. Senior government leaders have 
articulated the need for lower telecommunications cost to leverage ICT opportunities 
for using South Africa as a destination for business process outsourcing and call 
centres hubs. This aspiration is far from reaching the objectives. 
 
The analysis of the problem being researched will lead to a better understanding of 
the processes by systematically describing, explaining and evaluating the processes 
engaged in by the authorities to arrive at an interconnection rate which was shown 
earlier to be a large factor in overall telecommunications costs to the end user. It will 
determine strengths and weaknesses in the processes and will suggest 
improvements to be made if any, to the processes. 
 
3.2 The Research Purpose 
 
The purpose of this research is to analyse processes for the South African situation 
using the conceptual framework developed during the literature review (Fig 3) by, in 
summary, firstly investigating how legislation enables interconnection regulation, 
secondly by investigating processes for creating regulatory administration and rules 
including processes for defining markets and assessing competition and thirdly by 
investigating processes for remedying the situation of market failure if indeed it 
exists. Strengths and weaknesses are determined and lessons learnt are extracted 
by drawing parallels with processes engaged in by the Indian authorities over a 
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similar period to determine any differences in approaches adopted by the two 
countries 
 
India has a workable process for interconnection rate determination as is evident 
from TRAI‟s latest determinations in 2009 that have reduced rates by a further 30%. 
An analysis of the processes being followed in both countries will be useful to policy 
makers, regulators and consumer groups.  By examining the process followed in 
India it is hoped that lessons can be learnt that can be reported on and be made 
available to interested parties.   
 
3.3 The Research Question 
 
The key question to be answered is: to what extent does the approach to regulating 
interconnection rates adopted by the South African Regulator present a favourable 
outcome with reference to the approach adopted by the Indian Regulator?  
 
Sub questions related to the research topic are: 
3.3.1 To what extent has the approach to market definition promoted an effective 
regulatory process? 
3.3.2 To what extent has the review of the effectiveness of competition provided a 
valuable component of the regulatory process? 
3.3.3 How does the determination of pro-competitive remedies strengthen the 
regulatory process? 
3.3.4 How does the process for determining interconnection rates strengthen the 
process? 
3.3.5 What lessons can be learnt from the approach to interconnection regulation 
adopted in India? 
 
3.4 The Research Approach 
 
This research is a qualitative inquiry as it is a type of inquiry in which “the qualities, 
characteristics or properties of a phenomenon are examined for better understanding 
and explanation” (Henning, Smit & van Rensburg, 2004, p. 5). According to Bogdan 
and Taylor two major theoretical perspectives have dominated social research i.e. 
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positivism and phenomenology (Bogdan & Taylor, 1984, p. 1). The positivist “seeks 
the facts or causes of social phenomena whereas the phenomenologist is committed 
to understanding social phenomena from the actors own perspective” (Bogdan & 
Taylor, 1984, p. 2). The positivist seeks to understand causes by methods that 
produce data that can be statistically analysed. The phenomenologist seeks 
understanding through qualitative methods such as interviewing, document analysis, 
participant observation and others.  
 
3.4.1 The research uses an interpretivist framework 
However, gradually the role of the researcher as “co-creator of meaning” became 
more important (Henning et al, 2004, p. 19). The “qualitative project thus took an 
interpretive turn” (Henning et al, 2004, p. 19). The interpretivist believes that 
“measurement is fallible and encourages varieties of data and different sources and 
analysis methods in order to strive for validity” (Henning et al, 2004, p. 20). Thus this 
study lends itself to a qualitative analysis since it seeks to gain understanding by the 
actors own perspectives through a method of interviewing and document analysis 
using an interpretivist framework.  
 
3.4.2 The research is exploratory and explanatory 
In general research design involves specifying exactly “who or what is to be studied 
and when, how and for what purpose a study is to be undertaken” (Babbie, 2001a, p. 
90). Usually the choice of research design for any research project is a function of 
the purpose of the research being undertaken (Babbie, 2001a, p. 91). Babbie 
indicates three purposes of research which purposes may also be a combination 
thereof.  
 
The first purpose of research is to do exploratory studies for reasons that include a 
better understanding of a subject, to test the feasibility of undertaking a more 
extensive study or to develop methods to be employed in subsequent studies 
(Babbie, 2001a, p. 92). The second purpose of research is to describe situations and 
events (Babbie, 2001a, p. 93). In this case a researcher observes and then 
describes what is being observed. An example of descriptive research is the 2011 
South African census that seeks to describe accurately and precisely a wide variety 
of characteristics of the South African population.  
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However research is generally not limited to just being descriptive in nature and will 
require examinations of why observed patterns exist and what the patterns imply 
(Babbie, 2001a, p. 93). Following on, is the third purpose of research which is 
explanatory in nature. This type of study asks the question “why”. Whereas 
descriptive studies ask the question what, where, when and how explanatory studies 
will ask why certain phenomena take place. For example a research project of a 
descriptive nature may report the attitudes of various segments of the population to 
people living with AIDS whilst an explanatory study might determine that females are 
more accepting of people with AIDS than males which might assist the researcher in 
determining that gender plays a role in people‟s attitudes.   
 
The purpose of this particular study is to seek answers to the questions set out in 3.3 
above. The questions seek to describe the processes that were followed and explore 
why certain paths or models were chosen, why regulation has taken a long while to 
be developed and how and why various stakeholders responded in the ways that 
they did. The purpose of this particular study is therefore descriptive, exploratory and 
explanatory in nature using an interpretivist framework.  
 
3.4.3 The units of analysis 
The next step in the research design is to specify what or who is to be studied that 
will give relevant answers to the questions posed. Babbie clarifies that it is not 
important what you call given units of analysis but the key is to be clear as to what 
your unit of analysis is (Babbie, 2001a). One of the central units of analysis in this 
study is the regulatory processes for interconnection regulation. The regulatory 
process as define previously can be broken down into three steps that make up the 
units of analysis for this piece of research. They are the regulatory processes 
comprising three stages: “the enactment of enabling legislation, the creation of 
regulatory administrations and rules and the bringing to bear of those rules on 
persons or institutions sought to be influenced or controlled” (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, 
p. 96). These three stages make up the units of analysis. 
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3.4.4  The case study research method 
A case study approach was taken for this research paper. A case study may involve 
the study of “events, roles and relationships” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001b, p. 281). 
Amongst other things a case study may focus on best practice, policy 
implementation and evaluation making this approach ideally suited to the case in 
South Africa for processes for interconnection rate regulation and the case in India 
for interconnection rate regulation. This approach lends itself to this study as it 
investigates the processes taken by a specific Authority in South Africa i.e. ICASA in 
regulating interconnection rates. Similarly it also investigates the approach taken by 
the regulatory Authority of India, TRAI for similar processes. Leedy states that case 
studies may focus on a single case but more importantly he clarifies that case 
studies may be used to study two or more cases that may be different in keys items 
to make comparisons. The case study method was chosen for this research paper 
as it involves South African practices with parallels drawn with practices in India 
(Leedy & Ormond, 2003, p. 135).  
 
The conceptual framework shown in Fig 3 will be the basis on which the case study 
is undertaken. It shows the purpose of the study, the principles guiding the study and 
has led to the formulation of the research questions set out in 3.3 above. Multiple 
sources of data will be used which is typical of case study methods involving a 
variety of informants and documentation analysis (Babbie and Mouton, 2001b, 
p.282). 
 
3.5 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Methods of data collection involved interviews and examination of appropriate written 
documents (Leedy & Ormond, 2003, p.144). 
 
3.5.1 Data Collection 
Interviews 
Interviews were conducted with various experts in the field. Interviewees could be 
broadly be categorised into three categories: experts that were or are employed by 
ICASA or TRAI or other regulatory institutions, experts employed by the main 
telecommunications operators and thirdly experts that are consultants in the 
63 
 
telecommunications sector. The assistance of key informants in the 
telecommunications regulatory field in South Africa and in India were sought to set 
the direction for the interviews to follow. The researcher translated the information 
provided by the key informants into a set of questions that gave direction to the 
interviews that were conducted (see Appendix 1). The interviews were semi 
structured and questions were used as a means to extract information.  
 
The interview questions was a general plan of enquiry and although questions were 
developed to guide the interview, very rarely was the set of questions strictly 
adhered to. The questions were used more as probes to guide the conversations. 
The discussions with subject matter experts took on the form of a discussion about 
the interconnection regulatory process. The participants did most of the talking and 
raised certain topics and themes that were explored. Participants expressed views 
and often prompted the interviewer to agree or disagree with what was being said.  
 
Preparation for the interviews involved the understanding of the interconnection 
regulatory concerns beforehand so that intelligent conversations could ensue and so 
that the interviews could flow in a smooth and continuous manner. The approach 
that was taken was that the participants had specific information that needed to be 
drawn out. The researcher participated in the discussion to allow the conversations 
to flow smoothly but was cautious about not dominating the discussion so the 
approach was to allow the respondent to speak freely. However the researcher did 
express opinions when the conversations demanded and often this led to different 
paths being explored. 
 
Key informants were identified for the purpose of gathering broad perspectives on 
interconnection and specific individuals were sought out to gather their knowledge, 
experiences and opinions in the specialist fields of interconnection rate regulation.  
Key informants were drawn from the telecommunications sector. Some had 
previously been employed by the sector regulator in South Africa and India viz 
ICASA and TRAI respectively. Other informants are or have been employed in the 
regulatory divisions of the major telecommunications operators viz Telkom, 
Vodacom, Neotel, Cell C, Reliance and MTN. Others work as consultants to the 
major operators, ICASA and TRAI. 
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Table 4:  Respondents and background: South Africa 
Name Category Institution 
KEY INFORMANT  
 
Regulator/Operator Regulator/Industry 
Respondent 1 Competition Commission/ 
Operator 
CC/Industry 
Respondent 2 Regulator/Operator Dept of 
Communications/Regulator/Industry 
Respondent 3 Regulator/Operator Regulator/Industry 
Respondent 4 Operator Industry 
Respondent 5 Regulator/Operator Regulator/Industry 
Respondent 6 Consultant/Operator Industry 
Respondent 7 Consultant/USASA Universal Service Agency 
Respondent 8 Consultant 
 
Industry 
 
Table 4 shows a list of respondents in South Africa and are all still involved in the 
telecommunication sector in South Africa (2011) in one form or the other.  
 
The Key Informant in South Africa was interviewed with the express purpose of 
setting direction for this research report. The Key Informant worked for both the 
regulator and the industry and has vast experience at senior levels in both. A number 
of themes emerged from the discussion with the Key Informant that were used for 
the development of interview questions and also pointed to the kind of documents 
that were required to be examined (Appendix 1). 
Table 5:  Respondents and background: India 
Name Category Institution 
KEY INFORMANT   Research Fellow/Regulator Regulator/Industry 
Respondent 1 Regulator Regulator 
Respondent 2 Regulator Regulator 
Respondent 3 Academic/Advocacy Group Advocacy Group/Indian University 
Respondent 4 Academic/ ICT Consultant Indian University 
Respondent 5 Academic Indian University 
Respondent 6 Academic Indian University 
Respondent 7 Consultant/Advocacy Group Advocacy Group 
Respondent 8 Consultant 
 
Industry 
Respondent 9 Research Officer Industry/Indian University 
 
Table 5 shows respondents in India drawn from a sector that have in-depth 
knowledge of the telecommunications sector in India. 
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The Key Informant in India and was interviewed with the express purpose of setting 
direction for the Indian segment of the research report. The Key Informant has a long 
association with the Telecoms Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and the 
Department of Telecoms and was involved amongst other things in interconnection 
regulation in the early days.  
 
A number of themes emerged from the discussion with the Key Informant that were 
used for the development of interview questions and also pointed to documents that 
were required to be examined (Appendix 1). 
 
Although the distribution of selected respondents is significantly different between 
South Africa and India, any bias, views shared and quality of information issues are 
corroborated by a thorough document analysis process. It must be noted however 
that this research report is a case study of the Republic of South Africa with a 
perspective from India. 
 
Document Analysis 
Document analysis was also undertaken as a means of gathering research data for 
analysis together with the interviews as set out above. Content analysis is the “study 
of recorded human communications” (Leedy & Ormond, 2003, p. 304). Content 
analysis lends itself perfectly to this research study as it involves the study of laws, 
constitutions, emails messages, web pages and letters amongst others. It answers 
the questions of “who said what to whom and for what effect” (Leedy & Ormond, 
2003, p. 305). Babbie advises that it is not advisable to study all content that is 
available but rather sample appropriate material.  
 
In this study the legislation pertaining to telecommunications, guidelines issued by 
the authorities, findings documents, policy documents and regulations were analysed 
to establish the processes that were followed by the authorities. The coding of the 
particular content that was done by transforming the data into a standardised form 
according to the conceptual framework established in Chapter two, Fig 3. Thus 
content analysis was done by codifying from the documents certain patterns relating 
to interconnection regulation that involved legislation, how markets were defined, 
how market failure was established and remedies invoked. Furthermore documents 
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were codified and certain models and patterns that appeared repeatedly established 
as being significant for this study were grouped into themes to be studied.    
 
The documentation in South Africa consisted of the Telecommunications Act, the 
Electronic Communications Act, the Competition Act, governments gazettes issued 
by ICASA consisting of invitations to comment, findings documents, guidelines, 
media releases, draft regulations, regulations, notices, licences issued to Operators, 
Operator responses, reference interconnection agreements and charts of accounts. 
 
In India document gathering involved the analysis of documentation mainly available 
on the TRAI website, the Indian Telecoms Act and a strategic document published in 
1998, Consultation paper No. 98/3 that according to the Key Informant set the 
direction for Interconnection regulatory processes in India.  
 
3.5.2 Data Analysis 
In this qualitative analysis the researcher commenced with a large body of data 
gathered from the interview and document analysis process and through inductive 
reasoning reduced the data into small sets of abstract themes (Leedy et al, 2003, p. 
150). The researcher engaged in an active process of interpreting the data to take 
note of issues that are significant and discarding issues that are not regarded as 
being material (Leedy et al, 2003, p. 150). Common threads emerged and these 
were gathered under broad themes using the conceptual framework (Fig 3) to 
contextualise the themes that were identified. 
 
There was a continuous process of interpreting the data that was presented to 
identify general categories or themes. Sub themes were also identified and a sense 
of what the data meant began to take shape as the analysis progressed. The 
analysis process concluded by drawing parallels with the processes engaged in by 
the Indian Authority and lessons learnt were summarised. 
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3.5.2.1 Validity was a strongpoint of this Qualitative research however 
reliability was questionable at times 
 
In research validity refers to the “extent to which the empirical measures adequately 
reflect the real meaning of the concept under consideration” (Babbie, 2001a, p. 143). 
This can be interpreted for this piece of research, the extent to which the data 
gathered from interviews and content analysis correlates with the actual 
interconnection regulatory processes. 
 
Validity in this research study was assured as it is a factor of having interviewed the 
very people that were involved in the development of the processes for 
interconnection regulation in South Africa and India.  Babbie is clear when he 
advances that validity in field research is “superior as compared with surveys and 
experiments” (Babbie, 2001a, p. 299). Field researchers can give detailed 
illustrations instead of merely specifying concepts (Babbie, 2001a, p. 299).  
 
The reliability in field research however is problematic according to Babbie (Babbie, 
2001a, p. 299). Reliability means, for this research topic, that the observations and 
assessments made can be repeated over a number of different interviews and by 
different researchers and will not differ much. However it cannot be guaranteed that 
different researchers will not assess respondents differently to that of this 
researcher. In fact it is probably certain that other researchers may interpret 
responses differently. However a system of triangulation was used to ensure 
reliability as two different research methods were used for this field research. Semi-
structured interviewing was coupled with content or documentation analysis. 
Furthermore after interviews were conducted they were immediately written up and 
made available to the same respondents for comment. Respondents that did 
comment made certain adjustments to some of the interviewer‟s observations.  
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3.5.2.2 Ethical considerations included assuring respondents that comments 
will not be attributed to any single respondent  
 
Interconnection has had been mentioned previously is highly contentious and no 
more so than in South Africa. Litigation has often not been ruled out through the 
entire process so the confidentiality of the respondent statements was assured. In 
fact some of the respondents were very reluctant to speak to the researcher unless 
comments were not to be attributed directly to them. 
 
Care therefore was taken not to attribute comments directly to respondents. 
 
 
 
3.6 Summary  
 
In essence, the problem that was researched was the ineffectual processes 
conducted by ICASA that did not achieve the desired outcome of cost-based 
interconnection rates. Parallels are also drawn with similar processes in India. The 
research question sought to unravel how processes have unfolded over the years 
and the strengths, weaknesses and lessons learnt are portrayed. The research 
design was exploratory and interpretivist in nature and a case study method was 
used to gather information through interviews and document analysis. Analysis was 
accomplished by codifying data gathered into themes that were examined for 
patterns and commonalities so that inferences could be made and lessons learnt 
could be extracted.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
REVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICA’S MARKET REVIEW APPROACH, KEY 
LEGISLATION, REGULATIONS AND OTHER MATERIALS 
 
The conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2 (Fig 3) set the approach by which 
data was to be gathered and tested against the framework that was developed. 
Seven themes emerged that will be discussed here. 
 
The conceptual framework began with an analysis of telecommunications legislation. 
It followed with a review of how markets were defined using certain concepts such a 
demand and supply substitutabilities and complementarities and economic tools 
such as the hypothetical monopolist test. Processes on how the markets were 
assessed for competitiveness were investigated using concepts such as market 
concentration, market share and barriers to market entry. Competition law or anti-
trust interventions to propose pro-competitive measures were investigated such as 
imposing cost based pricing, accounting separation, pricing models e.g. LRIC, 
structural separation and divestiture.  
 
4.1 Themes from interviews conducted 
 
Seven themes emerged from the interviews conducted with the Key Informant and 
other respondents. Care was taken to preserve the anonymity of the Key Informant 
and the eight respondents (collectively referred to as the respondents).  However 
one of the respondents pointed the researcher to a paper that was written by the 
respondent that captures the views of this particular respondent. Therefore an 
exception is made as this article is referenced directly in this report, as it exists in the 
public domain and was referred to often during the interview with this particular 
respondent.  
 
4.1.1 Theme 1 – The ECA defined interconnection regulatory processes are onerous  
The majority of the respondents believe that the ECA effectively promulgates 
interconnection regulatory processes but they share a common view that the ECA 
has promulgated a very onerous process. One respondent suggested that there was 
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no real power in the previous Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Respondent 3 SA, 
personal communication, 8 March 2011). The Telecommunications Act according to 
this Respondent was promulgated mainly to deal with the issues of managing the 
Telkom monopoly. The ECA however was brought about to manage the liberalisation 
of the telecommunications market, the main driver of which was convergence. 
(Respondent 3 SA, personal communication, 8 March 2011). Previously, the Minister 
established Ministerial interconnection guidelines for Telkom which were supposed 
to be in force until May 2000 (Respondent 3 SA, personal communication, 8 March 
2011). Thereafter, ICASA was to determine interconnection fees and charges. The 
original Ministerial determination stated that Telkom's interconnection charges 
should as soon as practicable be based on its long-run incremental costs (LRIC), but 
did not prescribe what Telkom should do in the meantime, preventing ICASA setting 
and enforcing interconnection price regulation until LRIC was feasible (Respondent 4 
SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). Whilst interconnection agreements had 
to be lodged with ICASA and the regulator was to resolve any disputes, it lacked 
either data or any guiding framework within which to do this (Respondent 3 SA, 
personal communication, 8 March 2011) 
 
Respondents agreed that with the passing into law of the ECA in 2006 the processes 
were now clearly defined. A respondent pointed out that although the market 
definition process in the ECA was developed according to the European model it had 
one striking difference in that it had in contracts to the European model an ex-ante 
approach to market definition (Respondent 2 SA, personal communication, 5 May 
2011). The European Union approach meant that a Framework had to be 
established before regulations could be prescribed (Respondent 4 SA, personal 
communication, 5 May 2011).  With the ECA, Chapter 10 required that the regulator 
had to do a study to define the market and only if it was found that there is not 
significant competition then only could it issue call termination rates (Respondent 4 
SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). Thus a full market investigation had to 
be concluded first before regulations could be prescribed (Respondent 4 SA, 
personal communication, 5 May 2011). 
 
In the European Union context although the market definition process is similar to 
Chapter 10 of the ECA this did not have to be done before regulations could be 
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prescribed (Respondent 3 SA, personal communication, 8 March 2011). Although 
legal opinion confirmed that the ex-ante process needed to be followed this could 
have been challenged had ICASA pursued this with more vigour (Respondent 3 SA, 
personal communication, 8 March 2011). Advocate Gilbert Marcus SC confirmed 
that ICASA could have short-circuited the process because it had done sufficient 
work according to him to issue the regulations. “The ECA does not say that 
regulations needed to be prescribed subject to the market definition exercise” 
(Patricia de Lille, 2009). The processes could have been implemented in parallel 
(Respondent 3 SA, personal communication, 8 March 2011). 
 
Although the ECA before passing into law was circulated for comment, ICASA was 
not cognisant of the complexity involved in executing the terms and conditions of 
chapter 10 at the time (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). It 
was only during implementation “like many telecommunication policies” that the 
challenges became evident (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 
2011). A Respondent that was with ICASA at the time, suggested that the Operators‟ 
were probably aware that requirements were onerous but did not raise this during 
the commentary process (Respondent 5 SA, personal communication, 9 May 2011).  
 
Respondents suggested that it was not relevant whether the process that was 
prescribed by the ECA was efficient or not but ICASA as a creature of statute had to 
follow the ECA to the letter (Respondent 8 SA, personal communication, 2 February 
2011).  
 
A respondent reminded the researcher that notwithstanding the ECA it must be 
noted as well that it is required that all parties comply with the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 
May 2011). Therefore it is critical to note that “process is everything” (Respondent 4 
SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). The inference is that had ICASA not 
followed the process as defined by law, it would have opened itself to challenges as 
per the PAJA. 
 
Most respondents concurred that the process followed under the ECA therefore was 
the right process whereas in the past it seemed that “ICASA wanted to get to an 
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outcome that was already pre-determined” (Respondent 4 SA, personal 
communication, 5 May 2011). The common view held by respondents was that the 
ECA however is onerous and is very complex to implement. A Respondent further 
suggested that it was also developed for a “managed liberalisation” strategy but this 
needed to evolve into a set of legislation that will support a fully liberalised market 
that is evolving very quickly. “Some minor changes to the Telecoms act could have 
probably fostered a better outcome” (Respondent 3 SA, personal communication, 8 
March 2011).  
 
The Chapter 10 process then is too complex and overly prescriptive (Respondent 3 
SA, personal communication, 8 March 2011). There should be room for the Authority 
to have more latitude (Respondent 3 SA, personal communication, 8 March 2011). 
There are too many steps and they are onerous and require a skill set that is not 
readily available (Respondent 3 SA, personal communication, 8 March 2011). The 
entire economic exercise that needs to be done is very long and too complex as it 
requires a lot of data from the operators which ICASA did not have at the time 
(Respondent 3 SA, personal communication, 8 March 2011). 
 
The framework for defining markets therefore needs to be simplified (Respondent 3 
SA, personal communication, 8 March 2011). The ex-ante framework needs to be 
removed and replaced with a framework that will allow the process to be concluded 
concurrently with the issuing of regulations (Respondent 3 SA, personal 
communication, 8 March 2011). The process in the end was expedited because of 
the vast public interest that was generated around this issue (Respondent 3 SA, 
personal communication, 8 March 2011).  
 
To add to the complexity of the ECA there are differences in opinion too as to how 
the ECA is interpreted (Respondent 3 SA, personal communication, 8 March 2011). 
The requirements of Chapter 10 in the ECA are not in themselves problematic 
however the prescriptions in Chapter 7 did not tie back to the requirements in 
Chapter 10 (Respondent 3 SA, personal communication, 8 March 2011). For 
example under Chapter 7 interconnection pricing could be regulated by the Authority 
but the definitions in the chapter complicated the implementation thereof 
(Respondent 3 SA, personal communication, 8 March 2011). 
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4.1.2 Theme 2 – The market analysis process was eventually carried out effectively 
by ICASA  
Some of the respondents shared the view that the regulatory process that was 
followed in the beginning from around 2000 was not a very efficient process. It 
seemed that the regulator in the past “took short cuts to get to an end objective that 
was almost predetermined” (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 
2011). Respondents from Industry suggested that this combined with the lack of 
continuity with ICASA councillors, poor skills retention, inappropriate use of the skills 
available at ICASA, internal strife at ICASA all contributed to a process that did not 
yield any results at that stage. As a consequence this resulted in many legal 
challenges from the operators when regulations were issued in 2000. Telkom 
challenged these regulations especially strongly in the earlier days. So call 
termination and interconnection regulations “did not get anywhere” (Respondent 4 
SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). 
 
In 2007 ICASA released a set of draft framework regulations which were never 
finalised and instead opted to proceed on a market-by-market basis as prescribed by 
the ECA (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). The reaction 
from the operators was that they were going to challenge ICASA in court to force 
ICASA to follow the correct process (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 
May 2011). This also contributed to the extraordinary delay where the regulations 
were only finalised in 2010 (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 
2011).  
 
However ICASA did not follow through on this until government intervention in the 
form of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee and Ministerial intervention in 2009. 
However “the process that was followed subsequently to get to the regulations of 
2010 was by and large a good process. This is evidenced by the fact that there are 
no legal challenges to the process” (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 
May 2011).  “However ICASA could have stated more explicitly what exactly it 
wanted to achieve by prescribing interconnection rate regulations. This was always 
only inferred but not stated overtly by ICASA. This Respondent had a strong view 
that this will be problematic in the future when it comes to measuring the success of 
the regulatory processes” (Respondent 2 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011).  
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This process is not unique to SA but as has been stated, in many ways it was overly 
prescriptive and onerous (Respondent 1 SA, personal communication, 12 November 
2010). The economic analysis that had to be done required an enormous amount of 
data and it was time consuming as well and it needed the appropriate resources to 
be able to complete this exercise successfully and within the timeframes required. It 
did not give ICASA much flexibility (Respondent 1 SA, personal communication, 12 
November 2010).  
 
Some Respondents shared a view that instead of a market review process a 
benchmarking study of other jurisdictions could have sufficed “It would have been 
much easier to have done a benchmark study of other countries in a similar position 
with SA in terms of development as a starting point” (Respondent 6 SA, personal 
communication, 23 April 2011). The Respondents drew the Researcher‟s attention to 
the fact that Operators in South Africa possibly also operate in other jurisdictions that 
would have been chosen for benchmarking, including looking at best practice.  
 
Most Respondents shared a view that a strength in the process followed was that 
ICASA engaged very robustly with the operators which made for a situation where 
there will probably be no legal challenges from the operators with regard to the 
process that was followed.  
 
Note that although interested parties had an opportunity to make comments on the 
regulatory processes that were being proposed to be followed in the ECA but nobody 
really anticipated the challenges that ICASA faced with in implementing some of the 
provisions of the Act (Respondent 5 SA, personal communication, 9 May 2011). It is 
up to ICASA to point out some of these challenges and make recommendations for 
amendments to the ECA (Respondent 5 SA, personal communication, 9 May 2011).   
 
A common view held by Respondents is that the market review process in hindsight 
however was very comprehensive and hence it is not anticipated that any 
complications will arise from the implementation of the interconnection regulations. It 
also places ICASA in a favourable position in that the regulations are in fact very 
practical and should be able to be implemented easily.. 
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4.1.3 Theme 3 – The process has catered for asymmetric call termination rates but 
it is not supported by all stakeholders 
Respondents held differing views as to the fairness of prescribing asymmetric call 
termination rates, albeit temporarily through a glide path for Cell C and Telkom‟s 8-ta 
subsidiary. Respondents confirmed that the new regulations provides for 
asymmetrical rates. Respondents affiliated to the smaller mobile operators held the 
view that this is a positive development from a competition point of view in that new 
operators are given an opportunity to compete with incumbent operators in the 
market. Justification for this was given by Respondents as being that asymmetry is 
an effective mechanism to increase the level of competition with more operators 
coming into the market which will have a positive effect in the retail prices and choice 
for the consumer. Furthermore it was suggested that asymmetry is premised on the 
fact that incumbent operators have an established market share that they can use to 
leverage the cost of providing their services without the burden of having to invest in 
infrastructure and compete with other operators in the market at the same time, 
unlike new entrants into the market (Key Informant SA, personal communication, 5 
October 2010).  
 
There is a case also to be made for keeping call termination rates for fixed and 
mobile different as there is no fixed to mobile substitution. “One cannot take one‟s 
fixed line with you when travelling about hence no substitution” (Key Informant SA, 
personal communication, 5 October 2010). Some Respondents suggested that fixed 
and mobile will always service different needs. Although Telkom has complained 
about the supposedly low rate that it receives for calls terminated on its network 
(0.29c) benchmarks have shown that in other jurisdictions this is in fact very high 
(Key Informant SA, personal communication, 5 October 2010). 
 
However the main weakness in the process, some Respondents suggested, is the 
inconsistent approach ICASA has taken in using the market definition to get to its 
end objectives. In one instant ICASA declared each operator as a monopoly in the 
call termination market when calls are terminated on its own network. This means 
then that all operators should have been treated equally.  Yet ICASA used another 
market definition i.e. the fact that some operators don‟t have a majority in the entire 
market as sufficient reason to give some operators an asymmetric rate (Respondent 
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4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). “However there is a glide path here 
and it reduces over time. So it is not a battle that the operators want to fight because 
the outcome in the end is not an incorrect outcome” (Respondent 4 SA, personal 
communication, 5 May 2011). 
 
At least two Respondents shared a differing view as to why interconnection rates 
were increased by MTN and Vodacom just before Cell C‟s entry into the market 
place. One respondent reminded the Researcher that it is often quoted by various 
commentators that MTN and Vodacom increased their prices to keep others out of 
the sector (Respondent 6 SA, personal communication, 23 April 2011). In 1993 the 
mobile operators were charging each other between 10c and 20c for call termination 
and Telkom about R1.19 (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). 
This went up substantially because of the majority ownership of Telkom in Vodacom, 
Telkom was in fact receiving a large portion of the charge that they were paying to 
Vodacom for call termination back in the form of profits through their majority 
shareholding in Vodacom. So this large increase was implemented more to balance 
this effect than as has been stated to keep other players e.g. Cell C out of the 
industry (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). 
 
Another Respondent stated that Cell C were net beneficiaries of interconnect 
revenues at the time because of the sheer volume of calls terminated on the Cell C 
network by Vodacom, MTN and Telkom. The Respondent suggested that COA/CAM 
could have revealed this. There is an opposing view regarding the increase in 
termination rates before the entry of Cell C in the market. A consultant to the industry 
that was one of the respondents believes that this is a fallacy that still persists that 
“in 1999 Vodacom and MTN conspired to raise interconnection rates to keep Cell C 
out” (Vella, 2011, p.55). According to Vella (2011) the raising of the rates benefited 
Cell C as it was a net earner of interconnection revenues in the first few years of its 
operations. The new rates also were in line with international fixed/mobile 
interconnection rates at the time. Thus Cell C‟s growth was partially funded by the 
incumbents at the time. 
 
Now ten years later after Cell C struggled to build up a ten percent market 
share the regulations prescribe reduced interconnection rates. ICASA has got 
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it wrong yet again by allowing cheaper termination rates for 8-Ta, a sub-brand 
of Telkom and for Cell C that has been running for ten years (Vella, 2011, p. 
55). 
 
ICASA seems oblivious to the fact that Cell C has already benefited to a large extent 
from being a net receiver of interconnection revenues in its early days (Vella, 2011, 
p. 55). By exempting Cell C from making the availability of COA/CAM data 
mandatory has resulted in incorrect decision making.  It seems then that far from 
levelling the playing fields the “new call termination regulations rewards failures and 
penalises successes” (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). 
 
4.1.4 Theme 4 – The economic model chosen for rate regulation does not support 
the South African situation 
Respondents suggested that one has to understand what the basis is for 
interconnection costs to understand what interconnection really is. One Respondent 
further suggested that one has to understand from an international perspective what 
the basis for this rate actually is (Key Informant SA, personal communication, 5 
October 2010). The recurring theme emerging from the interviews is that there must 
be some underlying basis behind the rate that needs to be established before rates 
are prescribed. The Key Informant SA suggested that one has to understand how 
Vodacom and MTN “exchanged numbers with each other in the past to establish the 
basis for their interconnection rates” (Key Informant SA, personal communication, 5 
October 2010).  
 
Most Respondents held the view that to establish a regime for interconnection rate 
regulation there needs to an exercise conducted to understand the real costs of 
interconnection via a COA/CAM exercise that will strip out all unrelated costs. “One 
has to look at the real costs via a COA/CAM exercise which must exclude all the 
corporate sponsorships viz. rugby, soccer world cup etc” (Key Informant SA, 
personal communication, 5 October 2010). 
 
There is a prevailing view from various commentators that call rates will come down 
if interconnection rates are reduced. Most respondents from Industry were sceptical 
that this would be the case in the South African situation. 
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Respondents acknowledge that ICASA has chosen LRIC as a forward looking cost 
based model to determine interconnect rates. However some suggested that this 
might not necessarily apply to the South African situation (Respondent 4 SA, 
personal communication, 5 May 2011). One Respondent suggested an ex-post 
regulatory regime where rates are only imposed on a case by case basis when the 
Competition Commission for example find unfair market practices. “The Competition 
Commission has got it right. They do a market study every time there is potential 
issue with competition. It is part of their DNA” (Respondent 4 SA, personal 
communication, 5 May 2011).The Respondent expressed a strong view that the 
larger operators have been labelled “Big is Bad” with the incumbent label that is not 
necessarily fair (Respondent 2 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). 
 
Vella (2011) suggests that LRIC is not suitable for the developing country situation 
as it has its origins in western democracies or hard currency markets (Vella, 2011, p. 
57). Most of the equipment needed to build these networks is “denominated in these 
western currencies” (Vella, 2011, p. 57). South Africa has a currency that is highly 
volatile compared to these western currencies which make it extremely difficult to 
use the LRIC model to estimate what funds will be needed in the long run (Vella, 
2011, p. 57). Furthermore the mobile industry is already investing in fourth 
generation technology (Vella, 2011, p. 57). These new infrastructure costs cannot be 
foreseen in the medium term let alone in the long term (Vella, 2011, p. 57). 
 
It is granted that regulation should focus more on stimulating macro-economic 
benefits for the sector at large. But it should look at the negative impact of tax 
revenues being reduced as operator revenues decline as an unintended 
consequence of focusing just on reducing interconnection rates (Vella, 2011, 
p. 58).  
 
There is danger that is the telecoms sector is regulated to vigorously that venture 
capitalists that fund infrastructure development will withdraw funds from 
infrastructure project that don‟t give them healthy returns. This in turn will negatively 
impact innovation in the sector (Vella, 2011, p.58).  Regulation should therefore 
focus on efficiencies such as optimising infrastructure such as towers and 
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underground fibre optic cables” (Respondent 6 SA, personal communication, 23 April 
2011). 
 
Respondents from Industry suggested that ICASA did not take into account the 
“water bed effect” in that if you reduce one of the revenue streams then the natural 
effect is that the other revenue streams will have to be increased. The operators 
have just three main streams of income i.e. interconnection, retail pre-paid and retail 
post-paid (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). When the 
interconnection revenue stream is decreased the only other way the operators can 
use to protect revenue is to increase retail prices. “This is exactly what happened in 
Israel when interconnect rates were reduced” (Respondent 4 SA, personal 
communication, 5 May 2011). This is the water bed effect and will be a natural 
outcome of reducing interconnect revenue stream (Respondent 4 SA, personal 
communication, 5 May 2011). Reducing investment in infrastructure is not an option 
as the core business of any mobile operator is to ensure that the networks are 
capable of handling all the traffic generated by smart phones for example. Smart 
phone traffic needs about 40% more capacity than only voice traffic (Respondent 4 
SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). 
 
4.1.5 Theme 5 – The pro-competitive remedies imposed by ICASA are accepted 
but is not well supported   
There is a view from some of the Respondents that pro-competitive remedies should 
not have been imposed in this round of regulations but rather ICASA should have 
waited to see what the outcome of the regulations would be. The impression held by 
some Respondents is that ICASA have just applied what happens in other 
jurisdictions. “Often it seems that a sledgehammer is used to kill a fly” (Respondent 4 
SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). Respondents believe that ICASA has not 
chosen appropriate pro-competitive measures. “An appropriate remedy for a 
particular problem needs to be chosen” (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 
5 May 2011). For example carrier pre-selection has been mooted as a remedy for 
competition. However it is not recognised that carrier pre-selection only applies to 
the fixed line environments in other jurisdictions. This Respondent suggests that 
ICASA needs to choose the appropriate remedy to address a particular competition 
issue. 
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Another Respondent described that the other remedy that has been chosen is local 
loop unbundling (LLU); yet ICASA has done absolutely nothing substantial in this 
regard yet (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). ICASA want to 
use facility leasing concepts to be able to implement LLU. “Telkom whether we like it 
or not is still seen as a national asset” (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 
5 May 2011). The Respondent inferred that a culture of protection for Telkom still 
exists in the country. 
 
A view expressed by a number of the Respondents is that initially when the first set 
of regulations were issued ICASA tended to take some short cuts that eventually 
resulted in challenges to the process from the operators (Respondent 4 SA, personal 
communication, 5 May 2011). “The policy makers and regulators tend to hear buzz 
words from other jurisdictions and assume that the same principles will work here. 
This is termed the “wash over” effect. ICASA want to apply the buzzwords in SA” 
(Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). 
 
One of the Respondents held very strong views as to why the ICT industry should 
not be regulated too forcefully. Regulation of the ICT industry, suggests this 
Respondent, can in fact be described as being “too little too late” (Vella, 2011, p.51). 
The “banking and mining industries for example have been established over 
hundreds of years while ICT industries are only decades old” (Vella, 2011, p.51). The 
ICT regulator too has “only just been established relatively speaking therefore it is 
premature to expect that the engagements between the ICT industry players and the 
regulator to be anything but non value adding to the sector as a whole” (Vella, 2011, 
p.51).  
 
This Respondent goes on to suggest that unlike other industries the ICT industries 
are not reliant on natural resources. The products produced by ICT industries are 
virtual in nature e.g. Google and Facebook therefore if the regulatory environment is 
untenable it will be quite easy for ICT industries to move their businesses off-shore 
to more accommodating jurisdictions. Governments and Regulators need to 
cognisance of this (Vella, 2011, p.51). 
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Further strong views expressed by this Respondent are that: “with the remedies 
imposed by the new call termination regulations the mobile operators are being 
coerced into losing their fixed-mobile interconnection subsidy and no thought has 
apparently been given to its effect on retail tariffs to consumers” (Vella, 2011, p. 57). 
Although much of the focus has been on the high mobile retail tariffs the question 
that begs to be asked is whether this in fact will reduce their ability to reduce 
consumer prices. Some of the benefits can be seen in the cheap 3G prices of 
anywhere in the world of approximately 25 cents a Mbyte (Vella, 2011, p.51). It is a 
well-known fact that data services are being sold at a loss. This situation could 
change if operators become pressured to reduce investments to retain some 
semblance of profitability (Vella, 2011, p.51).  
 
A recurring view from the interviews conducted was that ICASA were not explicit in 
stating what their desired outcome was for the sector as a whole. If for example the 
intention was to reduce retail rates then “we seem to be pulling the wrong lever to 
achieve retail price reduction” (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 
2011). If one has to look at the basket of goods in the CPI formula “one will see that 
mobile telecommunication prices in particular are actually trending downward within 
this basket whereas the other indices such as fuel are increasing” (Respondent 4 
SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). This means that we are targeting retail 
mobile prices unnecessarily (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 
2011). According to this Respondent Stats SA have done a slide presentation in 
about March that shows this phenomenon quite clearly (Respondent 4 SA, personal 
communication, 5 May 2011). The Respondent believes that the only conclusion one 
can make is that ICASA did not make an informed decision but they were pushed by 
political forces i.e. the DoC and Parliament (Respondent 4 SA, personal 
communication, 5 May 2011). 
 
Respondents from Industry reminded the Researcher that the objective of the ECA is 
to regulate telecommunications in the public interest and that this does not 
necessarily mean that this is all about pricing. The Respondents pointed the 
Researcher to Michael Porter in this regard viz. there must be a balance 
(Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). The Respondent drew 
attention to what is happening in India where according to the Respondent the 
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authorities have reduced interconnection to such an extent that there is a huge 
problem with quality of service as operators are questioning why it is necessary to 
invest in this network under this environment of very low interconnect and retail 
prices (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011).  
 
4.1.6 Theme 6 – Participation by the policy maker in the process was counter-
productive   
In 2009 there was direct intervention by Minister Nyanda to get the operators to 
reduce interconnection rates (Key Informant SA, personal communication, 5 October 
2010). The operators then dropped their rates voluntarily to 0.89c (Key Informant SA, 
personal communication, 5 October 2010). This is a significant drop and questions 
have been asked about operator sustainability. In the short run the MTN and 
Vodacom have had their licensing rates reduced from 5% of gross profit to about 
1.5% of gross profit. So this will give them some immediate relief but when the glide 
path and the reduction to 0.40c become effective this will have a huge impact on 
their sustainability (Key Informant SA, personal communication, 5 October 2010). 
Cell C on the other hand has not had its licensing fees reduced so it will have to bear 
the full brunt of a much reduced interconnection fee (Key Informant SA, personal 
communication, 5 October 2010). Furthermore Vodacom and MTN have a 
subscriber base of about 20 million subscribers compared to the 7 million of Cell C 
so should be better able to buffer the loss of revenue from interconnection charges 
than Cell C (Key Informant SA, personal communication, 5 October 2010). Some 
Respondents pointed out that that an unintended outcome of the reduction in 
licensing fees is that there are reduced collections that will now filter into the fiscus. 
Respondents are concerned that somehow this situation needs to be remedied. 
 
The PPC was driven by the so called high interconnect charges but some 
Respondents suggested that fundamental errors were made in assessing the 
problem. Firstly the charge of R1.25 is often quoted as being the high rate but this is 
in fact the peak rate (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). A 
more correct reference will be to take the blended rate between the peak and non-
peak and compare this with other jurisdictions. One will find that this rate was very 
much aligned with the others (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 
2011). The Respondent asked the Researcher to that note that the UK for example 
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also started at a high rate of the equivalent of about R2.50 about this time 
(Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). 
 
Many of the Respondents held the view that the Ministry‟s intervention through the 
Portfolio Committee was not helpful. Respondents suggest that the Ministry and the 
PC were reacting to a major public outcry on interconnection charges and the cost of 
communications in the country (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 
2011). However, ICASA still had to follow the process as prescribed by the Act. 
Although, the operators did reduce their charges but this was not based on any 
regulation that could be upheld in law. Therefore ICASA did the right thing and 
continued with the process to its logical conclusion. Most Respondents contend that 
if the Ministry had continued, the process would have eventually been unenforceable 
and open to challenge in court. 
 
The ambivalence of government is a major stumbling block to success of this 
sector. These results in a schism between policy and regulation because 
government often acts as both referee and player taking decisions aligned 
with its particular position at the time. Government ownership in Telkom and 
its direct and indirect control of the SABC, Sentech, and Broadband Infraco 
can explain why government behaves in the way that it does when decisions 
involving the sector are to be made. A number of decisions that have been 
made in the past reflect this schism between policy and regulation (Vella, 
2011, p. 55).  
 
Respondents cited other examples where the Policy Maker intervened unnecessarily 
in decisions that ICASA should have been allowed to make without undue pressure. 
Telkom operated as both a fixed line service provider and as a mobile operator 
through its shareholding in Vodacom. After years of negotiating at the highest 
governmental level it was finally agreed to sell its controlling stake to Vodafone. But 
the Friday before Vodacom‟s Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the Johannesburg 
Securities Exchange, COSATU served papers on ICASA who then claimed that it 
had in fact not approved this transaction (Star, 19th May 2009). In the end the courts 
ruled that the transaction was legitimate and that it could go through but this could 
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have impacted negatively impacted on the attractiveness of South Africa as 
destination for Foreign Direct Investment. 
 
Further examples of this schism is reflected in governments poor handling of 
the digital broadcasting standard by first supporting the industry 
recommendation then calling for a subsequent review under Minister Nyanda 
and then under the past Minister Padayachi agreeing on a third revised 
standard. This suggests that government’s impartiality is questionable given 
that the SABC and Sentech, both major stakeholders in the process both 
report to the DoC. This leads to government confusing the roles of referee 
and player. 
 
With regard to the new call termination rate regulations that were issued the 
entire process was influenced politically and operators were coerced into 
reducing their rates despite the process that was required to be followed as 
prescribed in the ECA (Vella, 2011, p. 57).  
 
Respondents from Industry suggest that the reduction in call termination rates will 
ultimately result in a decline of service levels. There will be a lack of investment by 
the larger operators. Some Respondents believe that the large operators are in fact 
the only parties that are capable of massive infrastructure improvements and any 
impact on their profitability will surely affect investment. 
 
In conclusion a Respondent strong expressed that a “blight on the entire process 
was the heavy handed approach by Minister Nyanda in coercing the operators to 
reduce their interconnection rates without following the process prescribed in the 
ECA” (Respondent 6 SA, personal communication, 23 April 2011). Under this 
pressure MTN and Vodacom just rolled over (Respondent 4 SA, personal 
communication, 5 May 2011). ICASA responded by re-establishing the process that 
it had started years ago and capitulated to the Ministers wishes (Respondent 4 SA, 
personal communication, 5 May 2011). 
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4.1.7 Theme 7 – ICASA’s view on interconnection has evolved over time 
Respondents accept that ICASA is mandated to promote universal access and 
service to communications services that is also affordable to the consumers. Most 
agreed that as such, delays in intervening in the mobile wholesale termination 
market did not support this imperative.  
 
A previous ICASA Councillor expressed the opinion that ICASA had different views 
over time regarding the strategy to be followed. The Council however did not want to 
regulate retail prices but were interested in regulating wholesale prices which was 
known to lead, but not always,  to a decrease in retail pricing (Respondent 4 SA, 
personal communication, 5 May 2011). The previous Councillor expressed the view 
that the thinking with regard to call termination evolved over time. Further, it must be 
noted that interconnection only became problematic only when prices began 
escalating (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). In 1994 under 
the Ministerial Determination prices for termination were around 24c (Respondent 4 
SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). This increased dramatically to R1.25 just 
before the entry of Cell C into the market and terminations costs were estimated to 
be around 56% of the retail price. This is when the problem in fact started 
(Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). 
 
The previous ICASA councillor believes that the first group of councillors at ICASA in 
2004 left a framework in place that could be built on to complete this work 
(Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). However it has taken 5 
years to complete the process (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 
2011). There were problems with the requirement for periodic reviews but by and 
large there was a process in place that could be developed on and finalised by the 
subsequent set of councillors (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 
2011). This did not happen however. The Respondent explains that this could be the 
result of councillors having different frame of references for how this work needed to 
be done. Some of the councillors were from a Competition Commission background 
and a Treasury Department background. This change of approach could have 
resulted in very long delays as there was no evidence that ICASA was moving on 
this at all (Respondent 4 SA, personal communication, 5 May 2011). 
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A Respondent holds another view that ICASA should move away from regulating 
interconnection. In last 15 years the mobile industry has provided phones to the 
majority of the population (Respondent 6 SA, personal communication, 23 April 
2011). This industry has an annual turnover in excess of R140 bn (Respondent 6 
SA, personal communication, 23 April 2011). Although government is committed to 
providing telecoms services to the majority of citizens it has not succeeded in this. 
Rather the mobile industry has been successful in providing services to majority and 
this was done in an era of lax regulatory controls and in the absence of price 
regulation (Respondent 6 SA, personal communication, 23 April 2011).  
 
A more strategic question rather to be posed is whether regulation should 
continue on the laissez faire route or should these industries be regulated. It is 
not coincidental that some of the smaller operators such as VOX and ECN are 
bordering on folding up. Vodacom and MTN could also potentially lose about 
10-20% of their revenue (Vella, 2011, p. 57). 
 
The Respondent suggest that Government should focus more on regulatory controls 
that will increase funding to smaller players to allow them to compete effectively and 
let the big operators get on with the task of building infrastructure and rolling out 
services (Respondent 6 SA, personal communication, 23 April 2011). It seems that 
this was the view in the dual-layer licensing structure in the ECA (Respondent 6 SA, 
personal communication, 23 April 2011). This was reversed in the Altech Autopage 
case that allowed VANs to self-provide (The Financial Mail, 7th November 2008). 
 
Perhaps the strategy to be adopted by ICASA should focus on efficiencies 
rather than on regulation that could negatively impact the country as a whole. 
There are opportunities to optimise the use of mobile phone towers or fibre 
optic cable by regulating the sharing of facilities and resources for example by 
national roaming arrangements on existing networks (Vella, 2011, p.58) 
 
4.2 Review of legislation, regulations and other materials 
 
As has been previously stated regulatory processes comprise three stages: “the 
enactment of enabling legislation, the creation of regulatory administrations and rules 
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and the bringing to bear of those rules on persons or institutions sought to be 
influenced or controlled” (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 96). The approach that will be 
taken in analysing documents relating to processes for interconnection regulation will 
be to examine the legislation relating to telecommunications and specifically the 
prescriptions describing processes relating to regulation of interconnection, the 
processes leading to the issuing of guidelines and regulations, the notices, 
guidelines, documents and regulations issued by ICASA (or SATRA). 
4.2.1 A review of current telecommunications legislation with regard to 
interconnection 
The first stage of regulatory processes according to Baldwin and Cave (1999) 
comprises enabling legislation. This section will examine current telecommunications 
regulation and more specifically the legislation that pertain to interconnection. 
 
Figure 4: A schematic representation of processes leading up to the issuing of 
final Call Termination Regulations by ICASA in 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 shows a time line for interconnection rate regulation in South Africa (Chetty, 
2011). 
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This section examines how the relevant telecommunications legislation defines 
regulatory processes and examines specifically the processes for interconnection 
regulation. 
 
4.2.1.1 Analysis of the Telecommunications Act No 103 of 1996 (Telecoms Act) as 
amended relating to interconnection processes   
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 pre-dates the Electronic Communications Act 
of 2005. The primary objective of the Telecommunications Act No 103 of 1996 was 
to provide for the regulation and control of telecommunications matters in the public 
interest and it thus sets the context for the analysis of current legislation. Listed 
amongst the seventeen objectives of the Act are the objectives to promote universal 
and affordable provision of telecommunications services, protection of the interests 
of telecommunications consumers and users and the ensuring of fair competition 
within the telecommunications industry. (Republic of South Africa, 1996b). 
 
 The Act established the first independent telecommunications regulatory 
authority 
The Act established the independent telecommunications regulatory authority, the 
South African Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (SATRA). The Act affirms 
that SATRA will be independent and impartial in the performance of its functions. 
The Act however frames SATRA‟s role in terms of policy directions that will be 
issued by the Minister from time to time. References to SATRA in section one of the 
Telecommunication Act was amended in 2000 with the passing into legislation of the 
ICASA Act 13 0f 2000. ICASA replaced SATRA as the Authority referred to in the 
Telecommunications Act. 
 
 The Act provided the legislative framework for the creation of regulatory 
administrations and rules for the regulation of interconnection rates 
Provisions of section 43 of the Telecoms Act provided the legislative framework for 
the creation of regulatory administrations and rules for the regulation of 
interconnection rates. In essence the Act makes it obligatory for any PSTN service 
provider to interconnect with other operators if the request to interconnect is 
reasonable i.e. it is technically feasible, it will promote the efficient use of the PSTN 
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and furthermore that it can be done on a mutual basis between the operators wishing 
to interconnect and the PSTN operator.  
 
 The Act required the Authority to publish interconnection guidelines 
An important aspect to the Telecoms Act was that it required the Authority to 
formulate guidelines for Interconnection Agreements between operators. The 
guidelines had to cover the essential terms and conditions for the agreements. Some 
of the essential elements included timelines for interconnection to be executed, the 
quality of service to be provided and the applicable rates for providing 
interconnection. The Telecoms Act required that Ministerial Guidelines regarding 
interconnection be published within a year of the Act being passed and these 
Guidelines were to remain in force for a period of three years. 
 
The Act however specified that Ministerial Guidelines regarding Telkom would be 
published within a year of the Act being passed and that these guidelines will remain 
in force for a period of three years.  
 
 The Authority issued interconnection guidelines in March 2002 
The then Minister of Communications Dr Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri approved 
Interconnection Guidelines published by SATRA in March 2000 (Republic of South 
Africa, 2000a). Subsequently supplementary Interconnection Guidelines were issued 
in 2002 as a “result of changes in the industry and technology” (Lawrence, 2006, p. 
186). 
 
The Interconnection Guidelines define major operators and essential services, give 
guidance on the content of interconnection agreements, prescribe principles 
pertaining to requests for interconnection and negotiations for interconnection 
(Lawrence, 2006, p. 186). 
 
The issue of a Major Operator is dealt with in the 2000 Guidelines. According to the 
Guidelines a Major Operator is an operator that controls at least 35% of the market 
in which it operates and can influence price and supply because of the influence and 
control it has over the market. The onus is on the operator who disagrees to prove 
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that it does not have market power. SATRA could also declare an operator as a 
Major Operator if it feels that in doing so it will promote the objectives of the 
Telecoms Act (Republic of South Africa, 2000a). The Guidelines further declared 
Telkom as a Major Operator (Republic of South Africa, 2000a). 
 
A very important principle established by the Guidelines is that interconnection 
charges must reflect underlying costs. Furthermore charges must “not exceed retail 
charges for similar services” (Lawrence, 2006, p.190). Charges for interconnection 
by Major Operators for essential service should be on Long Run Incremental Costs 
(LRIC) and should be calculated on the basis of relevant forward looking costs 
calculated for an efficient telecoms service provider and including any reasonable 
cost of capital (Republic of South Africa, 2000a). 
 
Prior to the application of the LRIC pricing regime the 2002 Interconnection 
Guidelines included a two year transitional period whereby all charges imposed by a 
Major Operator for Essential Services must be “no greater than the Major Operator‟s 
fully allocated costs” (FAC) (Lawrence, 2006, p. 190). Fully Allocated Costs were to 
be calculated according to the accounting separation principles set out in the Major 
Operators Chart of Accounts and Cost Allocation Manual (COA/CAM) including a 
reasonable cost of capital (Lawrence, 2006, p. 191). 
  
4.2.1.2 Analysis of the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa 
(ICASA) Act 13 of 2000 as amended 
The ICASA Act was promulgated to establish an Authority in an environment where 
the broadcasting and electronic communications field were rapidly converging. The 
Act provided for the formation of ICASA and the dissolution of the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and the South African Telecommunications Authority  
 
 The objective of the ICASA Act was to establish an independent authority to 
regulate matters in the communications sector 
The ICASA Act established an independent authority to regulate broadcasting, 
electronic communications and postal services “in the public interest” (Republic of 
South Africa, 2000b). The objective was that the Independent Regulator will regulate 
91 
 
appropriately to achieve the objectives set out in the underlying statutes that 
collectively regulate these sectors (Republic of South Africa, 2000b). 
 
 The ICASA Act sets out the functions of the Authority and chairperson allowing 
it to make regulations, conduct research and undertake enquiries, amongst 
other things 
Section 4 of the ICASA Act permits the Authority to make recommendations to the 
Minister on policy matters related to the sectors being regulated. This Section also 
allows ICASA to recommend amendments to the related Acts supporting the 
objectives that will promote development of the sectors (Republic of South Africa, 
2000b). Some of the other objectives listed in the Act permit the Authority to conduct 
research, undertake inquiries and gives the Authority the mandate to make the 
necessary regulations that will support objectives. Furthermore ICASA is given the 
responsibility to deal with complaints submitted in terms of the Act (Republic of 
South Africa, 2000b). 
 
Section 4B and 4C expand the rules related to the undertaking of inquiries. The Act 
calls for public participation before regulations are made by requiring the Authority to 
inform the Minister timeously and by inviting written representations from the public 
(Republic of South Africa, 2000b). 
 
4.2.1.3 Analysis of the Electronic Communications Act (ECA) 36 of 2005 as 
amended.  
In relation to interconnection, the ECA, in summary, sets out objectives for ICT, 
emphasises the importance of interconnection arrangements and lays out processes 
for regulating interconnection. 
 
 The purpose of the ECA is to regulate electronic communications in the public 
interest 
Section 2 of the Electronic Communications Act (ECA) 36 of 2005 as amended lists 
the objectives of the Act and emphasizes that the primary purpose of the Act is to 
regulate electronic communications in the public interest. Section 2b of the Act 
amongst other things states that for this purpose the Act seeks to “promote and 
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facilitate the development of interoperable and interconnected electronic networks” 
(Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.20). 
 
 The Minister makes policies and can issue policy directions to ICASA with 
regard to, inter alia, interconnection 
Section 3 of the ECA confirms the Minister as the policy maker and also gives the 
Minister authority to issue policy directions to the Authority subject to certain 
processes (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.22). A policy direction can be issued 
by the Minister after obtaining Cabinet approval to allow intervention by Government 
to ensure “strategic ICT infrastructure investment” or to provide for a framework for 
the licensing of a public entity by ICASA (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.22). 
Policy directions may also constitute inquiries to be conducted by ICASA, 
submission of reports to the Minister, the determination of priorities for development 
of the sector or for any matter that the Minister requires to be urgently dealt with by 
ICASA (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.22). 
 
 The Act gives ICASA the mandate to make regulations regarding any matter 
related to electronic communications as described in the Act and sets out 
processes for making such regulations 
This section of the Act gives ICASA its mandate to make regulations „„with regard to 
any matter which in terms of this Act or the related legislation must or may be 
prescribed, governed or determined by regulation” (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, 
p.24). The Authorities mandate includes making regulations regarding technical 
aspects of the licensing framework, matters of procedure for the ECA or related Acts, 
payment of fees to the Authority, control of the radio frequency spectrum and related 
matters. Regulations can be made for different uses of the radio frequency spectrum 
and for different licences (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.24). 
 
The processes for making regulations are prescribed under section 4 of the Act:  for 
example the Authority must publish the regulation in the Government Gazette at 
least 30 days before the regulation is issued. It must invite public participation by 
requesting interested persons to make written submissions related to the regulation 
that it intends publishing. The Minister has to be informed at least 30 days before of 
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the Authorities intention and also the subject matter of the regulations. However the 
Act does make provision for the Authority to issue regulations that need to be made 
urgently, in the public interest, without having to notify the public of its intention to 
make regulations. The Authority need not invite interested parties to make written 
submissions under these circumstances (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.24). 
 
Non-compliance with regulations could be regarded as an offence as long as the 
regulation specifies the penalty to be imposed in respect of the contravention. The 
penalties could be a fine or imprisonment and are covered in more detail in section 
17H of the ICASA Act (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.24). 
 
 ICASA needs to determine the reasonableness of an interconnection request 
and more importantly establish Significant Market Power before obliging 
operators to comply in full with interconnection regulations 
Sections 37-42 (Chapter 7) of the ECA deals with interconnection and states broadly 
that on request licensed service providers are obliged to interconnect with one 
another under the terms and conditions of an interconnection agreement that should 
be entered into by the parties (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.58). However, the 
service providers are not obliged to interconnect if “the request is unreasonable” 
(Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.58). Requests are assessed as being reasonable 
if they are financially and technically feasible and will “promote the efficient use of 
electronic communications networks and services” (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, 
p.58). This section of the Act also introduces the important concept of service 
providers with Significant Market Power (SMP) (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, 
p.60). The Act states that a service provider is not obliged to interconnect if it does 
not have SMP in relevant markets or market segments. The Authority has the task of 
determining the reasonableness of any interconnection request that is disputed and 
to determine whether a licensee has SMP (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.86).  
 
If the parties are unable to reach agreement given a dispute then the Authority may 
intervene by imposing terms and conditions for interconnection within the framework 
of the Act. The Authority can stipulate timeframes for the conclusion of 
interconnection agreements or in the case of disputes may refer the dispute to the 
Complaints and Compliance Committee (CCC) for speedy resolution (Republic of 
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South Africa, 2005a, p.58). The Authority is obliged to respond within specific period 
to ensure timeous resolution to disputes.   
 
With regard to SMP, the ECA declares that licensees have SMP with regard to the 
relevant market or market segment if “they are dominant, have control of essential 
facilities or have a vertical relationship” that the Authority determines could impact on 
competition in the applicable markets (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.86). 
Licensees are not obliged to interconnect if they do not have SMP (Republic of 
South Africa, 2005a, p.86). In this case if interconnection agreements are entered 
into, non-discrimination need not be a factor to be managed by the Authority and 
service levels don‟t have to be regulated either. 
 
Furthermore these Service providers do not have to disclose their rates and charges 
and they do not have to publish terms and conditions of their interconnection 
agreements. For all other non-exempted service providers the Authority must review 
interconnection arrangements for consistency with regulations prescribed and must 
intervene if this is not the case. 
 
 ICASA must set out interconnection agreement principles in regulations to 
facilitate conclusion of interconnection agreements 
 
The Act requires ICASA to give guidance on interconnection agreement principles. 
This may take the form of a Reference Interconnection Offer (RIO) containing terms 
and conditions that will support the objectives of the Act for interconnection (Republic 
of South Africa, 2005a, p.58). These terms and conditions may specify time frames 
for conclusions of agreements, technical implementation of interconnection 
agreements, quality of service issues, points of interconnection and facilities, pricing, 
dispute resolution, invoicing and payment arrangements (Republic of South Africa, 
2005a, p.20). The principles may also cover access and security arrangements, 
frameworks for determining technical and financial feasibility and the promotion of 
efficient use of the electronic communications networks. The principles also may 
cover the unbundling of services so that requestors for interconnection are not forced 
to take up services that they do not require (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.60). 
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 ICASA’s regulatory process must include a process for speedy dispute 
resolution 
According to the ECA processes for regulating interconnection disputes must ensure 
that disputes are resolved quickly. Disputes not resolved by the Authority can be 
referred to the Complaints and Compliance Committee (CCC) (Republic of South 
Africa, 2005a, p.62). The decision by the CCC is binding unless overturned by a 
court order of “competent jurisdiction” (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.62). 
 
 ICASA’s regulatory process must define the retail or wholesale markets or 
market segments, set out the methodology to determine whether competition is 
effective in the markets it has determined and then establish the level of 
competition in the said markets before prescribing interconnection regulations  
 
The ECA sets out that the Authority may regulate wholesale interconnection rates 
and related services. However regulation can only be made if the Authority 
establishes that competition will impacted in the present and as well as in the future 
if no action is taken to regulate the sector (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.84).  
 
The Authority needs to establish a number of criteria before regulations are passed. 
These include that the Authority needs to prescribe regulations that spell out what 
would be considered by the Authority as giving “undue preference or causing undue 
discrimination” to another licensee (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.84) However 
before regulations can be prescribed the Authority must firmly establish that there is 
not sufficient competition in the market or market segments being investigated 
(Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.84).   
 
Hence before making these pronouncements regulations must be prescribed that 
define the retail or wholesale markets or market segments and then a determination 
needs to be made with regard to the level of competition in the markets. The 
methodology to determine whether competition is effective needs to be set out in the 
regulations. Regulations must prescribe the pro-competitive measures that may be 
imposed to correct the situation should the Authority find that competition is 
ineffective.  Regulations must declare in the relevant market or market segments 
96 
 
licensees that have SMP and must set out pro-competitive measures applicable to 
such licensees (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.84. 
 
In determining SMP the Authority must consider barriers to entry to the applicable 
markets or market segments and must also consider the “dynamic character and 
functioning of the market or market segments” (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p. 
86). The analysis of the effectiveness of competition must consider the effective 
market share of the various licensees in the defined markets or market segments. 
The assessments must also be forward looking in that the market power needs to be 
investigated for a suitable period that will:  
 
consider actual and potential existence of competitors, level, trends of 
concentration and history of collusion, size of each of the market participants, 
control of essential facilities, technological advantage or superiority of market 
participants, the degree of power of other market participants, ease and 
privilege of access to capital markets and financial resources, the dynamic 
characteristics of the market, including growth, innovation and products and 
service diversification, economies of scale and scope, the nature and extent of 
vertical integration and the ease of entry into the market including market and 
regulatory barriers to entry (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.86). 
 
 ICASA’s regulatory process must set out pro-competitive measures that may 
include a requirement for the separation of accounts should it determine that 
competition is ineffective 
A number of pro-competitive measures may be imposed if the Authority finds that 
there is ineffective competition. These measures include “fair, reasonable, non-
discriminatory, transparent and timely responses to requests for access, provisioning 
of services, interconnection and facilities leasing” (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, 
p.88). Terms and conditions of agreements need to be published to ensure 
transparency. Furthermore the Authority may require that licensees maintain a 
separation for accounting purposes of the different line items that make up access 
charges, interconnection and facilities leasing, and including all other services. A 
separation of retail and wholesale prices may be required as well (Republic of South 
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Africa, 2005a, p.88). The Authority may also stipulate the accounting methodology to 
be used to show the separation of accounts (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.88). 
 
Arguably the most important pro-competition measures cited by the Act is to 
introduce wholesale and retail price controls for interconnection in markets or market 
segments that have been found to have ineffective competition (Republic of South 
Africa, 2005a, p.88). 
 
 The Act gives direction to ICASA with regard to the review of pro-competitive 
conditions 
 
The Act also requires pro-competitive conditions to be reviewed on an on-going 
basis. Based on the review the Authority can decide whether it wants to continue 
with the pro-competitive measure or whether the measure needs to be withdrawn or 
modified. To do this the Authority must review the market determinations it had made 
previously that gave rise to the pro-competitive measures that were set (Republic of 
South Africa, 2005a, p.88).  If the licensee no longer has SMP then the Authority 
may withdraw the measure set. If the licensee still retains SMP but the market 
condition has changed resulting in share profiles in the market changing then the 
Authority may revoke pro-competitive conditions for that licensee as the situation 
requires (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.90).  
 
In conclusion the Competition Act applies to all competition issues for the electronic 
communications industry as well notwithstanding the ECA. Further to this ICASA is 
defined as a regulatory Authority in terms of section 1 of the Competition Act 
(Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.90). The Competition Commission and ICASA 
may request and receive assistance from one another in regard to any competition 
matter related to the ICT industry (Republic of South Africa, 2005a, p.90). 
 
4.2.2 A review of regulatory administrations and rules 
The second stage of regulatory processes concerns the “creation of regulatory 
administrations and rules” (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 96). This section will examine 
the processes leading up to the issuing of Interconnection and Call Termination 
regulations by ICASA in April and October 2010 respectively. 
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 An analysis of ICASA’s processes for definition and identification of the relevant 
(interconnection) markets, the methodology to determine competitiveness, the 
level of competition in the relevant markets, identification of operators with 
SMP, setting out of pro-competitive measures and ICASA’s schedule for the 
periodic review of the relevant market and competitiveness. 
Regulatory principles imposed by the ECA define a process to be followed before 
interconnection regulations or call termination regulations are gazetted. The 
methodology to be used to determine markets, the identification of markets and 
identification of operators with SMP and the setting out of pro-competitive measures 
and a process for regular review needs to be completed before regulations are made 
(Republic of South Africa, 2005a). The process that ICASA has to follow to engage 
with all stakeholders including operators, the Minister of Communication and 
interested parties is set out in the ECA as described above. 
 
Processes leading to the issuing of regulations can be ascertained from the process 
initiated in 2005 by notice in the Government Gazette No 27854 of July 2005 dealing 
with mobile pricing under the old Telecommunications Act No 103 of 1996. This 
notice invited comment on a review of mobile pricing to be conducted by ICASA 
under section 27 of the Telecommunications Act No 103 of 1996. This notice was 
accompanied by a discussion document (DD) which summarised the concerns at the 
time. The discussion document was triggered by a complaint lodged by the 
Communications User Association of South Africa (CUASA) regarding various 
aspects of mobile pricing (Republic of South Africa, 2005b, p. 5). 
 
The aim of the discussion document according to the notice was to obtain inputs 
regarding the nature of the problem and possible solutions. ICASA‟s intention in 
issuing this notice was to establish whether the high costs of mobile services was 
justifiable and whether there was a need for more “rigorous regulatory oversight of 
mobile pricing” (Republic of South Africa, 2005b, p. 5). 
 
In summary the problems identified by CUASA that ICASA was requested to 
investigate were the high costs of mobile calls and other services including pre-paid 
services, the reasons for the difference in interconnection charges between mobile 
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and fixed calls and why mobile call rates had not reduced after the introduction of a 
third mobile operator i.e. Cell C and whether there is sufficient competition in the 
market (Republic of South Africa, 2005b, p. 5).  
 
 
 ICASA issued its Findings and Conclusions document on 15 December 2006 
establishing the need to identify relevant market segments to establish SMP 
and also declared that it needed to look at call termination charges to reduce 
mobile pricing 
ICASA issued its Findings and Conclusion, Government Gazette number 29457  in 
response to the invitation for comment on mobile pricing as described above, on the 
15th December 2006 (Republic of South Africa, 2006).  
 
This process resulted in eight findings with regard to mobile fees and charges: The 
regulatory framework requires operators to lodge fees or tariffs with the Authority 
before they may charge for services. Increases in any existing tariff were restricted to 
the increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI).The Authority must provide written 
responses to the Licensee where it disallows or delays tariff increases. The 
Authority‟s view was that the current regulatory framework for fees and tariffs was 
not adequate (Republic of South Africa, 2006, p. 26). The Authority is required to 
define relevant markets as per the ECA and the Authority needs to impose 
regulatory measures where it finds licensees with SMP. This Findings and 
Conclusions document thus sets the process for the definition of markets (Republic 
of South Africa, 2006, p. 26). 
 
The important conclusion from the Findings Document was that the Authority 
determined that it had to give attention to call termination charges in order to reduce 
mobile prices. The list of key findings concluded by giving assurance that the 
approach described above will allow the Authority to deal with allegations of SMP 
and pricing in a holistic manner (Republic of South Africa, 2006, p. 26). 
 
 On the 29th January 2007 ICASA set out its methodology for market definition, 
proposed markets, evaluated SMP and competitiveness and proposed pro-
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competitive regulations for operators with SMP and called for representations 
from interested parties. 
The next step in the process leading on from the Findings and Conclusions 
document of December 2006 saw ICASA issuing a notice of intention to define 
wholesale call termination markets in terms of the chapter 10 of the ECA on the 29th 
January 2007, Government Gazette number 29568. All interested parties were 
invited to submit written representations in response to the issues being discussed. 
This notice set out the four essential issues for discussion i.e. the methodology to be 
used for market definition, the markets that were identified, evaluation of SMP and 
competitiveness and pro-competitive regulations for operators with SMP (Republic of 
South Africa, 2007a).  
 
ICASA‟s gives assurance by stating that the proposed methodology to be used for 
market definition is in line with that being used by the Competition Authorities in 
South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 7). The methodology is also used 
by other jurisdictions such as the European Commission and the United States 
Department of Justice (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 7). The methodology 
proposed the “hypothetical monopolist test” as the conceptual framework to define 
markets (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 8). The test involves the evaluation of 
the likely “competitive consequences emanating from a hypothetical profit 
maximising entity imposing a small but significant non-transitory increase price 
(SSNIP) test‟ ” to measure market dominance (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 
8). Simply put the SSNIP looks at a narrow market that the operator is active in. It 
then looks at a hypothetical small increase in price and whether this will increase 
profitability for the operator. If there are no substitutes that users can turn to then this 
is defined as the narrow market. If users are practically able move to other products 
and services then there is substitutability and the market is probably not an attractive 
one for monopolists (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 8). In this case the product 
of the operator does not constitute a market in its own right. The market then has to 
be defined wider to include the substitutes. Again a hypothetical small increase in 
price is applied and profitability is measured. This time if profitability for the operator 
improves then the operator is regarded as an SMP in that expanded market. The 
notice also lists examples of qualitative analytical tools to be used with the 
conceptual framework in defining markets. These tools are given as “critical loss 
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analysis, price correlation analysis, price elasticity analysis and diversion ratio 
analysis” (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 8). 
 
The second issue dealt with in this notice was call termination markets. ICASA 
identified call termination on the Vodacom, MTN and Cell C networks as markets in 
their own right (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 9). The notice goes on to say that 
the declaration of each mobile operator‟s network as constituting a separate market 
is in line with other jurisdictions such as the UK, Sweden, France, Norway, Ireland, 
Finland and the European Commission (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 9). 
 
ICASA explains that the narrow definition of these markets is based on the Calling 
Party Pays principle (CPP). ICASA affirms that South Africa like most jurisdictions in 
the world has adopted CPP where the mobile operators do not charge users for 
incoming calls (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 10). With CPP the caller‟s mobile 
company is charged a termination fee by the receiving party‟s mobile company and 
this termination fee is included in the calling party‟s call charge. The argument being 
made is that users do not choose mobile operators based on the cost effectiveness 
of their call termination charge as these charges are passed on to the calling party. 
This therefore does not incentivise mobile operators to reduce call termination 
charges to attract and retain customers. In fact users are probably not aware of call 
termination charges levied by their networks as there charges are accrued to other 
users. Therefore operators are not constrained by high call termination charges in 
attracting customers (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 10). 
 
In line with the SSNIP model discussed earlier the concept of substitutability is raised 
in this notice (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p.11). ICASA argues that parties 
have no substitute for calling the called party on their operator‟s network (Republic of 
South Africa, 2007a, p.11). Similarly if other operators want to provide off-net calls or 
fixed to mobile services they have no choice but to purchase mobile call termination 
form that particular mobile company that will terminate the call (Republic of South 
Africa, 2007a, p. 11).  
 
ICASA uses definitions of product and geographic markets to further justify the 
narrow market definitions it has proposed i.e. being that of call termination on each 
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mobile operator‟s networks. The notice goes on to describe four conditions that need 
to be met before operators may be constrained by call termination charges. Firstly, 
the mobile call termination charge must pass through transparently to the outgoing 
price that calling parties face when making calls to that network. Operators‟ may be 
constrained if callers are made aware of the mobile operator that is terminating their 
calls and the associated costs that they are being charged. Lastly operators may be 
constrained if users have choices or substitutes for calling that particular network 
(Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 11). 
 
The notice then explains in detail why none of four conditions mentioned above are 
likely to be met in the South African situation which means that users will not react to 
an increase in call termination charges. It further explains that there is little or no 
substitutability in the wholesale, demand side or supply side for off-net calls or for 
fixed-to-mobile calls. Numerous substitutes such as fixed-to-fixed, mobile-to-fixed, 
Voice over internet (VoIP), small message service (SMS) are examined then 
discarded as being impractical (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 16).  
 
The third issue to be dealt with by ICASA in this notice is that of SMP. It reminds 
readers of the definition of Significant Market Power as set out in the ECA. It also 
draws from the Competition Act that states that a firm is dominant in a market if it 
has at least 45% of the market share or if it has at least 35% of market share but 
less than 45% of the market share unless it can show that it does not have market 
power, or it has less than 35% of market share but it has market power (Republic of 
South Africa, 1998). In the context of the legislation and the definition of the relevant 
markets as discussed above ICASA proposes that Vodacom has SMP in the market 
for call termination on the Vodacom network and similarly Telkom, MTN and Cell C 
have SMP in the market for call termination on their networks (Republic of South 
Africa, 2007a, p. 32).  
 
ICASA then, in terms of this notice turns its attention to the determination of levels of 
competitiveness and examines barriers to entry and countervailing power as two 
important criteria for measuring the effectiveness of market competition (Republic of 
South Africa, 2007a, p. 33). ICASA declares that each mobile operator is a complete 
monopoly in the supply of call termination to its own network. There are also no 
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technological alternatives to this therefore there are absolute barriers to entry into 
this market of call termination. 
 
After examining potential for countervailing power ICASA finds that countervailing 
power does not exist with any of the operators in trying to reduce call termination 
charges by for example threatening not to interconnect with the termination supplier 
or to threaten to charge high call termination charges in return (Republic of South 
Africa, 2007a, p. 34). 
 
Lastly, in terms of pro-competitive measures ICASA proposes six remedies that 
include the regulatory principles proposed by the ECA. The obligation to 
“interconnect (upon reasonable request), the obligation not to discriminate between 
buyers and price transparency is to be imposed on all operators declared as having 
significant market power” (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 39). Additional 
measure which the Authority proposes to implement and that are in line with the ECA 
are price controls, account separation and methodologies to recover costs relating to 
call termination (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 39). 
 
The notice proposes that all six remedies need to be imposed on the larger 
operators i.e. Telkom, Vodacom and MTN and that only the first three remedies will 
apply to Cell C and Neotel. ICASA argues the case for this approach by stating that 
although Cell C and Neotel have SMP they are not significant market players yet 
(Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 40). 
 
In conclusion the price controls to be imposed on MTN, Vodacom and Telkom are 
Long Run Incremental Costs (LRIC). Factored in will be reasonable capital costs for 
infrastructure development (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 40). Furthermore 
accounting separation is required so that the Authority may verify whether prices 
reflect LRIC (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, p. 40). 
 
 ICASA published its Findings regarding the Wholesale Call Termination market 
definition process on the 9th November 2007 
In response to the January 2007 document that called for representations regarding 
definitions of wholesale call termination markets, written responses were received, 
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and hearings were held in May of 2007. ICASA consolidated the views received and 
published its findings in the Government Gazette, No 30449 on the 9th November 
2007. However ICASA clarifies that these are preliminary findings and are not final 
determinations. ICASA in fact sees these preliminary findings as a  setting a “stake 
in the ground” as to the current state of affairs regarding call termination markets and 
indicates that there “are parameters that still require definition” (Republic of South 
Africa, 2007b, p. 6). 
 
In summary ICASA, using the methodology set out in the DD of January 2007 
concluded that the markets can be defined in its narrowest sense as call termination 
on each individual operator‟s networks. Thus the defined markets are individual 
wholesale call termination on the Vodacom, MTN, Cell C, Telkom and Neotel 
networks and wholesale call termination on all other Electronic Communications 
Network Services (ECNS) providers that provide call termination on their networks 
(including Under- serviced Area licensees) and call termination on all Electronic 
Communication Service (ECS) providers that are able to set call termination rates on 
their networks (including VoIP providers) (Republic of South Africa, 2007b, p. 7). 
 
ICASA bases this definition on the methodology chosen previously (See DD January 
2007) to define markets viz. the hypothetical monopolist test using the small but 
significant non-transitory increase price (SSNIP) test which was explained earlier in 
this report. Based on these instruments ICASA finds that there are no substitutes 
that users can move to, to find alternatives to call termination on the receiving user‟s 
network. ICASA argues that the operator providing call termination is therefore not 
constrained. As a result the market needs to be limited to call termination on each 
operator‟s network. If for example there are suitable substitutes available then the 
market could be expanded to include these substitute products. In the previous case 
however the market needs to be defined in this narrow sense as described (Republic 
of South Africa, 2007b, p. 9). 
 
 ICASA published its Draft Interconnection Regulations on the 10th July 2009 
calling for written representations on the draft regulations 
The process in which ICASA engaged in is started from time of the issuing of draft 
interconnection regulations on the 24th July 2007 by notice in the Government 
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Gazette No 30091 (Republic of South Africa, 2007c). Public hearings were held in 
October 2007 and another set of draft interconnection regulations was published for 
comment on the 27th December 2007 in the Government Gazette No 30611 
(Republic of South Africa, 2007d). A workshop, open to all interested parties was 
held in April 2008 and a third set of draft interconnection regulations, together with 
an explanatory note was published on the 10 July 2009 in Government Gazette No 
32370, for comment. With the publishing of these draft regulations the 
interconnection guidelines published in 2000 (Government Gazette No 20993), the 
supplementary interconnection guidelines published in 2002 (Government Gazette 
24203) and the interconnection and facilities guidelines and supplements published 
in 2004 (Government Gazette No 26539), all of these published under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 were to be revoked (Republic of South Africa, 
2009, p. 31). 
 
 The purpose of the Draft Interconnection Regulations of 10 July 2009 was to 
facilitate the process, make interconnection mandatory and to encourage inter-
operability 
The purpose of the draft regulations of 10 July 2009 was three fold. The first purpose 
focused on the facilitation of the process for the conclusion of interconnection 
agreements. It proposed timeframes for the conclusion of agreements, the process 
to be followed by parties for the submission, review and filing of agreements 
(Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 20). The second purpose of the regulations was 
to “provide for and require the provision of interconnection services to enable 
licensees to interconnect with one another” and the third purpose was to encourage 
interoperability between the networks and operators (Republic of South Africa, 2009, 
p. 20).  
 The Draft Interconnection Regulations sets out the process of how 
interconnection requests should be made and responded to 
The draft regulations set out the rules of how requests for interconnection are to be 
made. Requests must be in writing and must include the date of request, technical 
requirements taking into account the interconnection provider‟s technical standards 
and must state the type of interconnection that is required (Republic of South Africa, 
2009, p. 21). Further to this an interconnection provider must respond within very 
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specified periods for responses to requests and for the final conclusion of 
agreements.  
 
 The Authority sets conditions to determine whether a request is technically and 
financially feasible 
The Authority will determine that a request for interconnection is reasonable if it is 
financially and technically feasible on a “case by case basis” (Republic of South 
Africa, 2009, p. 21). This notice describes conditions for financial and technical 
feasibility. The interconnection providers existing capacity needs to be used 
efficiently. There should be no adverse conditions imposed on the provider due to 
“overloading” of the provider‟s network (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 21). There 
should be no need for the provider to build additional capacity to satisfy the needs for 
this interconnection request if it has not been included in the planned budget 
(Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 21). However if this is a requirement then to 
ensure fairness the requester will bear a portion of these costs. Technical feasibility 
according to the draft regulations will be possible if the request will not impact the 
interconnection provider‟s network negatively, if there are indeed technical synergies 
between the networks and if all aspects of the interconnection request can be 
achieved with the current resources and in the current circumstances (Republic of 
South Africa, 2009, p. 22).  
 The draft regulations promote seamless interoperability between different 
network providers 
The notice further requires that the terms and conditions of interconnection 
agreements “facilitate interoperability and promote any-to-any connectivity such that 
an end user on the requestor‟s network can communicate electronically with an end 
user on the provider‟s network and vice versa” and furthermore this should be able to 
“take place seamlessly” (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 22). Interconnection 
agreements should also allow for the interconnection requestor to enter into different 
interconnection agreements with different interconnection providers (Republic of 
South Africa, 2009, p. 22). 
 
 The draft regulations sets out principles for interconnection agreements that 
include amongst others principles for technical standards, service levels, 
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remedies and penalties, transparency, points of interconnection, charges, 
unbundling, non-discrimination and conditions under which providers are 
exempted 
The draft regulations deal next with principles for interconnection agreements.  The 
agreements must deal with issues of technical standards to ensure compatibility and 
must comply with international standards as prescribed by the ITU or standards set 
by the Authority themselves (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 23). The 
interconnection agreements must spell out the service levels required and must 
contain remedies and penalties for repeated breach of service levels (Republic of 
South Africa, 2009, p. 23). Agreements should not have clauses that restrict public 
disclosure of the agreement (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 23). 
 
Non-discrimination is an essential requirement in the ECA and the draft regulations 
provide for this. To prevent discrimination the Authority requires that under similar 
circumstances agreements should have similar terms and conditions and pricing 
models. This requirement is not a requirement for operators that do not have SMP as 
per the criteria in the ECA. Parties to the interconnection agreement must not 
discriminate between requestors for interconnection in the negotiation, conclusion 
and implementation of agreements and lastly requests from an interconnection 
seeker including requests for additional interconnection from existing interconnection 
agreements must be concluded “in the order that they are received in” (Republic of 
South Africa, 2009, p. 23). 
 
The regulations related to transparency, amongst other things require that charges 
for interconnection services are sufficiently unbundled so that interconnection 
requestors do not pay for unwanted services (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 23). 
Further to this, charges levied by an interconnection provider should not “exceed its 
retail charges for similar services” (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 23). These two 
regulations however do not apply to interconnection providers that do not have SMP 
according to the definitions of SMP in the ECA (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 
23). 
 
The interconnection provider must provide within a period specified in the 
regulations, any information that the requestor may need to formulate its request for 
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interconnection. Information has to be provided to the requestor that may assist it in 
planning, establishing and maintaining its networks for the purposes of 
interconnection (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 24). 
 
A location needs to be specified for points of interconnection that is identified as a 
“demarcation between the two networks” (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 24). 
Examples of locations for points for interconnection are mobile switching centres, 
media gateways, local exchanges or tandem exchanges (Republic of South Africa, 
2009, p. 24). These points of interconnection are not exhaustive and may include 
others. The interconnection provider needs to offer interconnection services at any 
financially or technically feasible point on its electronic communications network on 
request by the interconnection seeker. The parties must agree on operations and 
maintenance expenses of the facilities necessary to reach points of interconnection 
within the provider‟s network.  In the situation where the requested point of 
interconnection lacks sufficient capacity then the provider needs to provide alternate 
points of interconnection. Lastly, in terms of points of interconnection, the parties 
must work together to agree on nearest points for interconnection (Republic of South 
Africa, 2009, p. 25). 
 
 The draft regulations sets out terms and conditions of interconnection 
agreements  
The draft regulations set terms and conditions of interconnection agreements that 
need to be agreed between service providers. Interconnection agreements must 
contain definition of terms and abbreviations. It must deal with the technical scope of 
the interconnection including descriptions of the purpose of the interconnection, the 
connection services required and the technical scope and specifications (Republic of 
South Africa, 2009, p. 26). It must document the mechanisms for changes to the 
purpose, scope, and specifications for interconnection. It must give details regarding 
access to numbers by the parties and data interchange formats (Republic of South 
Africa, 2009, p. 26). The terms and conditions of interconnection agreements must 
specify points of interconnection including the location of the point of interconnection 
and the specifications of related facilities, processes for changes to the point of 
interconnection or related facilities, charges for each point of interconnection and 
signalling interconnection description (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 26). 
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The terms and conditions must address billing and settlement which includes billing 
procedures, payment terms and conditions and billing and dispute settlement 
processes (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 26). The terms and conditions must 
address detailed charges for specific services and must set out mechanisms for the 
review of charges.  Terms and conditions must address service levels and quality of 
service obligations, penalties, testing and maintenance, fault reporting, service level 
disputes, and system protection and safety measures. Lastly the terms and 
conditions of interconnection agreements must address contract termination 
procedures and contractual dispute resolution and arbitration procedures (Republic 
of South Africa, 2009, p. 29). 
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 The draft regulations sets out processes for dispute resolution  
The draft regulations set out structured processes for dealing with disputes. In 
summary the party requesting interconnection may notify the authority if the 
reasonableness of a request is in dispute or if the interconnection provider has not 
responded within the specified period after the request (Republic of South Africa, 
2009, p. 27). Parties may inform the Authority of a dispute if the terms and conditions 
of an agreement have not been agreed to within the stipulated period (Republic of 
South Africa, 2009, p. 27). Disputes must be in writing, must give the Authority 
sufficient time to respond and the Authority will inform the parties within specified 
period whether the dispute warrants further investigation or whether the dispute will 
be dismissed accordingly. If the dispute warrants further investigation the Authority 
will inform the parties in writing of the dispute and give parties sufficient time to 
respond. The Authority may call for oral submissions or may decide on the merits of 
the case based on papers submitted to it if the issue is urgent. The Authority will 
provide its final decision to the parties in dispute within the specified timeframes and 
the Authority reserves its right to refer any matter to the Complaints and Compliance 
Committee (CCC) (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 28). 
 
 The draft regulations sets out processes for submission, filing, review, and 
timeframes of agreements 
Interconnection agreements or amendments must be submitted to the Authority 
within three days of signature (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 28). The Authority 
will review the agreements to assess compliance with regulations and the ECA Act. 
The draft regulations set out specific timelines for submission, filing and review. The 
Authority will notify the parties within twenty (20) days whether the agreements are 
consistent with regulations and the ECA (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 28). If 
not consistent then parties must agree on new terms within a period determined by 
the Authority (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 28). The Authority will review such 
amended agreement and advise the parties within a specified period on the 
consistency of the amended agreement with regulations and the ECA. The Authority 
will issue a compliance notice when it is satisfied that the agreement is consistent 
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with regulations and the Act and the date of issuance of the compliance notice will be 
taken as the date of filing (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 28). 
 
 The draft regulations conclude with conditions under which agreements may be 
suspended or terminated and make provisions for contraventions and penalties 
The regulations stipulate that the agreement must provide for termination and 
suspension that will minimise the effect of termination or suspension on the services 
received by end users (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 29). Suspension will only 
be allowed to address problems of quality of service degradation.  Agreements may 
only be terminated if there is mutual agreement that it may be terminated, a “vis 
major”‟ (act of God) situation, if there is material breach, or if one of the parties is 
declared insolvent or liquidated (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 29). However 
written notice of intention to terminate must be provided to the Authority and in the 
case of material breach, the Authority will give thirty (30) days to remedy the breach. 
Fines will be imposed by the Authority for non-compliance with any of the regulations 
as determined by the CCC (Republic of South Africa, 2009, p. 29). 
 
It must be noted that any regulations that were concluded before the regulations 
come into place will be reviewed by the Authority after parties are given to 
opportunity to align agreements with the new regulations (Republic of South Africa, 
2009, p. 29).  
 
 ICASA published new Interconnection Regulations on the 9th April 2010 
The purpose of the new regulations is consistent with the purpose described in the 
draft regulations published on the 10th July 2009 and as set out above and will not 
be repeated here. The new regulations confirm the processes for requesting 
interconnection as set out in the draft regulations. The new regulations once again 
confirm that interconnection is obligatory if it is financially and technically feasible. 
The regulations reiterate principles for interconnection agreements i.e. quality of 
service and standards, service level parameters, confidentiality and non-
discrimination and transparency (Republic of South Africa, 2010a). 
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Exemption from the obligation to interconnect will not apply to licensees with 
significant market power (SMP) i.e. see ICASA‟s pronouncements on SMP in the 
new call termination regulations of October 2010 where Cell C, MTN, Vodacom, 
Neotel and Telkom are declared as having SMP in their call termination markets 
(Republic of South Africa, 2010a, p. 14). 
 
The regulation further set out transitional provisions for agreements concluded 
before the coming into being of the new interconnection regulations in accordance 
with the table below (Republic of South Africa, 2010a, p. 15): 
 
Table 6: Transitional arrangements for interconnection agreements concluded 
before publishing of new interconnection regulations 
 
Year Interconnection 
agreement entered into 
Date to be submitted to 
the Authority 
On or before 01 January 2007 On or before 31 January 2011 
On or after 01 January 2007 On or before 30 June 2011 
 
SOURCE: Republic of South Africa, 2010a, p. 15. 
 
Lastly, the new Interconnection Regulations revokes previous interconnection 
guidelines published in 2000, supplementary interconnection guidelines published in 
2002 and interconnection and facilities leasing guidelines and supplements 
published in 2004 (Republic of South Africa, 2010a, p. 15). 
 
 ICASA published its draft Call Termination Regulations in the Government 
Gazette of the 16th April 2010 and interested persons were invited to give 
written representations on the draft regulations 
The purpose of the draft call termination regulations are consistent with the notice 
published on the 29th January 2007 i.e. the purpose of the regulations is to define the 
relevant markets, set out the methodology to determine whether competition is 
effective, pronounce on operators with SMP, set out pro-competitive measures and 
provide for enforcement of the regulations. Again the Authority finds that competition 
is ineffective in the markets it has defined and declares the main operators 
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Vodacom, MTN, Cell C and Telkom as having Established SMP in their own markets 
(Republic of South Africa, 2010b).   
 
The Authority requires that a reference interconnection order (RIO) be published 
within forty five days of the issuing of the regulations and describes the processes for 
the compilation, submission and approval of the RIO (Republic of South Africa, 
2010b, p. 8). 
 
Furthermore the Authority establishes pricing controls for call termination charges as 
set out below (Republic of South Africa, 2010b, p. 9): 
 
Table 7: Glide path for Call termination charges (July 2010 – July 2013) 
 
Period Mobile Call 
termination 
rates (R) 
Fixed call 
termination 
rates (R) 
From Jul -10  0.65 0.15 
From Jul-11 0.50 0.12 
From Jul -12 0.40 0.10 
 
SOURCE: Republic of South Africa, 2010b, p. 9. 
 
The draft regulations also make provision for accounting separation and cost 
accounting. The Authority prescribes the processes and format for the submission of 
reports in regulations to be prescribed by the Authority. A review of call terminations 
markets will take place in there years‟ time from the publication of the call 
terminations regulations. Furthermore the draft regulations propose financial 
penalties for non-compliance with regulations set out in the draft regulations 
(Republic of South Africa, 2010b, p. 10). 
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 ICASA published new Call Termination Regulations in the Government Gazette 
of the 29th October 2010 
The purpose of the regulations is consistent with the objectives published in draft 
regulations of April 2010 and previous notices such as those published in January 
2007. The purpose of the new call termination regulations is set out below.  
 
In summary the purpose of the new regulations are: the definition and identification 
of the wholesale call termination market that exist within the country, the 
methodology used to determine the effectiveness of competition in the defined 
markets, the declaration of licensees that have significant market power (SMP), the 
pro-competitive measures the Authority will impose to remedy market failure in the 
markets found to have ineffective competition and lastly to set out the schedule for 
periodic review of the relevant markets and the effectiveness of competition in those 
markets (Republic of South Africa, 2010c, p. 5). 
 The definition and identification of the wholesale voice call termination market 
that exist within the borders of the Republic of South Africa 
The Authority defines the markets as the markets for mobile and fixed wholesale call 
termination services in the Republic of South Africa. The Authority further 
categorises the markets according to the type of service offered to the end user in 
the country as being Market 1 for wholesale call termination services to any mobile 
location on the network and Market 2 for wholesale voice call termination services to 
a fixed location on the network.. Market 2 is further categorised into firstly market 
segments for wholesale voice call termination services to a fixed location within a 
geographic 0N area code and secondly between geographic 0N area codes 
(Republic of South Africa, 2010c, p. 4). 
 
 Methodology used to determine the effectiveness of competition in the markets 
defined 
The Authority has used the methodology described as the Hypothetical Monopolist 
Test which has been described in detail in the analysis of draft regulations of 
January 2007 and will therefore not be repeated here. To complement this, the 
Authority has determined market share in the relevant markets for each of the 
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operators and assessed on a forward-looking basis the level of competition and 
market power in the relevant markets (Republic of South Africa, 2010c, p. 6). 
 Effectiveness of competition in the defined markets and SMP 
The Authority has determined in these new regulations that there is ineffective 
competition in the wholesale call termination service markets. Furthermore the 
Authority determines that all licensees that offer wholesale call termination services 
have significant market power in their own markets. For clarity this will include 
Neotel, Telkom, Telkom 8ta, Vodacom, MTN and Cell C (Republic of South Africa, 
2010c, p. 6). 
 
 The pro-competitive measures the Authority will impose to remedy market 
failure in the markets found to have ineffective competition 
The Authority has determined that market failure exists because there is a lack of 
provision of access, there is a potential for discrimination between licensees that 
provide similar services, there is a lack of transparency and lastly there is inefficient 
pricing for wholesale call termination services (Republic of South Africa, 2010c, p. 6). 
 
The Authority further prescribes that all licensees must comply with interconnection 
regulations published in government gazette 33101 of 2010, the soon to be 
published Compliance Manual Regulations and charge fair and reasonable call 
termination rates. The Authority goes on further to impose additional pro-competitive 
measures on MTN, Vodacom and Telkom as they have according to the Authority 
benefitted from the allocation of lower more efficient bandwidth and have benefited 
from both “economies of scale and scope” because they have a “share of greater 
than twenty five percent (25%) in the termination markets” (Republic of South Africa, 
2010c, p. 7).  
 
MTN, Vodacom and Telkom are obliged to submit reference interconnection offers 
within forty five days of publications of the regulations and according to a set of rules 
laid down in the regulations (Republic of South Africa, 2010c, p. 8). The Authority 
goes on further to impose price controls based on cost based pricing for both mobile 
and fixed termination markets for the period 1st March 2011 to 1st March 2014 for 
MTN, Vodacom and Cell C as follows (Republic of South Africa, 2010c, p. 8): 
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Table 8: Market 1 – Wholesale voice call termination rates to mobile locations 
Period Peak (R) Off-Peak (R) 
1 March 2011 0.73 0.65 
1 March 2012 0.56 0.52 
1 March 2013 0.40 0.40 
 
SOURCE: Republic of South Africa, 2010c, p. 8. 
 
 
Table 9: Market 2 – Wholesale voice call termination rates to fixed locations 
Period Within 0N area code 
(R) 
Between 0N area code 
(R) 
Peak Off-peak Peak Off-Peak 
1 March 2011 0.20 0.12 0.28 0.19 
1 March 2012 0.15 0.12 0.25 0.19 
1 March 2013 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.19 
 
SOURCE: Republic of South Africa, 2010c, p. 8. 
 
Neotel and Cell C may charge higher termination rates if they are able to justify why 
the current spectrum allocation negatively impacts them or they may charge an 
asymmetric rate if they have less than twenty five percent (25%) of the total 
terminated minutes in the relevant market as of June 2009. There are certain limits 
however to the asymmetric rate that Neotel and Cell C may charge based on the 
table below (Republic of South Africa, 2010c, p. 12): 
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Table 10: Allowable asymmetric voice call termination rate 
Period Maximum percentage 
above rate set for 
identified licensees 
1 March 2011 20% 
1 March 2012 15% 
1 March 2013 10% 
 
SOURCE: Republic of South Africa, 2010c, p. 12. 
 
An additional requirement for MTN, Vodacom and Telkom is that they have to submit 
regulatory financial reports in line with the format prescribed in the Accounting 
Separation and Cost Accounting Regulations to be published by the Authority 
(Republic of South Africa, 2010c, p. 9).  
 
The regulations also oblige the Authority to review the wholesale voice call market, 
the effectiveness of competition and the application of pro-competitive measures in 
these markets after a three year period from publication of the regulations. Lastly the 
regulations lay down penalties for contraventions of the regulations and fines range 
from between five hundred thousand rand to two hundred thousand rand (Republic 
of South Africa, 2010c, p. 9).  
 
4.3 Summary  
 
The Conceptual Framework (Figure 3) developed in Chapter 2 was used as a basis 
for identifying themes from discussions with the Key Informant and the other 
respondents. The themes that emerged broadly were that the ECA has defined a 
very onerous process for interconnection regulation. However the processes 
themselves were followed to the letter by ICASA and even the asymmetric rates 
were heralded as being tolerable by the incumbent operators even though they did 
not support it fully. Government intervention was seen as counterproductive and it 
very nearly scuppered the process. The rate model, LRIC that was prescribed did 
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not have widespread support though. The pro-competitive measures were seen as 
being pre-mature and other unintended consequences were pointed out. Finally the 
last theme that emerged was that ICASA‟s strategic view on interconnection evolved 
over time as councillors changed. It started off as a much defined process but 
traction was lost for a few years and picked up again with the close scrutiny 
precipitated by the media, the PPC and the Minister.  
 
The regulations themselves developed over the period under review and followed a 
European Union approach to market definition, assessment of competitiveness and 
the setting of pro-competitive measures. The regulations were very thorough and 
were aligned to processes described in the literature in terms of methodologies for 
defining the market, the assessment of the level of competitiveness and to some 
degree the imposition of pro-competitive interventions. This is seen as international 
best practice. 
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CHAPTER 5 
REVIEW OF INDIA’S COST-ORIENTED APPROACH, KEY LEGISLATION, 
REGULATIONS AND OTHER MATERIALS 
 
India articulated its plan for telecoms in the country by identifying three strategic 
imperatives i.e. tariff rebalancing, quality of service regulation and interconnection 
regulation (Republic of India, 1998).  
5.1 Themes in India’s approach to regulation 
 
Seven themes were identified whilst examining India‟s approach to interconnection 
regulation: 
 
5.1.1 Theme - 1 Interconnection was integral to telecoms strategy for India 
The Key Informant explained that when telecommunications reform first began in 
India the three main issues that needed to be considered were tariff rebalancing, 
interconnection and quality of service issues (Key Informant India, personal 
communication, 29 October 2009). The approach that was then taken was to 
rebalance tariffs first and then to look at interconnection (Key Informant India, 
personal communication, 29 October 2009).  Thus the status quo for interconnection 
remained as it was not dealt with initially (Key Informant India, personal 
communication, 29 October 2009). The status quo meant that interconnection was 
“heavily skewed in favour of the incumbent” viz. the Department of 
Telecommunications (DoT) (Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 
October 2009). DoT at the time was housed within what is now the Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology (Key Informant India, personal 
communication, 29 October 2009). The corporatization of DoT only took place in 
2000 (Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 2009).  
 
The Key Informant further informed the Researcher that at this time there was no 
Regulator in place even when private mobile companies were making their entry into 
the market. Interconnection was heavily biased in favour of DoT because at this 
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point the payment regime was Receiving Party Pays (Key Informant India, personal 
communication, 29 October 2009). The mobile companies paid DoT a fixed fee of 
IR1.20 (Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 2009). The 
incumbent however did not have to pay the mobile operators anything for terminating 
calls on their networks (Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 
2009). 
 
5.1.2 Theme 2 – The move from Receiving Party Pays regime to Calling Party pays 
assisted with interconnection regulation 
Respondents shared a common view that India watershed process that resulted in a 
regime where interconnection could be regulated effectively was a move from the 
traditional model of Receiving Party Pays to a system of Calling Party Pays. This 
ensured that the playing field between the incumbent and the new entrants was 
levelled out. 
 
When private mobile companies began establishing themselves in India they had to 
pay the entire PSTN charge for calls even when calls originated on the incumbents 
network (Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 2009). The 
interconnection fee paid by mobile operators to the fixed line company was IR1.20. 
However because of the Receiving Party Pays regime when calls originating from 
the fixed network were terminated on the mobile network no fee was paid by DoT to 
the mobile companies (Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 
2009). There was no Calling Party Pays (CPP) at this point. This then was biased in 
DoT‟s favour and DoT‟s attitude was a “take it or leave it attitude” (Key Informant 
India, personal communication, 29 October 2009).  
 
TRAI first started operating in 1998. TRAI came up with a process for tariff 
rebalancing. Although it did not tackle interconnection directly this was a strategy 
that was a part of the rebalancing process (Key Informant India, personal 
communication, 29 October 2009). The interconnection regime was not changed at 
all initially but a Consultation paper was issued in 1998 (Key Informant India, 
personal communication, 29 October 2009). The paper mostly looked at rate 
rebalancing between international and long distance calls with local calls (Key 
Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 2009). According to the Key 
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Informant DoT did not want this to the extent that TRAI wanted rebalancing. 
Politicians feared the backlash for local calls going up which would have been a 
consequence of the rate rebalancing. However there was some kind of “political give 
and take that occurred between TRAI and DoT” that allowed the process to continue 
(Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 2009). By March 1999, 
one third of the rebalancing had taken place. Although interconnection was not dealt 
with directly, there was a consideration given to it as there was a chapter on 
interconnection in the Consultation Paper (Key Informant India, personal 
communication, 29 October 2009). TRAI described quite clearly in the Consultation 
Paper what they wanted to do with interconnection. Thus the path to interconnection 
regulation was not a meandering path but was a strategic approach as is borne out 
by the Consultation paper (Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 
2009). 
 
Interconnection regulation was derailed by the incumbent when it was first mooted 
but in the end it eventually took place (Key Informant India, personal communication, 
29 October 2009). Soon after rebalancing took place TRAI worked on 
interconnection as the second task. TRAI introduced CPP in 2003. This process 
initiated by TRAI however started a process of litigation with the incumbent (Key 
Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 2009). In 1999 TRAI started a 
consultation process for interconnection. New entrants did not have facilities and port 
charges needed to be reduced (Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 
October 2009).  
 
The incumbent at that stage was charging high prices for facilities but also did not 
allow access on to the networks (Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 
October 2009). Delaying tactics were also used in 1999 to 2000 (Key Informant 
India, personal communication, 29 October 2009). In 2001 interconnection costs 
were reduced but a sliding scale was employed and it was reduced gradually over 
the years (Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 2009). CPP 
however was still not implemented (Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 
October 2009). It was stuck in court battles between TRAI and DoT (Key Informant 
India, personal communication, 29 October 2009). TRAI tried to convince DoT that it 
will benefit in the long run but DoT was not interested in profit but only interested in 
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not losing market share. “They were in-fact a deal spoiler backed by the Minister” 
(Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 2009). 
 
By 2000 CPP implementation was still being blocked by the incumbent (Key 
Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 2009). The incumbent did not 
share any of its revenue but kept 100% of all interconnection revenue (Key Informant 
India, personal communication, 29 October 2009). The Key Informant impressed on 
the Researcher that CPP was the tipping point, the watershed for solving the 
interconnection issue. “In fact a causal link can be made that the introduction of CPP 
helped with the reduction of interconnection charges” (Key Informant India, personal 
communication, 29 October 2009). The Key Informant explained that there was an 
explosion in growth after CCP was introduced (Key Informant India, personal 
communication, 29 October 2009). This led to an acceptance that it was the 
changeover to a CPP regime that got interconnection fixed in India. Therefore, 
according to the Key Informant one can conclude that interconnection was weaved in 
with the CPP issue (Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 
2009). 
 
A further point raised by the Key Informant was that the timing of the introduction of 
CPP and interconnection regulation in general was important as the political climate 
was changing towards competition all over India. There was an increasing 
acceptance by government that private players could come into telecoms. This led to 
this explosion in growth. TRAI had been in court for 4 years with interconnection 
challenges mostly from the incumbent. Eventually with consultation with all parties 
there was eventual acceptance. Politicians were starting to see the value in mobile 
not from a development perspective but a revenue generating perspective i.e. 
licence fees (Key Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 2009). 
Mobile was now seen as an elitist technology that could generate huge incomes. ICT 
for development came much later. They saw potential for sharing in some of the 
profits. It was a money spinner for government from licence fees (Key Informant 
India, personal communication, 29 October 2009).  
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5.1.3 Theme 3 – Participation by the policy maker in the process had to be managed  
The Key informant explained that there was interference from the policy maker 
throughout the entire process of establishing an interconnection regulatory regime 
for India. However the Key Informant also believes that although the process 
unfolded over time it was essential that the relationships with DoT and the Ministry 
were well managed.  
 
The Key Informant reminded the Researcher that TRAI was an independent 
regulatory body. DoT issued policy and the Telecoms Act made TRAI responsible for 
issuing regulations. DoT did not have a mandate to change the regulation mandate 
of TRAI. They had to go to court to do this if they so desired. Practically speaking it 
took a lot of time for the both to go to court. “In 2000 the entire TRAI was sacked as 
they were accused of being pro private sector because of the CPP issue” (Key 
Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 2009). The Key Informant 
believed that in time they learnt to work together. DoT had the power to nominate 
people onto TRAI and in fact DoT first appointed people in TRAI. In time there was a 
realisation that with all the litigation only the legal community benefited (Key 
Informant India, personal communication, 29 October 2009). In time they recognised 
that a fair interconnection regime needed to prevail. Meanwhile the mobile industry 
too was a powerful body as well with lots of money and influence. Lobbing was 
taking place in the background. Some of the mobile companies belonged to old, well 
connected and established Indian conglomerates (Key Informant India, personal 
communication, 29 October 2009). The Key Informant shared a strong opinion that 
today there is much competition due to the successes with interconnection. Retail 
prices according to the Key Informant are not regulated except for rural fixed at IR 
100/month. TRAI only regulates quality of service (QoS) and interconnection usage 
charges. The Key Informant expounded on some interconnection costing models 
that were considered. There are two ways of regulating the price of interconnection 
as per the World Bank model. Models can be cost based for example, Bill and Keep. 
However Bill and Keep will only work if operators are the same size. If there is 
asymmetric traffic then Bill and Keep usually will not work. Cost based charges could 
also be fully distributed costs (FDC) or based on Long Run Marginal costs. 
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5.1.4 Theme 4 - Skills is an issue for Regulators 
Although by and large Respondents were satisfied with the quality of skills of TRAI 
personnel some Respondents commented that the Regulator needs good skills to 
understand the cost models i.e. economic skills, political skills and stakeholder 
management skills to be able to regulate interconnection issues. One Respondent 
pointed out that the interconnection issues were complex and officials responsible for 
its regulation needed to “thread this minefield carefully” (Respondent 5 India, 27 
October 2009). Regulators need the relevant skills to sort out problems amicably 
(Respondent 5 India, 27 October 2009). This Respondent described a situation in 
neighbouring Bangladesh where the strategy not to interconnect “backfired as was 
the case with the Bangladeshi incumbent”. The incumbent refused to interconnect 
with Grameen phone. Grameen‟s Muhammed Yunus developed a SME business 
model to empower rural women (Respondent 5 India, 27 October 2009). Rural 
women helped people make calls and used the mobile phone as a business tool to 
help people. This model was so successful that roles have reversed and now the 
incumbent is requesting Grameen to interconnect. The Respondent cautioned that 
one has to learn from the Bangladeshi experience; the market is dynamic so big 
companies need to be fair as the “tables can be turned on them very quickly” 
(Respondent 5 India, 27 October 2009). The regulator needs skills to understand the 
dynamics of the market that they find themselves in and should be able to 
communicate this to all stakeholders effectively (Respondent 5 India, 27 October 
2009). 
 
5.1.5 Theme 5 – Market structures in India will change 
In India Circles coincide with state lines and licences are granted accordingly. Many 
Respondents shared the view that spectrum is the constraint to having many 
operators in each circle. Too many operators can put the costs up as each operator 
needs expensive spectrum. They need to recover these costs and they can only do 
that by charging higher prices. “Consolidation in India will happen. “Mergers and 
acquisitions will take place” (Respondent 5 India, 27 October 2009). The 
Respondent further explained that what is optimum a priori and the number of 
companies operating in each circle now is the question that needs to be asked. Two 
operators are probably too little as the opportunity for collusion is great. In fact the 
competition policy document of TRAI says that there should be a minimum of four 
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operators. An opposing view that was expressed is that one must take into account 
that fragmentation sometimes increases costs. It is easier to collude with two 
operators; with four it will be more difficult.  However one must have a strong 
regulator though if there are going to have fewer operators. 
 
5.1.6 Theme 6 - A cost-oriented approach is the basis for Interconnection Usage 
Charges 
Respondents expressed the view that the Indian interconnection regime is far ahead 
of the world as this is a well-established interconnection regime based on sets of 
rules and regulations. In essence interconnection prices are cost based (Respondent 
1 India, 30 October 2009). In India there are two kinds of operator i.e. government as 
the legacy operator with high sunken costs and private companies with the latest 
technologies and methods whose costs are somewhat lower than government 
operators (Respondent 1 India, 30 October 2009). MTNL and BSNL (Previously 
DoT) are government operators. Private operators are companies such as Reliant, 
Airtel, Aircel, Vodaphone, Idea and Tata Docomo (Respondent 1 India, 30 October 
2009). 
 
“The cost models of both types of operators are examined and there is a moderation 
process that TRAI uses that establishes a cost somewhere in between the costs of 
both types of operators” (Respondent 1 India, 30 October 2009).  TRAI uses a LRIC 
model that they have developed. TRAI also looks at operators current costs. They 
want to give a reasonable return to new entrants and providers.  TRAI respondents 
believe that in this way there are no losers.  This regime was started in 2003 and 
there have been many revisions since then. Right now interconnection usage 
charges (IUC) are 20p for local/national calls and 40p for international calls (for 
received calls in 2009).  
 
According to the Respondents from the Regulator there was a well thought out 
structure and plan to deal with interconnection (Respondent 1 India, 30 October 
2009). Right now there only issues that are regulated are interconnection and QoS 
issues.  Respondents confirmed that initially a Bill and Keep regime was in place. 
Respondents expressed a view that there was a very high price initially. A 
respondent shared with the Researcher the explosive growth in India where India is 
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adding about 14 million users every month.  Again respondents confirmed the 
importance of the CPP model. However respondents further added that to implement 
such a system all the network elements need to be known i.e. the makeup of a call‟s 
components needs to be understood. The respondents further explained that once 
you have the total cost you add a fair rate of return of say 15%. As you know the 
number of minutes called you can then work out costs per minute.  When operators 
give their costs these can be easily verified. Accounting separation is in place and 
the costs are audited. There is then an open consultation and all stakeholders are 
given an opportunity to comment before an order is issued. A respondent expressed 
an opinion that India has proved to the world that economic principles can be applied 
(Respondent 2 India, 30 October 2009).  
 
A Respondent pointed out that with the reduction in costs the volume of minutes 
consumed in India has increased exponentially. According to Respondents the 
Indian consumer is very price sensitive. The Respondent shared with the 
Researcher that  “when prices were reduced from 16 rupees to 1 rupee the minutes 
consumed went up 16 fold” (Respondent 1 India, 30 October 2009). The Respondent 
further informed the Researcher that the operators had accepted this basic economic 
principle that with the reduction in costs basic minutes will go up disproportionately. 
The Respondents from the regulator added that TRAI has proved to all stakeholders 
that this is the case. The Respondents opinion was that India‟s tariff is the lowest in 
the world yet growth is the highest in the world. Only China is almost equal to India in 
this regard.  
 
Respondents pointed out that TRAI recognised that Interconnection is a fundamental 
requirement for growth for the telecoms sector and this has been accepted by 
operators, government, policy makers, and regulators alike. TRAI levelled playing 
fields by establishing rules and regulations. Costs have been reduced by 96% in the 
last 10 years according to some Respondents. Other positives outcomes that were 
quoted were that there has been an increase in teledensity (mobile). More minutes 
are consumed and both operators and consumers are happy. An example cited was 
that not so long ago it was 106 rupees to make a UK call. Now it is just 4 rupees. 
Respondents explained that this has happened over a period of time from 2000 to 
2009 coinciding with moving from a Bill and Keep (Receiving Party Pays) regime to a 
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CPP regime. The Respondent explained that the interconnection regime is revised 
every six months to a year (Respondent 1 India, 30 October 2009). The Respondent 
drew attention to the fact that the cost of the network is reducing due to the network 
effect and that the price of technology is decreasing.  
 
According to some Respondents there were many rejected calls under the Bill and 
Keep method. Respondents explained that when the call did not mature, no one 
made any money and the consumer also did not get what he wanted i.e. to make a 
call (Respondent 2 India, 30 October 2009). With the cost based regime CPP was a 
natural progression. “With CPP the receiver does not pay. This changed everything 
in India” (Respondent 3 India, 27 October 2009).  
 
Access deficit charges (ADC) was raised as an important aspect to the 
interconnection regime in India by some Respondents. With liberalisation there were 
now more private players and government suffered a setback therefore ADC was 
introduced because government operators had to continue to meet government‟s 
objectives such as universal service and other social and political goals (Respondent 
3 India, 27 October 2009). The Respondent explained that the compensation for 
government operators was the ADC regime introduced in 2003 (Respondent 3 India, 
27 October 2009). However there was another mechanism for this as well i.e. the 
universal service obligation (USO). USO was for areas that were not developing and 
where facilities were lacking. The Respondent reminded the Researcher that the ITU 
principle was that “telecommunications is for everyone” (Respondent 3 India, 27 
October 2009). The principle was that ADC was phased out over time and was 
replaced by the USO. The mechanism that India introduced was 5% of operator 
revenue went to the USO fund. This is managed by DoT (Respondent 3 India, 27 
October 2009).  The Respondent explained the process that was followed - a 
tendering process was issued to take the lowest cost service provider to be 
reimbursed from the USO fund for fixed rollout. The Respondent further explained 
that this was also done for mobile and that the towers business will be reimbursed 
from this fund as well. The towers business has been separated in India. Mobile 
operators have a choice of whether they want to install their own towers. However 
the towers business can lease services to the operators but there are rules and 
regulations that apply to infrastructure leasing. 
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5.1.7 Theme 7 – Infrastructure rollout is progressing now that interconnection issues 
are resolved 
To counter claims by operators that they need to cross subsidise rural infrastructure 
rollout the approach that India is taking is to subsidise rural rollout by using a 
universal access fund. As has been mentioned five percent (5%) of revenues go into 
this fund. India used reverse auctions to get bidders for rural rollout and some bids 
came in at zero for phone subsidies (Key Informant India, 29 October 2009).  
 
The towers business is a separate business in India. Companies install dark fibre 
towers that at least three operators can use together. Operators‟ have the choice of 
having their own towers business. With Government‟s policy of opening up the 
economy to competition, electricity and rail infrastructure was offered to private 
companies. Towers can be shared in rural areas by different operators thus bringing 
down costs for rural infrastructure rollout (Respondent 3 India, 27 October 2009). 
TRAI has issued regulations called “Shared Infrastructure” (Respondent 3 India, 27 
October 2009). The Respondent informed the Researcher that once the 
interconnection issue was sorted out the network started growing (Respondent 3 
India, 27 October 2009). Growth in the telecoms market took up momentum by itself. 
In urban areas penetration is now pervasive (Respondent 3 India, 27 October 2009).  
 
Many Respondents were unhappy with the progress with broadband rollout in India. 
Some reiterated the importance of a solid interconnection regime to enable 
broadband because there is a view that broadband will only be possible in India over 
mobile networks. In India fixed line is declining and the future of broadband lies in 
mobile. Fixed lines have in fact seen a decline from 50 million in 2005 to 35 million 
lines in 2008 (Respondent 3 India, 27 October 2009). 
 
During discussions it was pointed out repeatedly that broadband is a failure thus far 
and India is lagging far behind (Respondent 3 India, 27 October 2009). “Broadband 
will have to thrive on mobile in India hence the importance of having a good 
interconnection regime” (Respondent 3 India, 27 October 2009). The Researcher 
was informed that there is not enough optic fibre to support fixed broadband. 
Respondents shared the view that broadband will take a mobile route and it must be 
on 3G spectrum. Respondents agreed that the Indian private sector will innovate and 
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this won‟t be a constraint to rollout broadband on mobile networks (Respondent 6 
India, 19 October 2009). The root-cause to broadband failure, explained 
Respondents is the failure of the implementation of 3G spectrum. Government has 
been unable to decide whether 3G should be a “tool for development or a cash cow” 
(Respondent 3 India, 27 October 2009). Hence spectrum auctions have been 
delayed by three years. Government has not been able to put this out to auction as 
yet. Government wanted a reserve price at one stage. Then it could not decide who 
should get what (Respondent 3 India, 27 October 2009). Elections in the meantime 
have happened in the middle of the process resulting in further delays. Government 
has a fiscal deficit and can use telecoms as cash cow (Respondent 3 India, 27 
October 2009).  
 
5.2   Review of legislation, regulations and other materials 
 
The documents that were inspected consisted of the New Telecom Policy 1999, the 
TRAI Act of 1997, the TRAI consultation paper of 1998, the Telecommunication 
Interconnection Usage Charges (IUC) Regulation 2003 (The Main Regulations),  the 
IUC (10th Amendment) Regulations 2009, the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Telecoms IUC 10th Amendment and other materials.. These particular documents 
that were reviewed were identified through the interviews conducted in India and 
must be read in conjunction with section 5.1 above. 
 
5.2.1 The New Telecom Policy 1999 (NTP 99) sets objectives for 
telecommunications in India 
 The telecoms industry in India is governed by the New Telecom Policy 1999 (NTP 
99). In India telecommunications is legislated by the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 
(ITA), the Indian Wireless Act of 1933 (IWA), the Telecom Regulatory Authority of 
India Act of 1997 (TRAI Act) and the Information Technology Act of 2000 (IT Act) 
and the rules made thereunder from time to time (Smale ed, 2011, p 76).  
 
The objectives of the NTP 99 are to “promote competition, ensure the availability of 
affordable and effective communication facilities to Indian citizens, provide equal 
opportunities and a level playing field to all players and achieve efficiency and 
transparency in spectrum management” (Smale ed, 2011, p 76). More importantly 
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the NTP 99 provided for the restructuring of DoT separating policy making and 
licensing from operations and providing for the corporatisation of BSNL, MSNL and 
VSNL by 2001 the government owned telecommunications service providers 
(Republic of India, 1999). 
 
  The NTP 99 also clarifies the role of TRAI especially in the context of the 
restructuring of DoT. It reiterates the objective of TRAI i.e. to provide an effective 
regulatory framework and adequate safeguards to ensure fair competition and 
protection of consumer interests. Therefore TRAI is mandated to issue directives to 
government in its role as service provider however government in its role as policy 
marker and licensor is not obliged to implement the recommendations of the TRAI on 
other matters. 
 
5.2.2 The TRAI Act of 1997 created an independent sector regulator for 
telecommunications in India 
 Prior to the creation of TRAI, regulation was the domain of the DoT. With the passing 
of the TRAI Act an independent body was created and policy making was separated 
from regulation. Broadly speaking the TRAI‟s role is divided into providing 
recommendations which do not necessarily have to be implemented by DoT and the 
issuing of regulations and dispute resolutions between service providers which is 
statutory in nature. 
 
 TRAI can recommend the need and timing for the introduction of new service 
providers, recommend the terms and conditions of new licences and recommend 
revocation of licences for non-compliance of terms and conditions. More importantly 
TRAI is obliged to ensure effective interconnection between service providers, 
facilitate competition and promote efficiency so as to ensure growth in services, 
protect the interest of consumers, and maintain a register of all interconnection 
agreements and levy fees and other such charges as necessary (Republic of India, 
1997).  
 
Furthermore the Telecom Dispute Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) was 
created under the TRAI Act where any direction, decision or order made by TRAI 
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can be heard by the TDSAT (Republic of India, 1997, p.76). The TDSAT will also 
consider interconnection and access related disputes (Smale, 2011, p. 77). 
 
5.2.3 The TRAI Consultation paper of 1998 proposed rules for interconnection 
regulation 
 This is document is widely believed to be a watershed document that set the path for 
reform of the telecoms sector in India. The Consultation paper tackled the very 
controversial matter of rate re balancing thereby setting the path for cost based 
pricing for retail and interconnection charges.  
 
The main aim of this paper was to propose a restructuring of telecom tariffs and to 
provide consistent and transparent frameworks for regulating these tariffs in order to 
amongst other things achieve cost based prices through regulation and or 
competition, enhance transparency of subsidies and to provide a basis for enhanced 
competition in the near future (Republic of India, 1998). 
 
The Consultation paper further sets out important principles for interconnection such 
as non-discrimination, transparency, timeliness, mandatory interconnection at any 
technically feasible point in the network, unbundling of the elements of the network 
and cost based interconnection charges (Republic of India, 1998). 
 
 Rules for cost based interconnection charges take shape in the Consultation 
paper 
The framework for cost based interconnection rates propose that set up costs 
incurred for establishing interconnection should be fully taken into account when 
calculating interconnection costs. Incremental costs arising due to usage of the 
network facilities should be included in the costs. Finally a margin should be added 
to the cost estimates to cover the joint or common fixed costs involved (Republic of 
India, 1998). 
 
The paper further re-affirms from past consultation papers that set-up costs should 
be borne by the operator seeking interconnection. For locals calls the present 
system of Bill and Keep is to remain. For international and long distance a revenue 
sharing regime is proposed. 
132 
 
 
For long distance calls asymmetry is introduced as revenue will be shared between 
new entrants and incumbent in the ratio of 60 to 40 respectively. For international 
calls the ratio will be 45: 55 between the new entrant and the incumbent (DoT) 
respectively. When more than two operators are involved in long distance calls then 
the terminating operator will not share in the revenue streams. The rationale for this 
is that over time there should be a balance between terminating and originating long 
distance calls for any operator. The revenue sharing system was to be re-examined 
when more detailed cost information became available (Republic of India, 1998). 
 
Furthermore the Consultation paper proposes that from here on mobile calls do not 
have to only interconnect through the DoT network. Calls can go directly from one 
mobile operator to another. The interconnection charge between these mobile 
operators is to be settled through bilateral negotiations. Another watershed feature of 
the Consultation paper is that now the fixed network operator (DoT) will pay a 
termination fee to the mobile operators when calls from the fixed operator are 
terminated on the mobile network in a revenue sharing scheme in the ratio of 15:85 
in favour of the mobile network (Republic of India, 1998). 
 
5.2.4 The Telecommunication Interconnection Usage Charges (IUC) Regulation 
2003 (The Main Regulations) 
The main objective of the regulation is to regulate interconnection usage charges to 
be paid between service providers of basic telecommunications services, wireless in 
the local loop service providers, cellular mobile services and long distance service 
providers (National and International) (Republic of India, 2003, p. 1). 
 
As per the regulations IUC are broken down into Transit, Origination, Carriage, and 
Access Deficit charges. 
 
 Termination Charges 
Termination charges are set at IR 0.30 for all types of calls e.g. basic, wireless 
in the local loop, cellular mobile and long distance. 
 
 Origination Charges 
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The regulations regarding Origination Charges stipulate that the originating 
service provider shall retain the amount left over after paying for termination, 
carriage and access deficit charges (Republic of India, 2003, p. 9) 
 
 Carriage Charges 
o Carriage charges for Long Distance 
Table 11 : Carriage Charges for Long Distance Calls in India 
Carriage 
charge per 
minute for 
long distance 
calls (IR) 
Distance 
Below 50km 50-200km 200-500km Above 500km 
0.20 0.65 0.90 1.10 
 
Source: Republic of India, 2003, p. 10. 
 
o Transit charges for intra- Short Distance Charging Area(SDCA) 
Direct connection between service providers is mandatory; charges 
can be mutually negotiated but should be lower than IR 0.20 (Republic 
of India, 2003, p. 10). 
o Carriage charges for International Long Distance  
The regulations allow the service providers to negotiate a rate however 
any surplus may be shared between service providers on the approval 
of the regulator (Republic of India, 2003, p. 10)  
 
 Access Deficit Charges (ADC) 
Access deficit charges are specified for certain categories of calls such 
as fixed to fixed, fixed to wireless in the local loop (limited mobility) 
(WLL) (M) and vice versa, cellular to cellular, cellular to fixed and vice 
versa, cellular to  WLL(M) and vice versa. The charges range between 
IR 0.30 to IR 0.80 (Republic of India, 2003, p. 10). Methods for and 
collection and distribution of the ADC are also set out in the 
regulations. 
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5.2.5 The Interconnection Usage Charges (10th Amendment) Regulations 2009 
A number of Amendments were issued to the Main Regulations issued in 
2003. These Amendments culminated in the 10th Amendment issued in 2009.  
 
The 10th Amendment further reduced termination charges from IR 0.30 to IR 
0.20 per minute for all local and national long distance calls. The termination 
charge for incoming international calls was set at IR 0.40 per minute (The 
Republic of India, 2009a, p. 2). 
 
Transit charges for intra- Short Distance Charging Area (SDCA) was set to be 
lower than IR 0.15 from being lower than IR 0.20 per minute (The Republic of 
India, 2009a, p. 2). 
 
IUC for short message service (SMS) was to be negotiated between service 
providers as long as the charges were non-discriminatory, transparent and 
reciprocal (The Republic of India, 2009a, p. 3). 
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5.2.6 The Explanatory Memorandum to the 10th Amendment 
The Memo explains how cost effective telecoms charges will aid in India‟s 
development. It explains further that the issue of interconnection as a barrier 
to entry for new service providers needed to be resolved and hence the 10th 
Amendment. It is the objective of the Authority as well to ensure that service 
providers recover their costs and that transfer of charges takes place correctly 
(Republic of India, 2009b, p. 5). 
The Memo goes on to set out how the various inputs from stakeholders during 
the consultation process were dealt with. It also revisits the history of the 
various Amendments in a chronological order. The call costs are broken down 
into origination, carriage and termination charges.  
 
During the Stakeholder engagements three models for calculating 
interconnection charges were suggested. They were Forward Looking Long 
Run Incremental Costs (FLLRIC), Bill and Keep (BAK) and Fully Allocated 
Costs. The Regulator goes on to explain why none of the models could work 
in the prevailing situation. The regulator dismisses the use of the FLLRIC by 
suggesting that it is difficult to compute and requires high regulatory 
overheads. The regulator goes on to suggest that a hybrid FLLRIC model may 
even lead to higher termination costs (Republic of India, 2009b, p.23). 
 
The regulator is not in favour of BAK at all as it is of the opinion that it is not 
suitable if traffic flows between operators is disproportional as would be the 
case between established operators and new entrants (Republic of India, 
2009b, p.23). The regulator also made it quite clear that it did not want to 
revert to a regime where the Receiving Party pays for incoming calls. 
 
The FAC regime was dismissed as it divides operator‟s costs between all the 
services that it provides which could mean that operator inefficiencies could 
be passed on to the interconnection service providers which would be 
unacceptable (Republic of India, 2009b, p.23). 
 
In the end, although the regulator agreed that a FLLRIC models needs to be 
implemented it is not in favour of doing so immediately. It will continue to use 
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a proxy cost together with the information from BSNL to get to a cost based 
tariff for interconnection usage charges. Although the information from BSNL 
was not reliable in certain instances the regulator was able to benchmark with 
a high level of accuracy the cost for termination and carriage. The regulator 
specifically excluded CAPEX charges to determine termination charges and 
only used OPEX and it was based on the audited financial statements of 25 
mobile operators (Republic of India, 2009b, p.23). 
Table 12 : Interconnection Usage Charges India (2009) 
 
Source: Republic of India, 2009, p. 66 
 
5.3 Summary  
 
India‟s telecommunication reform process identified three issues to be resolved i.e. 
tariff rebalancing, interconnection and quality of service regulation. India began with 
tariff rebalancing between long distance and local call costs. While this was 
happening the status for interconnection remained and was heavily biased toward 
the incumbent which was the DoT. The interconnection regime was Receiving Party 
Pays where the mobile companies paid the incumbent when calls were terminated 
on mobile networks.  
Service New  (IR) per minute Previous (IR) per minute 
Termination Charge domestic 0.20 0.30 
Termination Charge 
International (incoming) 
0.40 0.30 
Carriage long distance 0.65 0.65 
Origination Charge Not Specified- service provider to retain after paying other 
IUC 
Transit/Carriage charge from 
level II trunk automatic 
exchange (TAX) to SDCA (short 
distance call area) 
0.15 
Transit Intra SCADA and TAX Less than 0.15 
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All respondents agreed that the changeover to Calling Party Pays (CPP) paved the 
way for a more equitable interconnection regime. This led to many challenges from 
the incumbent but eventually there was acceptance of the CPP regime. At one stage 
the entire TRAI staff was fired. The situation in India however was changing where 
completion was being introduced in other network industries such as rail and 
electricity. 
 
India‟s approach to interconnect charges dubbed Interconnection Usage Charges 
(IUC) was a cost based approach. IUC was broken down into origination, 
carriage/transit and termination charges. The incumbent, the corporatised DoT‟s 
(now called BSNL‟s) information was used to benchmark some of the costs. India did 
not choose one of the popular costing models such a LRIC, BAK or FACs. Rather 
they chose to use a proxy to determine actual costs for termination and carriage. 
Origination charges are not regulated and operators are allowed to keep the 
origination charge after paying the termination and carriage charge.  Interconnection 
charges were eventually settled at IR 0.20 across the board in 2009. On a pure 
exchange rate basis this is equivalent to R0.03 (3 cents). The South African 
interconnection rate by contrast in 2011 is R 0.73 for mobile R 0.20 for fixed within 
0N and R0.28 between 0N areas. 
  
138 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
SOUTH AFRICA MARKET REVIEW APPROACH CONTRASTS WITH INDIA’S 
COST-ORIENTED APPROACH 
 
South Africa followed a market review process promulgated in the ECA which was 
modelled on the European Union Framework Directive. India on the other hand went 
through a rigorous cost determination exercise to prescribe termination charges. 
India‟s process yielded low retail prices whereas South Africa has yet to see the 
retail pricing benefit of this exercise.  
6.1 ICASA neglected to use interconnection strategically to reduce retail 
prices 
 
The literature has shown that interconnection is a key regulatory issue for enabling 
competition in a liberalised telecommunications sector. Melody‟s iconic statement 
that “interconnection is a cornerstone of competition” is testimony to the importance 
of interconnection in a liberalizing telecoms industry (Melody, 1997, p. 53). In 2007 
ICASA commenced with a process to regulate interconnection rates but failed to 
complete the process. This inertia demonstrated by ICASA gives little comfort that 
the Authority had a strategic view on using interconnection to introduce competition 
despite overwhelming evidence that it does. South Africa remains a country with one 
of the highest telecoms prices in the world impacting on South Africa objectives 
articulated in the white paper of giving affordable access to all.  
 
India on the other hand had a strategic view on interconnection from the outset. They 
targeted interconnection to reduce retail rates as set out in the Consultation paper of 
1998 and pursued this relentlessly using cost exercises to determine the true costs 
for interconnection. India not coincidentally has the cheapest retail rates in the world.  
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6.2  ICASA correctly followed a market review process as defined in the 
literature but did not achieve the desired outcome 
 
The Authority followed the processes prescribed in the ECA meticulously in arriving 
at the interconnection regulations of April 2010 and the call termination regulations of 
October 2010. The processes were modelled on the European Framework directive 
on telecommunications costs. However the literature shows that there are different 
views on how markets may be defined. The literature cautions that markets could be 
defined too narrowly if substitute products and complementary services are not taken 
into account. Although ICASA determined correctly that there are no substitute 
product for call termination on each operators networks there is no evidence to 
suggest that ICASA considered complements when defining markets. Although there 
is support for the definition it would have been interesting to understand ICASA‟s 
thinking in this regard. 
 
The market review process initially was not followed correctly through a variety of 
reasons. Some of the reasons include the fact that the previous Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 did not deal with the issue sufficiently as it was only concerned with the 
regulation of Telkom‟s monopoly in the market at that time. It is widely agreed that 
the process that was finally engaged in was a robust process and the process itself 
had support from the operators. The processes itself have their roots in the 
European Union Framework for interconnection regulation and are indeed very 
complex by nature. It was a necessary however to go through the market definition 
processes to get to a point where the processes could not be challenged by the large 
operators despite very strong views prevailing in 2009 from leading legal minds such 
as Advocate Gilbert Marcus SC that in fact it sufficient work had been done in 
defining markets in 2007 and that it was not necessary to conduct a further market 
review before interconnection rates were prescribed.  
 
There is reason to contend however that the processes could have been simplified in 
the legislation and could have taken place in an ex-post process rather than in the 
ex-ante way that it was conducted which would not have resulted in the nearly 
sixteen years of delay before interconnection rates were regulated. The delay has 
had serious developmental consequences for the consumer as there has been a 
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sustained period of high telecoms prices in South Africa lasting this entire period. 
That the processes that have been legislated were onerous but necessary is not 
disputed. However the implementation could have prescribed rates in parallel with 
market analysis being performed.  
 
The one criticism levelled at the process was that the rates that emerged after the 
process was concluded were not based on the underlying costs of interconnection. 
One could contend then that the process did not yield the outcome that was hoped 
for. There was a political process that ran in parallel to determine the rates 
 
The Indian experience is that interconnection usage charges were prescribed in 
2003 and more in-depth cost based exercises are continued to be performed. 
Officials from TRAI have stated quite openly that interconnection rates could be 
raised if the market demands it. The processes followed by the Indian authorities are 
not steeped in statute. The TRAI Act gives the regulator sufficient tools to prescribe 
regulations but the approach has been to move towards cost-based pricing. To this 
end the Authority has spent a considerable number of years understanding the costs 
of making a call in India. Costs that make up a call in India are divided into 
origination charges, carriage charges and termination charges collectively called 
interconnection usage charges (IUC). Regulation takes place at the level of these 
cost components. It seems to be a far more simplified process to get to regulated 
rates but it requires superior technical and financial skills within the regulator.  
 
A disadvantage of the onerous process defined in the ECA is that the skill set 
needed to achieve finality to these complex processes that have been prescribed, is 
not readily available. It has been put forward during the interview process that the 
skills at ICASA are either lacking entirely or not deployed optimally to undertake a 
market analysis of this nature. The institutional problem at ICASA over the years 
including acrimony between the CEO and the chairperson of the Council has not 
been conducive to prescribing interconnection rate regulation timeously. There has 
been a lack of continuity with councillors and staff since the days of SATRA and this 
has impacted on regulations. Internal strife has resulted in the key issues not being 
dealt with appropriately. Staff retention is a major issue at ICASA and effort needs to 
be devoted to attracting and retaining key staff. Many of the respondents employed 
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by the major operators and that were interviewed for this research project are in fact 
previous ICASA employees that had left for greener pastures.  
 
6.3 The literature points to asymmetrical interconnection charges as a means 
to support new entrants 
 
South Africa‟s interconnection rate regime has not always favoured new entrants. 
The experience of Cell C in entering the South African telecoms market was often 
quoted as being how not to regulate for new entrants. In the absence of 
interconnection regulation the two mobile incumbents were allowed to raise their 
interconnection prices by 500% just before Cell C‟s entry into the SA market. 
Representatives from the major operators respond that the rates were merely being 
aligned to the Telkom tariff at that time and that they were not being raised to keep 
Cell C out.  However interconnection regulation or the lack thereof is blamed for Cell 
C‟s poor market share to date as interconnection is one of the highest cost 
components for new entrants. The regulations of 2010 addresses this issue but it is 
not without controversy. The new asymmetric rate regime is described in chapter 4 
of this report and gives new entrants Cell C, Neotel and 8ta an opportunity to charge 
slightly higher interconnection prices on a decreasing sliding scale over a three year 
period.  
 
Some of the controversy surrounds Cell C having been given an asymmetric rate 
because the view is that it is an established operator and also the fact that Cell C‟s 
client base consists mostly of younger people for e.g. students and that in fact Cell C 
has been a net receiver of interconnection rate income over the ten years it has been 
in operation. It is argued that Cell C has been a net receiver of calls rather than a net 
originator of calls because of the profile of its subscribers. The other controversy 
surrounds 8ta. 8ta is a Telkom subsidiary and it is stated as being ironical that 
Telkom now demands an asymmetric rate for its subsidiary whereas it had refused to 
allow asymmetric rates for other operators in the past. It is also believed that 8ta has 
the backing of the monopoly fixed line service provider and therefore this does not 
warrant paying 8ta higher interconnection rates. 
 
142 
 
Barriers to entry for new entrants are compounded by having to pay high 
interconnection rates or by not having a regulatory process that makes provisions for 
asymmetric charges favourable to new entrants. This is now by and large addressed 
in the call termination regulations issued in 2010. There is also a limited period of 
three years whereby this opportunity for new entrants exists. This limited period is 
seen as fair from the point of established operators as inefficient new entrants will 
not get this benefit beyond a „honeymoon‟ period. Asymmetry however was 
contested during the stakeholder engagements, with operators having opposing 
views on whether asymmetry should apply. However an outcome was reached 
whereby operators other than MTN, Vodacom and Telkom could charge higher rates 
within certain boundaries and under certain conditions that have been described 
previously and for a limited period only. This achieved a balance between opposing 
views and seemed to be a fair outcome. 
 
A point made by many of the respondents however is that reducing barriers to entry 
can only be achieved by a combination of regulations that incorporate access to 
efficient spectrum, carrier pre-selection, number portability, local loop unbundling 
and asymmetric rate regulation. Therefore the processes regarding entry into the 
telecommunications sector needs to be more clearly integrated and defined. 
 
The Indian Authority having introduced asymmetric rates in 2003 have also ensured 
that the incumbents get paid an access deficit charge (ADC) in the earlier years. This 
allowed incumbents to continue to rollout services to rural areas. The ADC however 
is slowly being replaced by fund from the Universal Services Obligation (USO) fund. 
 
6.4 Influence by the policy maker in the regulatory processes was largely seen 
as counterproductive 
 
Patricia de Lille, Member of Parliament and leader of the Independent Democrats at 
the time led a charge in Parliament to review interconnection charges. Belief at the 
time was that telecoms cost in South Africa were unacceptable high due to high 
interconnection rates.  The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee led by Ismail Vadi and 
of which Ms de Lille was a member picked up the issue and intervened citing lack of 
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direction at ICASA to deal with the issue as raison d‟etre. This drew protestations 
from Telkom, MTN and Vodacom who insisted that the process as prescribed in the 
ECA should be completed. The process was complicated further by the intervention 
by then Minister Nyanda who called the main operators into a meeting to discuss 
reduction in charges. 
 
The Ministry‟s intervention through the Portfolio Committee (PC) was not seen as 
helpful to the process. The Ministry and the PC were reacting to a major public 
outcry on interconnection charges and the cost of communications in the country. 
The Minister issued a policy directive to ICASA to have call termination rates 
reduced to 50% above cost by the end of November 2009 (Comninos, et al, 2010, p. 
11). However, ICASA still had to follow the process as prescribed by the Act. The 
operators did reduce their charges but this was not based on any regulation that 
could be upheld in law.  
 
With regard to the new call termination rate regulations that were issued the entire 
process was influenced politically especially by then Minister Nyanda who forced the 
operators into reducing their rates despite the process that was required to be 
followed as prescribed in the ECA. Therefore ICASA did the right thing and 
continued with the process to its logical conclusion. If the Ministry had continued, the 
process would have eventually been unenforceable and open to challenge in court. 
Many respondents share the view that interference by government is a major 
stumbling block to success of the telecoms sector in South Africa.  
 
India too has been grappling with state intervention in the telecoms sector. The 
DoT‟s service arm was corporatized in 2000 leaving the policy making section still 
ensconced with the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. 
However it has been difficult for the Ministry to extract themselves completely from 
regulatory decision making and had at one point relieved the entire TRAI members 
from their duties. They have also spent an inordinate time in court challenging some 
of the decision made by TRAI.     
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6.5 The rates prescribed in the new call termination regulations seem to be 
arbitrary in nature 
 
ICASA found that there is inefficient pricing in the wholesale call termination markets 
and thus prescribed pro-competitive price control measures that include cost-
oriented call termination prices (Refer to Table‟s 8 and 9, Chapter 4). The rates are 
prescribed on a glide path reducing to R0.40 for mobile and R0.12 for fixed voice call 
termination. To clear up any misunderstanding the price controls imposed have not 
been done to directly reduce retail pricing but rather to reduce barriers to entry 
thereby allowing new players to enter the market and thus improving competition. It 
is envisaged that in the outcome will be reduced retail pricing (Republic of South 
Africa, 2010c, p. 31). 
 
Although the Authority makes a point that price controls are cost-oriented there is no 
evidence to suggest how regulated rates were derived, other than to express that 
charts of accounts were used. The risks are that rates could be understated or even 
set too high. For rates that are set too low this could have a serious consequence to 
the financial sustainability as interconnection revenue makes up at least 20% of the 
revenue of a mobile operator. This could result in what is called the waterbed effect 
where other component prices increase to compensate for the decrease in 
interconnection revenue. This could also result in reducing investment in 
infrastructure over time. If on the other hand interconnection rates are set too high 
then prices remain inefficient and consumers do not receive the full benefit of 
reduction in retail prices. 
 
When drawing parallels with the India it seems that the Indian process followed to 
arrive at cost oriented interconnection rates was somewhat more structured. 
Whereas market definition was the central process in arriving at a regulated rate in 
South Africa, the Indian process was focused on arriving at a fair interconnection 
usage charge. The theme in the Indian process was “…sound economic basis…” for 
IUC (Republic of India, 2009, p. 54). Jain (2006) confirms that TRAI started with an 
inefficient pricing regime but eventually arrived at a more reasonable interconnection 
pricing regime (Jain, 2006, p. 183). 
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To recap IUC is made up of termination, carriage and origination costs. In summary, 
to arrive at a mobile termination rate (MTR) the Authority used the total relevant 
OPEX of the wireless industry divided by the total number of minutes handled by the 
wireless network in the same period. The Authority used the accounting separation 
reports of the mobile industry and profit and loss statements and made projections 
with regard to Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) an the earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation and amortisation to arrive at the relevant OPEX per user for future 
years. This yielded in the end a MTR of Rs 0.20 per minute (Jain, 2006, p. 59).  
 
In arriving at a fixed termination charge the Authority used the data of the largest 
fixed line provider BSNL to arrive at a fixed termination charge (FTC). The Authority 
took the cost data provided by BSNL, estimated the EBITDA and ARPU and using 
905 minutes of use arrived at an FTC of Rs 0.20 per minute (Jain, 2006, p. 63). 
 
For carriage charges the Authority used a method of calculating return on capital 
employed for the national long distance operators but also took in account the 
difficulties of infrastructure rollout because of remote geographic areas and hilly 
terrain to keep the ceiling at Rs 0.65. Other transit charges for Level-II Trunk 
Automatic Exchange to short distance charging area (SDCA) and intra SDCA and 
TAX were also regulated to Rs 0.15 and less than Rs 0.15 respectively. Lastly 
Origination charges will not be regulated and will be retained by the originating 
company after all other termination charges were paid. 
 
In conclusion the Indian authorities took a more systematic approach in determining 
cost oriented interconnection pricing and most of the regulatory effort was focused 
on this element. In the South African situation most regulatory effort was placed on 
the market analysis processes. The market review process versus the rates that 
were finally issued does not tie up. This probably can be attributed to the fact that the 
Authority's process was paralleled by a political one as the process was 
characterised by interventions of the PPC and the Minister at the time. From a 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) perspective this was possibly non-
compliant but it did yield at outcome that goes towards improving the consumer‟s 
welfare. The ICASA process, long, rigorous and complex as it was, never actually 
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yielded the proper result in terms of cost-based wholesale voice call termination 
rates. 
 
6.6 Pro-competitive measure imposed by ICASA did not consider other bold 
options  
 
ICASA correctly defined Telkom, MTN and Vodacom as having SMP but also that 
they had benefitted previously from more efficient spectrum and from a market share 
of more than 25% for total minutes terminated. The additional competitive remedies 
imposed on these operators were the submission and publication of a reference 
interconnection offer, submission of COA/CAMs and symmetric price controls on 
interconnection rates. However the literature suggests that divestiture should be 
considered for companies that operate in both a horizontal and vertical market. 
Telkom, MTN and Vodacom provide fixed and mobile backbone services 
respectively and also service other horizontal markets such as data services, internet 
access and voice services. There is no evidence to suggest that ICASA investigated 
this option of separating these lines of business so that they work independently of 
each other. Although collusion cannot be ruled out completely, as the literature 
suggested, Directors are governed by the Companies Act and will have to make 
decisions independently. This would have created companies that genuinely 
competed with each other.  Divestiture has been very successful in introducing 
competition as in the AT&T case in the USA. 
 
Wholesale cost imputation is also an additional measure that may have been 
imposed to prevent vertical price squeezing. Although more in the domain of 
competition law, ex-ante measures could have been introduced for incumbents to 
show that vertical price squeezing is not taking place before prices are imposed on 
unregulated interconnection charges e.g. for data access on each other‟s networks. 
 
Finally excluding Cell C from providing COA/CAM information to ICASA in the new 
regulations is seen as departing from the processes promulgated in the ECA. It is 
argued that ICASA followed the process as defined in the ECA to a point but then 
made certain adjustments that could be viewed as being biased. All operators were 
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identified as having SMP and despite the arguments set out by ICASA that Telkom, 
Vodacom and MTN were advantaged earlier, it is argued that COA/CAM from Cell C 
would ensure cost transparency and would prove that Cell C did not deserve an 
asymmetric rate. 
 
6.7   Delays in arriving at new interconnection and call termination regulations 
was caused by a combination of factors 
 
Telecommunication regulation in general was slow to start as the talks during the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) focused on the control of 
broadcasting. Control of broadcasting would allow the various political parties vying 
for power to have access to the South African voting public. Hence 
telecommunication regulation took a back seat until after the democratic government 
came into power.  
 
When the Telecommunication Act was promulgated the main focus was the 
managed liberalization of telecommunications in South Africa. The interconnection 
issues focused primarily on interconnection with Telkom. Telkom had been declared 
a Major Operator (Republic of South Africa, 2005b, p. 8) and any proposed 
interventions by SATRA and ICASA were challenged by Telkom. This contributed to 
the long delays as well. However respondents believe that the long delay from when 
the Telecommunications Act was in force and the promulgation of the Electronic 
Communications Act set interconnection regulation back by a few years. Both ICASA 
and the operators were aware of the ECA being imminent and therefore failed to 
move to finalise on interconnection regulations under the Telecommunications Act 
before the ECA was promulgated. 
 
Other delays mooted by the respondents included the onerousness of the market 
definition process defined in the ECA. Lack of skills at ICASA, poor deployment of 
the skills and lack of continuity of key staff had a negative impact on the 
interconnection processes. The general lethargic nature of the ICASA as an 
institution certainly did not assist matters. 
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Some have argued that if it was not through parliament‟s direct intervention because 
of media pressure, in the regulatory processes the interconnection and call 
termination regulations would have been delayed much further. 
 
6.8 The LRIC model to determine cost of an efficient operator might not be 
suitable for a developing country context 
 
The literature suggests that a marginal cost model needs to be chosen so that costs 
may be determined for an efficient operator. ICASA has not shown any evidence that 
it in fact has used any cost model to determine interconnection charges. A popular 
model to be implemented is the LRIC model. A caution to be considered is that the 
LRIC in its pure form might not be suitable for the South African context.  The LRIC 
model is based on an efficient operator and investments in infrastructure (capital 
cost) is smoothed out over a number of years. However operators are investing 
heavily in infrastructure at the moment to cater for the surge in data usage with the 
adoption of smart phones and they are anxious that they will not be able to recover 
costs if the LRIC model is adopted. The other weakness with the model is that most 
capital for the telecommunications industry is dollar based and operators will not be 
compensated using the LRIC model for any volatility of the rand against the dollar. 
India has implemented its own version of LRIC to cater for some of the inherent 
weaknesses described here. 
 
6.9 Lessons learnt 
 
The ECA‟s competition prescriptions in Chapter 10 are onerous and should be 
amended to ensure that rate regulations are not subject to a market review exercise 
being carried out before rates are prescribed. The market review process could have 
been expedited had ICASA implemented an ex-post approach to some of the 
elements of the market review for example the exercise to determine pro-competitive 
measures. 
 
Interconnection impacts on competition, therefore the regulator needs to recognise 
interconnection regulation as a strategic imperative to drive retail prices down. In the 
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absence of a cost-oriented exercise being carried out popular opinion is that the 
current glide path has still not achieved the aspiration of cost based charges. Some 
respondents believe that the costs should be closer to 25 cents. Therefore there is 
opportunity to further reduce wholesale call termination rates after 2013.  
Furthermore delays in implementing asymmetric rates for especially Cell C has 
resulted in low market share for this company. Although this has been addressed in 
the current regulations the damage caused by inaction has set Cell C back in terms 
of market share. 
 
Some pro-competitive remedies could have been bolder for example divestiture of 
some lines of business within Telkom and possibly MTN and Vodacom could have 
been alternative measures to introduce competition quickly. A caution has been 
raised with LRIC in that on implementation South Africa should consider a hybrid 
form of the model to suit the South African situation. Delays in finalising wholesale 
call termination and interconnection rates is a factor of poor skills at ICASA, dis-
continuity of key staff and poor use of existing skills. Further review of 
interconnection and wholesale call termination will result in further delays if skills at 
ICASA are not addressed. Finally government interference and ownership in the 
telecommunications industry is debilitating and impacts negatively on development 
objectives. 
 
6.10 Summary  
 
South Africa‟s process for interconnection regulation was based on the European 
Union market review approach. India on the other hand addressed the root of the 
problem by identifying interconnection as a strategic issue to reduce retail prices and 
proceeded to engage in an in-depth cost-oriented process for interconnection 
regulation exercise. Rates are regulated at this level.  A number of lessons learnt 
have been identified that will be explored further in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Affordable telecommunication access is a developmental issue and policy and 
regulatory decision making has an impact on how telecommunication is utilised for 
development (Cardilli and Spiller, 1997). The impact of telecoms access is felt in the 
field of agriculture, travel, small business, medicine, security and education but most 
importantly on how developing economies can integrate into the world economies by 
trading their knowledge, research and skills with the rest of the world (Mansell, 
1998). Affordable and accessible telecommunications enables this. However South 
Africa is falling behind the rest of Africa in how telecommunications and information 
technology is utilized for development. One of the main contributory factors is the 
high costs of communications as reported in the Genesis Analytics Study of 2005 
(Genesis Analytics, 2005, p. 1). Efficient and effective policy and regulatory 
processes therefore are key to realising developmental goals (Cardilli and Spiller, 
1997). 
 
This paper set out to analyse processes for interconnection as interconnection is 
identified as one of the contributory factors for high costs in South Africa as 
articulated by inter alia the previous Minister of Communications, General (Ret) 
Siphiwe Nyanda. The paper also undertook to draw some lessons from a jurisdiction 
that has some of the lowest telecoms costs in the world.  
 
7.1 Final conclusions 
 
South African Respondents concurred that the ECA promulgated a complex and 
onerous process. However Respondents agreed that the process needed to be 
followed as per the ECA or ICASA would have faced legal challenges from the 
telecoms operators. The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) could have 
been used to declare the process as procedurally unfair. Respondents therefore 
concur that the intervention by the Minister of Communications could have given 
cause to declare the process procedurally unfair in terms of PAJA.  
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Some Respondents were more vocal and suggested that government almost 
scuppered the process by intervening in a heavy handed way which covertly earned 
the ire of the regulator and the major operators. This had the makings of a court 
challenge had government preserved with the high handed approach to impose 
wholesale call termination rates outside legislation and the regulatory processes. 
This according to some Respondents would have set the process back a further few 
years.  
 
However an opposing view from some Respondents suggests that the intervention 
by the Minister expedited the regulatory process by firmly placing interconnection 
rate regulation on the national agenda at the highest level possible. This gave 
impetus to ICASA and Operators to find an amicable solution. They question 
whether ICASA would have been catalysed into eventual action had government not 
intervened in the process. 
 
The literature points to cost based interconnection rates. The ITU Study group 
suggests that interconnection rates should be based on underlying costs (ITU-D 
study group 1, 2004). This is supported by the World Trade Organisation‟s (WTO) 
1997 Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services. Respondents pointed out 
that they could not reconcile the new rates that were issued to any costing exercise 
carried out by ICASA. The Indian Authority on the hand, as has been shown, based 
Interconnection Usage Charges on a cost based exercise by benchmarking costs of 
the incumbent operator amongst others. This had the effect of dramatically reducing 
retail prices. 
 
The conceptual framework (Fig 3) that was developed set out the processes to be 
analysed by examination of how legislation enables interconnection rate regulation, 
how market definition was concluded using appropriate economic models, 
assessment of the market for competitiveness using Porters five factors and how 
anti-trust and competition models were used to impose anti-competitive measures. 
The research questions were developed to unravel the processes for interconnection 
regulation (chapter 3) and in summary sought to document the processes for 
interconnection regulation followed in South Africa and to investigate its strengths 
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and weaknesses. Parallels were drawn with similar processes engaged in by Indian 
Authorities. 
 
The conclusions drawn from interviews with Respondents was that the eventual 
processes followed by ICASA were thorough and had the support of the Operators 
because of the meticulous way that ICASA conducted the process in line with the 
ECA. However the view held by some Respondents is that the process yielded very 
arbitrary wholesale call termination rates as there was no evidence of a cost based 
exercise being performed and therefore seemed to defeat the purpose of this long 
and complex exercise. Although opinion prevailed from respected Senior Council 
that it was not necessary to conduct a further market definition exercise, had ICASA 
not done that, Respondents held the view that the process would have been 
challenged in court resulting in further delays. So ICASA acted correctly in following 
the process defined in the ECA to the letter.  
 
There are criticisms from some of the Respondents that suggest that the process 
could have been made more efficient by allowing some of the market review 
processes to be conducted ex-post. They believe that the European process on 
which the South African process is based did not mean that a Market Review 
process needed to be conducted before rates were to be issued. The view is that the 
review could have been done in parallel or after rates were issued. 
 
There are some opposing views on acceptance of how asymmetry is imposed in the 
regulations. Respondents that are not supportive of asymmetrical rates for Cell C 
and Telkom nevertheless are prepared to support the process because of the glide 
path that eventually levels the playing fields. 
 
In drawing parallels with India it was noted from the interview with Indian 
Respondents that India did not engage in long drawn out market definition processes 
but cut to the core of the problem by investigating the actual and projected call costs 
by breaking down interconnection usage charges into origination, carriage and 
termination rates. Regulation of rates takes place at this level. The process itself was 
marred by the DoT and its corporatised entity BSNL taking TRAI to court on 
numerous occasions but TRAI persevered and eventually gained reluctant support 
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from government. This has resulted in India‟s mobile call termination rates being 
equivalent to just over three South Africa cents using the current exchange rate (3rd 
Nov 2011). South Africa‟s mobile termination rate by comparison is currently fifty 
cents (2011). 
 
India engages in reviewing this determination regularly and is not disinclined to 
increasing rates if necessary.  
 
7.2   Lessons learnt and recommendations 
 
A number of lessons were learnt and are summarised from the interviews conducted 
and documents analysed. Recommendations that emanated from interviews and the 
document review are captured as well.  
 
Amendments to the ECA need to be promulgated 
Respondents suggested that the ECA‟s competition prescriptions in Chapter 10 of 
the ECA are onerous and should be amended to ensure that rate regulations are not 
subject to a market review exercise being carried out before rates are prescribed. An 
ex-post process will speed up the processes in the future. The ECA calls for another 
review of market determinations before pro-competitive measures are changed. This 
means then that consumers will be subjected to a further long drawn out process 
before rates are adjusted to get to close to underlying costs. Experts believe that 
rates should be closer to 25 cents (ZAR). Respondents cautioned that an 
amendment to the ECA will be appropriate and should ensure that any new rate to 
be regulated will not be subject to another market review before rates are adjusted 
but rather that rates are adjusted subject to a benchmark exercise as was achieved 
in India. 
 
Interconnection must be treated as one of the strategic pillars for cost 
reduction 
Some Respondents agreed that ICASA should treat interconnection as a strategic 
pillar to reduce retail rates. To achieve this it has to issue draft regulations to be 
implemented in 2013 to reduce rates to get closer to underlying costs. Respondents 
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alerted the Researcher to ICASA‟s institutional inertia and warned that the exercise 
will not be conducted in a timely fashion and will once again be a stumbling block, 
preventing consumers from improving their wellbeing. The regulator therefore needs 
to recognise that interconnection regulation is a strategic imperative to drive retail 
prices down. In the absence of a cost-oriented exercise being carried out opinion 
from Respondents is that the current glide path has still not achieved the aspiration 
of cost based charges. As stated some Respondents believe that the costs should 
be closer to 25 cents. Therefore there is opportunity to further reduce wholesale call 
termination rates after 2013.   
 
An opposing view however held by at least one Respondent is that ICASA needs to 
make its intention very clear that it wants to reduce retail rates. It is the Respondents 
view that ICASA has not done this. This then will give Operators an opportunity to 
work with ICASA to look for alternatives to meet this objective. Some Respondents 
believe that reducing interconnection rates, due to the waterbed effect, as has been 
explained will not achieve a reduction in retail rates. 
 
An asymmetric rate is not sufficient to assist new entrants 
View from respondents is that asymmetric rates should be complemented by 
regulations ensuring successful number portability implementation, local loop 
unbundling, access to efficient spectrum and carrier pre-selection so that new 
licensees get the benefit of easy entry into the sector. Although this has been 
addressed in the current regulations, some Respondents believe that the damage 
caused by this inaction has set Cell C back in terms of market share. 
 
Pro-competitive measures needed to be bolder 
A conclusion drawn from the literature suggests that some pro-competitive remedies 
could have been bolder; for example divestiture of some lines of business within the 
incumbents e.g. Telkom, MTN and Vodacom could have been alternative measures 
to introducing competition more rapidly. Telkom in particular is the monopoly 
backbone services provider to the sector. However it is also a service provider in 
downstream markets e.g. internet service provision. Even though a court ruling, 
favouring Altech Autopage has allowed other operators to self-provide they will have 
to obtain network services from Telkom because of high capital costs to roll-out 
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infrastructure of their own.  It is opportune that with the market review exercise that 
was conducted that ICASA together with the Competition Commission put plans into 
place to functionally separate Telkom‟s wires business from other services. This 
could mean that the licensing regime would have to be re-examined. 
 
Institutional problems at ICASA have impacted on developmental goals  
Some Respondents were adamant that delays in finalising wholesale call termination 
and interconnection rates is a factor of poor skills at ICASA, dis-continuity of key staff 
and poor use of existing skills. Respondents expressed an anxiety that any further 
review of interconnection and wholesale call termination will result in further delays if 
skills problems at ICASA are not addressed. The literature shows that delays in 
issuing regulations have impacted negatively on developmental goals such as 
aspirations for South Africa to enter the call centre market, like India has done.  At 
least one Respondent suggested that past acrimony between the CEO of ICASA and 
the Chairperson of the Council due to role clarity contributed to delays in the issuing 
of key regulations. Skills according to a head of regulation at a large operator are not 
deployed optimally. In some instances institutional skills are lacking to interpret 
COA/CAM data. The other problem that ICASA faces is that they are not able to 
retain skills for a sustained period to conclude on finalising key regulations. The 
Researcher in fact found that most of the Respondents were erstwhile ICASA 
employees/councillors having occupied key positions at ICASA previously. ICASA 
will have to improve working conditions to enable retention of key staff. Furthermore 
as one Respondent pointed out ICASA has a budget of R280 million to regulate an 
industry with a turnover of R100 Billion. “They are hopelessly underfunded and 
cannot retain or hire the staff required for the complex task at hand” (Vella, 2011, 
p.58). 
 
Respondents agree that since the ECA requires regular review of market dynamics, 
it is opportune that ICASA resolves skills issues immediately.  
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The interconnection rates prescribed in the new regulations has not yielded 
the correct result 
Some Respondents were annoyed that there seemed not to have been as thorough 
a costing exercise to get to the rates as specified in the glide path rates that have 
been prescribed.  The rates seem to be arbitrary in nature. The market review 
process and the rates that were finally issued do not correlate. This according to 
some Respondents can be attributed to the fact that the Authority's process was 
paralleled by a political one as the process was characterised by interventions of the 
PPC and the Minister at the time. From a Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
(PAJA) perspective this was possibly non-compliant but it did produce an outcome 
that goes towards improving the consumer‟s welfare. The ICASA process, arduous, 
rigorous and complex as it was, never actually yielded the proper call termination 
rate result based on cost based charges. 
 
Intervention by the policy maker in regulatory processes was 
counterproductive 
From the interviews conducted with Respondents there is little doubt that the focus 
on interconnection rates by the media, the PPC and Ms De Lille in particular 
galvanised ICASA into finally concluding on interconnection and wholesale voice call 
termination regulations. However some held the view that the intervention by 
General (Ret) Siphiwe Nyanda had the potential of setting the process back a few 
years. Had the Minister continued with the heavy handed approach it was inevitable 
that the regulations would have been challenged using the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act citing lack of compliance to due process.  
 
However one can understand the actions of the Ministry as they were “frustrated by 
the lack of progress between the operators and ICASA” (Comninos, et al, 2010, p. 
11). However this intervention by government also did not do justice to the new rates 
that were prescribed. The rates that were prescribed did not seem to be based on 
any rigorous costing exercise being conducted. The full value therefore has not been 
extracted and rates are a fair distance away from the rate of 25 cents that has been 
estimated as the true cost of interconnection in South Africa. 
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Table 13 : Summary of Research Questions and Conclusions drawn 
No Research Question Conclusions drawn 
1. To what extent does the approach to 
regulating interconnection rates adopted by 
the South African Regulator present a 
favourable outcome with reference to the 
approach adopted by the Indian Regulator?  
The approach taken by the SA authorities 
yielded arbitrary interconnection rates. The 
Indian process however achieved cost based 
rates that were used to drive retail costs 
down. The SA process was also overtaken 
by a politically driven process that 
overshadowed the ICASA driven process. 
The market review process could have been 
a combination of ex-ante and ex-post rather 
than ex-ante only. 
1.1 To what extent has the approach to market 
definition promoted an effective regulatory 
process? 
The process was onerous but needed to be 
conducted as per the ECA. This revealed a 
weakness in the ECA that did not clearly 
define an ex-ante or ex-post process. 
Literature points to a balance between the 
two. 
1.2 To what extent has the review of the 
effectiveness of competition provided a 
valuable component of the regulatory 
process? 
The process revealed that all operators are 
dominant in the call termination market. 
However the process itself was long drawn 
out and could have been conducted in 
parallel with a cost based exercise 
1.3 How does the determination of pro-
competitive remedies strengthen the 
regulatory process? 
Pro-competitive measures could have been 
bolder and could have included divestiture of 
certain lines of subsidiary businesses of 
incumbents    
1.4 How does the process for determining 
interconnection rates strengthen the 
process? 
Processes have gaps in them. The ECA 
unnecessarily bogs down the process 
because of a requirement for an ex-ante 
market review process  
1.5 What lessons can be learnt from the 
approach to interconnection regulation 
adopted in India? 
The process should be cost based. Conduct 
benchmarks of costs and determine rates. 
Adjust rates as information becomes more 
concrete. 
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7.3 Key Recommendations 
 
The literature strongly points to cost based interconnection rates. This is 
corroborated by views held by Respondents. Therefore a cost based exercise for 
interconnection needs to be performed urgently along the lines of that which was 
accomplished by India authorities. As in the Indian case the costing exercise should 
use the costs of Telkom for fixed and MTN and Vodacom for mobile costs to develop 
some benchmarks that will be close to actual costs that are incurred. The Indian 
Authorities used publicly available information for listed companies to estimate actual 
minutes terminated and estimated costs accordingly.  
 
This exercise needs to be completed before 2013 before the glide path rolls itself 
out. However three key issues have been identified from the interviews conducted 
with the Respondents as critical success factors.  
 
The first is that amendments need to be made to the ECA to make the 
interconnection processes less onerous particularly with the market review process. 
The market review process should give way to a pure interconnection cost 
determination exercise to determine actual interconnection usage charges. 
Interconnection rates should be based on these costs. 
 
Secondly the institutional problems at ICASA need to be resolved. Attraction and 
retention of key regulatory, financial, technical and legal skills should be developed 
and exchange programs for employees should be developed with TRAI. The Ministry 
should intervene by ensuring a representative budget for ICASA to enable it to obtain 
the skills and the capacity necessary to regulate a R100 billion industry.  
 
Thirdly divestiture of lines of business within Telkom, MTN and Vodacom will 
accelerate competition in the South African telecommunications sector and will 
enable developmental goals as articulated in the White Paper of 1998 to be met. 
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7.4 Limitations of this study and opportunities for further study 
This study focussed on the efficacy of the processes for interconnection rate 
regulation in the Republic of South Africa. Perspectives were drawn from similar 
process in India. However Respondents questioned whether reducing 
interconnection rates would in fact have the effect of reducing retail rates in the long 
run. Respondents drew the Researchers attention to the waterbed effect amongst 
others. An opportunity therefore exists to research whether indeed the new 
Interconnection and Call Termination regulations issued in 2010 have the effect of 
reducing retail rates in the long run. 
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APPENDIX 1 QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
The discussion with the South African Key Informant translated into a set of 
questions that were developed to inform the further discussions with experts in 
ICASA, government, operators and with consultants in the telecommunications 
sector. The introduction of the research topic to the participants and the set of 
questions developed are set out below: 
 
 Dear Sir/Madam, 
My name is Sagie Chetty and I‟m a student at the Graduate School of Public and 
Development Management at the University of the Witwatersrand (student number 
0617514V). My research topic is “Analysing processes for regulating interconnection 
rates in India and South Africa.”  My supervisor is Luci Abrahams, LINK Centre at 
Wits. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. 
 
Interconnection is a very topical issue in our country and high costs of telecoms calls 
have often been attributed to high interconnection rates. William Melody is quoted as 
saying that „Interconnection is the cornerstone of competition”. Keith Weeks and 
Steve Esselaar in a paper on „the case for the regulation of call termination in SA…‟ 
quote a “famous saying in the industry: telecoms is about three things, 
interconnection, interconnection, interconnection”. 
 
My research paper thus focuses on the processes for interconnection rate regulation 
in SA. Parallels will be drawn with similar processes in India and whether there are 
any lessons to be learnt will be investigated. India‟s call costs are arguably the 
cheapest in the world. 
 
South African regulatory processes including that for interconnection regulation have 
been defined in the ECA and the ICASA Act. In summary the processes require that 
the Authority (ICASA), before prescribing regulations: 
1.1 define the markets or market segments, 
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2.1 assess the level of competition in that market after defining the methodology 
to be used, 
3.1 establish pro-competitive tools to improve competitiveness, 
4.1 has a system of reviewing whether the competitive environment changes and 
taking appropriate action to ensure alignment. 
 
The questions that follow are in the context as described above. Comments are not 
expected on the rates that ICASA have prescribed in the final Call Termination 
Regulations issued in 2010 and respondents can be described as Respondent X, Y, 
Z if necessary. 
 
Question1:  Can you please describe, from your own perspective, the regulatory 
process that ICASA followed with respect to interconnection from about the year 
2005 leading finally to the gazetting of Interconnection Regulations and Call 
Termination Rate Regulations in 2010. 
 
Question 2: In hindsight, what were the strengths and weaknesses of the processes 
that were followed? Please comment on strengths and weaknesses with respect to: 
 
(a) definition of the market 
(b) assessment of the level of competition 
(c) establishing pro-competitive tools 
(d) review of the competitive environment 
(e) taking appropriate action to promote competitiveness with respect to 
interconnection 
(f) the regulatory process in general 
 
Question 3:  Do you think that ICASA has a strategic view on interconnection rates, 
for example, was interconnection rates targeted as a means to get call costs down. 
Please give us your insights. 
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Question 4: Why do you think it has taken such a long time to finally regulate 
interconnection or call termination rates ie 16 years from 1994 to 2010, what were 
the hold-ups and what do you think did not work for ICASA?  
 
Question 5: How did the operators participate in the process of getting to the final 
rates and how did ICASA respond to this? 
 
Question 6: How did the policy-maker participate in the process of getting to the final 
rates and how did ICASA respond to this? 
 
Question 7: Are there any changes to the regulatory processes themselves that you 
would propose? 
 
Question 8: Are there any improvements that you would like to see to the current 
ECA as amended so that regulatory processes may be improved? 
 
Question 9: Can you please explain why telecoms regulation was slow to start as 
opposed to broadcasting regulation in democratic South Africa? 
 
 
The discussion with the Indian Key Informant translated into a set of questions that 
were developed to inform the further discussions with experts in TRAI and other 
Institutions in India 
 
 
Masters Research Questionnaire India 
(Qualitative – semi-structured interviews + examination of documents policies, 
regulations, gazettes,) 
DATE OF INTERVIEW:  
1. Name of respondent: 
2. email address: 
3. Position: 
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4. Do you think that the Indian telecommunications‟ industry (mobile, fixed, 
internet, broadband) is a competitive industry? 
5. Why do you think so? 
6. What are the main institutions that have an influence in the 
telecommunications sector 
at national level? 
at provincial level? 
7. Who are the main/big operators? 
8. Are the operators/companies powerful and do you think that they engage in 
strategic behaviour to profiteer? (are the operators always fighting battles in the 
courts – do the courts/competition commission have to intervene to sort out issues) 
9. Do you agree that Indian telecommunications prices are about the lowest in 
the world? 
10. Why do you think this is so? 
11. Do the authorities have any influence in keeping prices low? 
12. In your opinion is interconnection a strategic issue here in India (is it spoken 
about / is it in the newspapers or media as an important issue) 
13.  What is your opinion on what processes were engaged in to reduce 
interconnection rates to the low levels that they are in India? 
 
